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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CRITIQUE OF VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF THE RELATION BETWEEN 
POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN SOME MODERN POLITICAL THEORIES  
 
Altunok, Gülbanu 
Ph. D. Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. James Alexander 
2012 
 
 
 
This thesis aims at understanding the relationship between violence and politics 
in twentieth century political thought. To this end, the study looks at the works 
of selected thinkers and suggests a threefold categorization of existing 
approaches: a ‘non-problematization of the relationship between violence and 
politics’ exemplified in the liberal-democratic paradigm, a ‘non-
problematization of violence in politics’ in some critiques of liberal thought and 
the position of ambivalence, which suggests a historical relationship between 
violence and politics. The thesis moves to a further analysis of Hannah Arendt 
and Michel Foucault, whose works are considered as representing the third 
position and discuss their analysis of the relationship between violence and 
politics with a focus on power and revolution.  
 
Keywords: Violence, Political, Politics, Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, 
Revolution, Power  
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ÖZET 
 
 
ŞİDDETİN ELEŞTİRİSİ:  
MODERN SİYASAL DÜŞÜNCEDE ŞİDDET VE SİYASET İLİŞKİSİ 
ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA 
 
Altunok, Gülbanu 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü  
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç Dr. James Alexander 
2012 
 
 
 
Bu çalışma, yirminci yüzyıl siyasal düşüncesinde şiddet ve siyaset arasındaki 
ilişkiyi anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu nedenle çalışma seçilmiş düşünürlerin 
eserlerine bakıp üçlü bir kategorizasyon önermektedir. Şiddet ve siyaset 
arasında olası bir ilişkiyi sorunsallaştırmayan ilk paradigma ve şiddetin 
siyasetteki yerini sorgulamayan ikinci paradigmanın ve şiddet ve siyaset 
arasında tarihsel bir ilişkinin olduğunu iddia eden üçüncü yaklaşım. Çalışma, 
belirsiz (göreli) tutum olarak adlandırılan üçüncü yaklaşım içinde ele alınacak 
ilk iki yaklaşımla belirli bir mesafesi olan Hannah Arendt ve Michel 
Foucault’nun siyaset, iktidar ve devrim düşüncelerinde şiddetin ne şekilde yer 
bulduğunu anlamaya çalışacaktır.  
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Şiddet, Siyasal, Siyaset, Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, 
Devrim, İktidar          
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PART I 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF THE RELATION 
BETWEEN POLITICS AND VIOLENCE 
 
 
  
 World history has shown itself the history of violence, if we consider the 
number of wars, civil wars, mass killings and many other forms of cruelties 
(Keane, 1996; 2004, Buffachi, 2005, Ferguson, 2006). Although we could claim 
that civility obviates violent practices and violent relations by pointing out the 
declension of cruelty for entertainment, human sacrifice for superstitious 
beliefs, slavery for labor or torture and mutilation for punishment (Elias, 1939, 
Foucault, 1979, Pinker, 2011 and Muchembled, 2011
1
), the magnitude of 
violent events, new technologies of destruction, and number of the victims of 
violence in the last century challenge these propositions (Wolin, 1963: 20). 
                                               
1
 Elias’s famous sociological analysis, the “civilizing process” suggests the taming of violent 
practices by modern cultural norms and structures. Muchembled (2011), like Elias, argues 
invented systems of controls (the deployment of sanctions by civic and state authorities and a 
parallel rise of discourse and norm of non-violence) over male aggression engendered the 
decline of violence. For Steven Pinker (2011) the decline of violence is due to an increased 
human ability to reason. Foucault’s historical analysis on the transformation of violence into 
disciplinary forms includes the discussion of rationality, however in a different tone. His 
argument will be presented in detail in the coming chapters.  
2 
 
During the twentieth century two world wars, numerous civil wars, 
concentration camps took place. Then there were Nagasaki and Hiroshima, 
Algeria and Bosnia. For this reason, some theorists call it as “the long century 
of violence” (Keane, 1996: 2; 2002: 32) some as the “age of extremes” since 
“more human beings had been killed or allowed to die by human decision than 
ever before in human history” (Hobsbawm, 1994: 12) 
 Apart from the question, which asks, whether violence has declined 
throughout the ages or not, violence also emerges to be a predicament of our 
era, because in this age we start to problematize the phenomenon. It is in this 
age we have come to consider violence as a malady, look for its causes and 
think about the ways of preventing it. Sheldon Wolin (1963) argues this is due 
to a curious fact of the modern world. In many contemporary western societies, 
where political and social institutions have effectively restricted the private and 
public forms of violence, “our capacity for enduring violence has diminished” 
while “the intensity of violence in certain instances has increased” (Wolin, 
1963: 21, emphasis original). As exemplified in the terrorist activities and wars 
of this age, a greater scale of violence is needed to breach the protective walls of 
modern socio-political orders. The violence of modern times, when employed, 
engenders an intensified level of fear on the part of the individuals for the 
relative elimination of violence in daily lives contributes to its unexpectedness.
2
 
Hence, a growing interest in the phenomenon of violence.  
A quick literature review reveals that there are numerous empirically 
grounded studies on the topic of violence and human aggression. There are 
                                               
2 Wolin (1963:23) even argues that it is this unexpectedness of systematic violence that gave 
way to the population’s perplexity and bewilderment under the rule of totalitarian regimes.  
3 
 
studies that explore the causes and the dynamics of civil unrest in different 
contexts: youth violence, violence against women, violence against minorities; 
many works focus on terrorism in different contexts, civil wars, military 
conflicts and so forth. Nonetheless, research into the definition and theorization 
of the concept violence is limited (Keane, 1996: 6).
3
 “Political theorists have 
rarely reflected on violence as such,” writes Arendt (1969). This might be 
because political theory usually deals with rights, equality, liberty, justice: that 
is, as normative ideals, rather than with apparent facts like violence. This is also 
due to the fact that the concept of violence is inherently ambiguous and its 
relation with politics is complex and multifaceted.  
In mainstream political debates, violence is generally conceived as the 
illegitimate or unauthorized use of force. Within this perspective, Wolff (1969: 
606) writes, “thence, murder is defined as an act of violence, but capital 
punishment by a legitimate state is not”. This definition suggests a distinction 
between force and violence even though both terms do imply a physical act with 
an impact of intervention or prevention. It is evident that in the evaluation of the 
former a neutral or affirming attitude is present. Force implies an authorized or 
natural action. The term violence, on the other hand has a normative dimension 
when we consider its affinity with violation. In politics, furthermore violence is 
considered within the framework of concepts like legitimacy, authority and 
legality. Such a conception, however, has given way to further confusions and 
controversies in modern political theory. A genuine distinction between violent 
                                               
3 Some attempts of philosophical reflection were evident during the sixties and seventies against 
the background of civil rights movement and the Vietnam War and I will refer to them 
whenever it is needed. A philosophical-political interest has revived in the last decade to reflect 
on the implications of the terrorist attacks of September 11 and of the U.S.’s “war on terror” (for 
instance, Agamben, Zizek). These reflections, however, do not deal with the issue of violence as 
such or present an analysis on its relation with politics. 
4 
 
and nonviolent political action does not seem to be possible in terms of legality 
since legality itself may fall short of justification at times. For Wolff, for 
example, no political authority is legitimate (1969: 608): “it is mere superstition 
to describe a policeman’s beating of a helpless suspect as ‘an excessive use of 
force’ while characterizing an attack by a crowd on the policeman as ‘a resort to 
violence’” (Wolff, 1969: 609). Similarly, upon observing the detention practices 
of the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (that avoids the application of 
the terms of the 1949 Geneva Convention
4
 with the discourse expressed by 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld classifying Guantanamo inmates as 
“battlefield detainees,” rather than “prisoners of war”), in 2002 Judith Butler 
(2002a) wrote  
Just as a distinction is drawn between legitimate violence and 
illegitimate violence according to whether the combatants are 
affiliated with states, various forms of political violence are now 
commonly called “terrorism,” not because there are distinguishable 
valences of violence, but as a way of delegitimizing violence waged 
by, or in the name of, authorities deemed illegitimate by established 
states or, indeed, those that threaten the hegemony of the nation-
state itself.  
 
Another rather recent tendency we see in the literature, which 
contributes to a further confusion, is the broadening of the range of the concept 
of violence. Accordingly, psychological, verbal or even symbolic acts that 
transgress a limit, violate a right or cause an unequal relationship, or give way 
to a form of discrimination are called violence. Therefore, we do come across 
concepts such as symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977), linguistic 
                                               
4 The Geneva Convention is an international convention initially signed after the Second World 
War in 1949 and established the standards of international law for the humanitarian treatment of 
the victims of war. 
5 
 
violence, normative violence (Chambers, 2007
5
), epistemic violence, or cultural 
violence (Galtung, 1969; 1990) in the literature. According to Johann Galtung 
(1969: 168) for instance, violence is the cause of a difference between the 
potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is. 
Considering developments in technological and medical areas, a person’s death 
from tuberculosis (which was a common and may be normal incident in 
eighteenth century) in this age is violence for Galtung (1969). He, therefore, 
introduces a distinction between direct violence and structural violence. 
Accordingly, while direct (also called as ‘personal violence’) violence is 
defined as a physical and personal force, which involves an immediate 
relationship between the perpetrator and the recipient of violence, structural 
violence is built into the socio-political and economic system and is disguised in 
the unequal distribution of power, income, education or opportunities. Thus for 
Galtung (1969: 171) “when one husband beats his wife there is a clear case of 
personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in 
ignorance there is structural violence.” 
From this perspective, one may suggest a link between structural and 
personal violence and argue that the direct (or personal violence) derives from 
structural violence. The riots that have put France into unrest in 2005, in that 
sense, can be linked with structural inequalities or socio-political exclusions 
experienced by the young (particularly those with Muslim or African origin). 
Drawing on Galtung’s approach one can also suggest that there is not much 
difference between direct and structural violence in terms of their negative 
                                               
5 Drawing on Butler and Derrida, Chambers argues that the idea of normative violence signifies 
violence that precedes everyday violence and makes it invisible, illegible, non-existent.  
6 
 
value. Derrienic (1972) suggests that if in a given country a number of people 
dies every day due to the lack of access to health services, then this incident is 
equivalent to the killings caused by a terrorist organization in the country in 
terms of its result (Derrienic, 1972). For this reason, defining violence in more 
encompassing terms, as Galtung (1969) suggests, offers a broader perspective 
on the analysis of the issue.
 6
 It also enables one to draw attention to structures 
and mechanisms of inequality that have the same deteriorating effects violence 
has. It also increases our awareness on issues that are not readily visible but 
loom in the background of the apparent. 
It is possible to argue however, by labeling any act, idea or form of 
relationship that produce unintended or undesired results such as negligence, 
verbal threat or command as violence we might lose the particularity of the 
phenomenon. What is violence then? Can we categorize any act with unwanted 
results as violence? Any form of relationship that produces inequality? What 
makes it different from discrimination or manipulation? 
These are questions that cannot be answered easily. Yet for descriptive 
and normative purposes for analyses, delimiting the concept of violence 
becomes a necessary task.  
In their attempt of marking off their subject of reflection, scholars (see 
for instance Buffachi, 2005:194; Wolin, 1963) generally start with the 
                                               
6 This definition aims to delineate the contours of the concept of peace; Galtung argues that the 
peace can be defined as “the absence of violence” rather than the absence of war. With the aim 
of separating peace theory from conflict studies and relating it to the theories of development, 
he rejects the narrow conception that views violence as a corporeal impairment (and killing in 
the extreme form) in the hands of an actor with an intention of harm. His analysis of violence 
focuses on six dimensions of violence. It can be physical or psychological; can use negative or 
positive means of influence; might have an object or not; can have a subject or not (personal vs. 
structural); might be intentional or not; might be manifest or latent (Galtung, 1969). While 
violence is treated as a phenomenon having two major sides, personal and structural, peace 
denotes a twofold condition: absence of both direct and structural violence.  
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etymological analysis, which is based on the Latin root of the term violentia, 
suggests vehemence, a passionate and uncontrolled force.
 
The notion of force 
primarily denotes physical energy, which is approved or demanded at times. 
Violence, in this sense denotes an excess—an excessive force, an undesired 
situation that exceeds its limits. From a pragmatist perspective for instance, 
John Dewey (1916) argues violence is the destructive but more importantly is 
the wasteful use of force; it is objected because of this feature. 
Other underlined characteristics of violence are its imposition by an 
external source, its suddenness and radicality of its impacts (MacCallum, 
2009:117-119). For Sheldon Wolin (1963) one needs to understand violence as 
an intensified, unexpected and unpredictable form of power, which in the end 
gives way to an unusual destruction in order to address its political significance. 
As pointed out, force is a dispositional concept; it refers to an ability or 
potentiality. Violence, on the other hand, is something “always done, and it is 
always done to something, typically a person, animal or piece of property” 
(Audi, 1971: 50 in Buffachi, 2005: 196). Violence differs from force by having 
a ‘subject’ and ‘intention’ (Keane, 2004) of the act and the result/impact of 
‘violation’. 
John Keane marks the relational aspect of violence in the sense that with 
the exercise of violence the victim of violence is regarded not as “a subject 
whose ‘otherness’ is recognized and respected, but rather” treated “as a mere 
object potentially worthy of bodily harm, or even annihilation” (Keane, 2004: 
36). It is marked with its negation of the other’s existence and its will of 
annihilation.  
8 
 
It is also important to note that violence is ‘embodied’. It “directly 
touches the body of its victim even when (as in the deliberate poisoning or 
gassing or irradiating or besieging of others) it takes time to make its mark” 
(Keane, 2004: 36).  
Therefore, as an ‘ideal-type’, violence can be defined as the intentional 
employment of physical force by a subject that violates bodies, souls, rights etc. 
of some other subjects.  
As the definition suggests, the specific and normative dimension of 
violence derives from the idea of ‘violation’, which means to infringe, or 
transgress or destroy a norm, a limit, or boundary. We can only answer the 
question “What constitutes violence?” once we have negotiated the norm, limit 
or the boundary of the object in question. The limit is set when we talk about 
rights, values, or about integrity and dignity in human affairs, and when we 
decide upon what constitutes an assault to these rights, values and integrities. 
We can then start talking about violence, about the possibility of its justification 
or of means of reparation.  
To sum up, it is possible to talk about three uses of the concept of 
violence in the literature, which is called by some as the ‘central’, ‘extended’ 
and ‘peripheral’ use of the term. There is the narrower (but more familiar) view, 
which relates violence to the excessive use of force (for instance Audi, 1971 or 
Keane, 2004)
7
. There is the extended version that offers a broader view, which 
relates violence to violation (for instance MacCallum, 1993), and finally we do 
                                               
7 Buffachi (2005) calls this approach as the “minimalist conception of violence (MCV)” which 
is analytical, advisable to strive for precise, tight definitions of key concepts. For him, however 
MCV misses out too many other important dimensions of the phenomenon of violence by 
restricting acts of violence to intentional, direct, physical acts against other persons, such as 
highly vigorous psychological abuse. 
9 
 
have the metaphorical, hence peripheral use of the concept (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1977).  
In this study, my intention is not to take up the matter of assessing the 
best definition. Upon presenting the ambiguity of the concept as a subject of 
theoretical reflection and noting that there is not one set of criteria for 
delimiting the matter, I would like to assert that my treatment of violence will 
combine both the ideas of force and violation but it will not extend the use of 
the term to cover the whole range of possible uses. So, I exclude, for instance, 
violence as distortion (“do violence to a text”), and violence as psychological 
harm (“do violence to the dignity of someone”). Therefore, I will use the term 
violence to refer to the employment of physical force by a subject (individual, 
collectivity, institution etc.) that violates that subject, some other subjects or to 
some extent, other objects as well. 
In doing this, I do not imply that violation of certain rights, limitation of 
personal autonomy and manipulation are acts that are less harmful than overt 
forms of violence. I do think that defining violence in broader terms has a 
particular value in terms of its success in challenging traditional ways of 
thinking on violence that somehow obscure our cognition about the operation of 
hidden mechanisms of oppression. As suggested before, I do think, however, a 
restriction in the use of the term violence is needed for analytical and 
descriptive purposes. In many instances, (I have mentioned above) where 
violations of rights take place or inequalities and injustices are caused by socio-
economic or political mechanisms and dynamics, it is possible to employ terms 
that specifically address these issues. For instance, as Galtung (1969) himself 
notes, the term “structural violence” describes the conditions of what has been 
10 
 
called as ‘social injustice’. For this reason, having appreciated its provocative 
potential, I would like to refrain from using the concept of violence in instances 
where other terms are available.  
Apart from the broader use of the term for provocative purposes, I do 
value naming certain practices (such as ‘psychological abuse’) as violence as an 
effective strategy where such ‘naming’ has material implications. Naming 
husbands’ battering of their wives as ‘domestic violence’ is an example of this. 
In accord with the demands of the feminist movement and the development of 
women’s human rights discourse, we see that there is an increased awareness of 
violence against women. With such developments, the women’s movement 
succeeded in the integration of the term ‘domestic violence’ into legal 
frameworks. Violence in the domestic sphere has come to be considered as a 
crime and a policy issue today in many countries. Such recognition, in my 
opinion, is important for the adoption of preventive and rehabilitative measures 
and regulations, and for the imposition of sanctions on perpetrators by legal 
authorities. Raising the issue as a structural problem is also crucial for 
considering alternative ways to deal with it with a broader perspective.  
Having noted the preference for a limited definition (with reservations 
and exceptions), I would like to also note that the concern of this study is 
political violence. Thus, I will not deal, for instance, with psychological studies 
on the causes of human aggression or with sociological works that query the 
issue of youth violence. With the insertion of the term ‘political’ in front of 
violence, however, I do not intend to bring clarity to the issue nor do I think I 
will be able to do that. This is due to the fact that as the concept of violence is 
ambiguous so is the ‘political’. The latter is a further contested and a 
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historically overloaded notion (Valentine, 2006; Heller, 1991; O’Sullivan, 2002; 
Alexander, 2010; Hauptmann, 2004).  
Recently, we see increasing debates on the definition of the concept of 
political. Some assess the emergence of a focus on ‘political’ to be neologism 
(Hauptmann, 2004). They argue that the concept has emerged as a theme of 
philosophical reflection due to the recent challenges brought by postmodern 
theory, radical feminism and multicultural theory (O’Sullivan, 2002: 739) to the 
traditional understanding of politics. Accordingly, “orthodox liberal ideas” of 
politics have false assumptions such as viewing the political as a neutral arena 
and politics as a process of arbitration (O’Sullivan, 1997: 739). They also 
operate on exclusionary mechanisms that leave out women, other minority, and 
disadvantaged groups from the domain of politics (both at theoretical and 
practical levels). For some others, on the other hand, the problematization of the 
‘political’ goes back to mid-nineteenth century Europe when the critique of the 
absolutist state began (Heller, 1991; Alexander, 2010). While throughout the 
eighteenth century politics was an activity related with the state (for it was a 
function of the state) with the eventual separation of the two, the definitive 
terms of politics has come to be problematic in modernity (Heller, 1991; 
Alexander, 2010). Without a ‘political’ subject par excellence i.e. monarch, and 
without a ‘political class’ e.g. aristocracy or the male-property owner citizens of 
Ancient Greece (Heller, 1991) we lost a criterion to judge what is political and 
what is not.  
The recent hypostatization of the adjective ‘political’ into a noun is 
indicative of the elusiveness of the term. In fact, the concept is “the name of a 
problem, which traces the conceptual and empirical incompletion of politics” 
12 
 
(Valentine, 2006: 506). As a theme of philosophical reflection or as an object of 
knowledge, the ‘political’ is argued to fall short of its pure or Ideal 
conceptualization and of the empirical phenomena through which the existence 
of concepts is established (Valentine, 2006: 506).
8
 This failure is suggested to 
be evident and due to the distinction between ‘politics’ and the ‘political’. 
Whereas the former denotes an ordinary, nominal and material process, the 
‘political’ recalls a space or a ground, foundation or cause of politics, which is 
included and present within the ‘political’ at the same time (Valentine, 2006: 
506).  
The ambiguity around the concept of ‘political’ has given way to 
different treatments in political theory. For instance, there is one that avoids a 
                                               
8 The noted distinction between ordinary ‘politics’ and an ideal ‘political’, as a matter of fact, 
has constituted an important theme of an academic debate in the American context in the past 
decades. A group of scholars from University of California, Berkeley made an assertion with 
regard to the notion of the ‘political’ and ‘political theory’ from late 1950s onwards (Reid & 
Yanarella, 1975: 297-302; Hauptman, 2004). The ‘Berkeley school’ (Wiley, 2006; Reid & 
Yanarella, 1975), represented by scholars like Sheldon Wolin (1960; 1969), Hanna Pitkin 
(1972), Norman Jacobson (1963) and John Schaar (Schaar and Wolin, 1963), formulated the 
‘political’ as distinct from ‘politics’ and defended ‘political theory’ as a form of reflection 
different from ‘political science’. The latter was argued to be epitomized with its reliance on 
positivism, behavioralism and empiricism (exemplified in studies on voting behaviors, political 
coalitions and decision-making procedures), and was criticized for neglecting the critical aspect 
of reflection on politics and political issues. Some scholars also differentiated the enterprise of 
‘political theory’ from political philosophy (Schaar and Wolin, 1963; Pitkin, 1972) and argued 
that while both theory and philosophy are engaged with the investigation of fundamental 
concepts of life, language and politics in terms of their logical-conceptual consistency, ‘political 
theory’ is concerned with the discrepancy between the concept and practice (Pitkin, 1972) i.e. 
between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it should be’ or ‘what it can be’. The ‘political’ conceptualized 
and defended in such works, then, denotes a mood of transcendence of private and personal 
concerns, a care and interest in ‘public’ matters and a will to intervene and transform the world. 
Notions like ‘freedom’, ‘participation’, ‘equality’ and ‘democracy’ become constituents of the 
‘political’. For further information on the debate and the details of it see: Reid, Herbert G. and 
Ernest J. Yanarella. 1975. “Political Science and the Post-Modern Critique of Scientism and 
Domination”. The Review of Politics, 37: 286-316; Pitkin, Hana Fenichel. 1972. Wittgenstein 
and Justice, University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles; Wiley, James. 2006. 
“Sheldon Wolin on Theory and the Political” Polity, 38(2): 211-234; Wolin, Sheldon. 1969. 
“Political Theory as a Vocation” The American Political Science Review, 63(4): 1062-1082; 
Wolin, Sheldon. 1960. Politics and Vision. Continuity and Innovation in Western Political 
Thought. Princeton University Press; Expanded edition (January 9, 2006): Princeton, New 
Jersey; Schaar, John H., and Sheldon S. Wolin. 1963. “Essays on the Scientific Study of 
Politics: A Critique.” American Political Science Review 57:125-50; Jacobson, Norman. 1963. 
“Political Science and Political Education,” American Political Science Review 57(3): 561-69. 
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discussion on the definition and meaning of politics, which is exemplified in the 
work of John Rawls (Alexander, 2010a). A second one rejects a formal 
definition of politics with the argument that any definition is inevitably 
arbitrary. Accordingly, meanings are subjective, shaped by power relations and 
are hegemonic. Although avoiding an exact definition such an approach views 
politics as a process of continuous contestation that is argued to be the case in 
the radical democratic theories of Laclau and Mouffe (Alexander, 2010). A 
third approach, on the other hand, attempts at providing a philosophical 
definition, albeit with some limitations. Weber, argued to define politics 
narrowly, as ‘the acquisition, distribution and exercise of state power’ 
(Alexander, 2010).
9
 
I have already argued that despite its controversial nature, I will limit my 
understanding of violence to a combination of use of force and violation and not 
extend it to cover literal, symbolic or metaphorical uses. In the case of the 
political, I will not offer a comprehensive definition either. My primary concern 
will be to understand the relationship between violence and politics in the works 
of political theorists. In this attempt, I will further assume that the definition of 
violence and the relation between violence and politics mainly derive from the 
construction of politics or the political.  
I think neither the existing empirical research nor debates that dwell on 
the denotative or connotative aspects of the term violence can solely settle the 
                                               
9Acquiring the third attitude Alexander (2010) argues that a metaphorical, abstract but limited 
definition for a sense of the idea is possible. A philosophical definition, for him, first of all, 
“should define the nature and the limits of the metaphorical use of a term” and also “the 
elements of tension or contradiction within the limits of its metaphorical use” and “should offer 
no more and no less than an abstract understanding of what is fully and metaphorically meant 
by the term no matter how the term is used in practice—in any particular situation or partial 
sense. A philosophical definition has to include particularity but does not have to limit itself to 
it” (Alexander, 2010: 2) 
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question of “What is the relationship between violence and the politics?” Is 
violence an intrinsic feature of the ‘political’ concerning its historical role in the 
moments of revolution, political foundation and its function in the preservation 
of political order or instrumental? Is it possible to justify the use of violence in 
politics? Is it possible to make a distinction between different forms of 
violence? Is there a difference between violence, force or terror? Is violence 
different from the legitimate use of force? Is it possible to develop a critique of 
violence? Can we oppose violence and if so on what grounds? 
I would like to think of my endeavor as an attempt of a critique. With 
this, I do not mean some sort of criticism but a certain way of thinking and 
elaborating on the issue, which also includes the review of existing 
perspectives. Although the word ‘critique’ has come to be used interchangeably 
with ‘criticism’10 with a negative tone as a practice of fault finding in the 
English-speaking world (Gasché, 2006: 8), it has a longer and complex history 
in the philosophical thought. The term ‘critique’ was the basic concept of 
Enlightenment philosophy, instanced with Kant’s (1999a) famous dictum ‘our 
age of … [Enlightenment]… is in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to 
criticism everything must submit.” Kantian critique denotes a negative attitude 
towards prejudices, the tradition, dogmatism, and the refusal of turning to 
persons or sources (such as a pastor, a book or a doctor) for guidance. It rejects 
any dictates over one’s thinking. By being autonomous and not beholden to 
                                               
10The Oxford English Dictionary offers a twofold definition for criticism: “expression of 
disapproval; finding fault” and “the critical assessment of literary or artistic works”. The 
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary Online provides a wider range including critique as 
synonymous. Accordingly, criticism refers to “the act of criticizing usually unfavorably”; 
“critical observation or remark”; “critique”; it is “the art of evaluating or analyzing works of art 
or literature; also: writings expressing such evaluation or analysis <an anthology of literary 
criticism>” and “the scientific investigation of literary documents (as the Bible) in regard to 
such matters as origin, text, composition, or history.” 
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traditional authorities such as church and the state, critique requires the use of 
reason and becomes an essential component of it. By being part of reason, it has 
also acquired a positive connotation and necessitated a final judgment on the 
matter of concern. In its intellectual span from Kant’s account of the imperative 
of critique to Nietzsche’s critique of morality, from Hegel’s immanent critique 
to Marx’s critique of capitalism, one can argue that a critical enterprise connotes 
a systematic inquiry of established forms of authority and knowledge by making 
distinctions, development of criteria for an objective analysis, which led to the 
passing of an autonomous judgment (Brown, 2005; Hanssen, 2000). The 
existence of an ideal or an alternative, again, characterizes the critical attitude 
and philosophy of modernity. The oppositional attitude of the modern critique, 
“highlights the disparity between what is taken as given and what should be”, 
hence the affinity of utopia and critique (Bernstein, 1988; Benhabib, 1987).  
Over the last several decades, the Enlightenment critique, some of the 
characteristics of which I have listed above, has been challenged by a group of 
theoretical and political positions e.g. feminism, poststructuralism and 
deconstructivism in terms of its premises.
 
While those who undertake the task 
of salvaging the critical potential along with a progressive notion of 
Enlightenment emphasize the necessity of a normative ground, those who have 
suspicions about the ideals of Enlightenment and who resist the idea of a 
normative foundation offer a different conception of critique (Hanssen, 2000). 
The former, which we can call the modernists, looks for clear definitions of 
notions such as subjectivity and true knowledge reached by the light of reason 
with the aim of developing a critical reflection on politics, passing a judgment 
and more importantly for envisioning and forming of a principles and policy. 
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The defendants of the latter, the so-called postructuralist, deconstructivist or 
posmodernist camp argue that the modernist group’s categories, such as their 
notion of subjectivity, are abstract and homogenizing; the rationality they 
presume to be universal and objective is totalizing and their vision of politics is 
exclusionary if not dominating. They therefore contend that ‘critique’ is a 
valuable tool for its capacity to challenge these constructions and established 
systems. A critical enterprise is important for this capacity to challenge, to 
struggle and to resist not for its final and eventual judgment or for its capacity 
of emancipation. Michel Foucault, who among the ardent defenders of the latter 
position, asserts that “by critical ... I don’t mean a demolition job, one of 
rejection and refusal, but a work of examination that consists of suspending as 
far as possible the system of values to which one refers when testing and 
assessing it” (Foucault, 1988: 107). In his late essays in 1980s on Kant, 
Foucault pays a particular attention to the question of critique and its relation 
with Enlightenment. Surprising many of his readers, he further argues that his 
work can be read as an example of a type of Kantian critique. The path of 
critique he follows, nonetheless, differs from the other stands he defines as the 
‘analytic of truth’ that aims to search eternal truths and works for the 
establishment of reason. This can be conducted in scientific domain with an 
emphasis on positivism, and in other domains with the arguments of scientism 
and scientific rationality. For Foucault critique can be understood as an ethos, 
an attitude developed in modernity; it denotes the courage that the process of 
Aufklärung needs to challenge the epistemic order and questioning and resisting 
given forms of knowledges with a will of transformation not emancipation. 
Following a Foucaldian line of thinking, Judith Butler (2002b: 213) too writes 
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critique “is precisely a practice that not only suspends judgment …but [also] 
offers a new practice of values based on that very suspension” to question the 
limits of our most sure ways of knowing and acting. She (2002b:215) states, 
“one asks about the limits of ways of knowing because one has already run up 
against a crisis within the epistemological field in which one lives.”  
As noted by Brown (2005) and Hanssen (2000) crisis is an important 
notion both for the contemporary world and for the enterprise of critique. In 
fact, for the historian Reinhart Koselleck (1988: 104) ‘crisis’ and ‘critique’ were 
etymological twins deriving from the root ‘krinein’. The noun, krisis, stemming 
from krinein, was a jurisprudential term and was also denoting a juridical 
process. It referred to “distinguishing the true from the false, the genuine from 
the spurious, the beautiful from the ugly, and the right from the wrong, 
distinctions that involved weighing pros and cons of particular arguments, that 
is evaluating and eventually judging evidence, reasons, or reasoning” (Brown, 
2005: 5; Koselleck, 1988: 103). In his historiography, Koselleck (1988) presents 
how the judicial use of the critique had lost its significance in Middle Ages. The 
word criticism was incorporated into national languages only in the seventeenth 
century but this time with a different connotation. Criticism came to denote “the 
art of an objective evaluation” of ancient, literary and biblical texts by the 
educated strata. Within this discourse, increasing emphasis was placed on 
rationality, neutrality and impartiality. The discourse of the rational and 
objective critique of a topic served further special purposes as well. It provided 
legitimacy to the practice of criticism in the eyes of the public and also gained 
self-assurance to the intellectuals in justifying their views and expanding their 
analysis to a range of subjects and institutions (Koselleck, 1988: 104). When 
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once the biblical interpretations were put under the scrutiny of critique, other 
matters such as public concerns, and political decisions of the state and even the 
sovereign itself also came to be debated by those learned men. Then, as I have 
depicted above, within Enlightenment philosophy critique came to be associated 
with the notion of reason. While the word krisis lost its juridical significance 
after Antiquity, in another vein, it came to be used in the field of medicine 
throughout the Middle Ages. It implied a ‘critical’ point, which may be either 
exceptional or chronic, in the course of a disease. For Koselleck, after coming 
apart and re-entering languages through different routes, the link between 
‘critique’ and ‘crisis’ revived in the analyses on political and economic sphere. 
Crisis now refers to unstable point, shattering of the foundations and a condition 
demanding urgent attention and prompt action (Brown, 2005: 5). The 
amalgamation of the two became epochal concepts in philosophy and history 
“most dramatically since the last third of the eighteenth century” (Koselleck, 
2006: 365-375).  
Within this context, it is possible to argue that while terms and promises 
of critique are debated by different theoretical positions for all of them an 
engagement with critique signifies awareness of and an assessment of a crisis. 
This point has been also underlined by Seyla Benhabib (1986: 19-21) in her 
reflections on Critical Theory when she argued that “crisis diagnosis” is one of 
the irreducible aspects of philosophical criticism. In fact, as one scholar has 
noted (Slomp, 2009: 3), for many thinkers, crisis functions as a revitalizing 
source, it prompts the thinkers to reflect on the questions that are waiting for 
solutions. For Eric Voegelin “the fundamental problems of political existence in 
history are more apt to come into view than in periods of comparative stability” 
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(Voegelin 1999: 88; also in Slomp, 2009: 3) and for Sheldon Wolin (2006 
[1960]: 9; also in Slomp, 2009:4) 
the theories of Plato, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, for example, are 
evidence of a ‘challenge and response’ relationship between the 
disorder of the actual world and the role of the political philosopher 
as the encompasser of disorder. The range of possibilities appear 
infinite, for now the political philosopher is not confined to 
criticism and interpretation; he must reconstruct a shattered world of 
meaning.  
  
Crisis might emerge within established forms of knowledge, authority or 
power relations. Critique, then, might be either in the form questioning the 
limits of ways of knowing as Butler (2002b) suggests or may take an 
interventionist, corrective or emancipatory role as Benhabib and others have 
argued. For Hannah Arendt the crisis of the political structure (ways of 
thinking, knowing and acting) of our age became manifest with the catastrophic 
events of the twentieth century—a century of wars, revolutions, mass 
destructions, totalitarianism, racism—”hence a century of that violence which is 
currently believed to be their common denominator” (Arendt, 1972: 105). 
Therefore, in her view, violence denotes a crisis, which demands a critical 
engagement with the phenomenon.  
Against this background, as I have stated above, this study aims to 
engage with a critique of the relation between violence and politics. The 
enterprise will be considered as a way of thinking and elaborating on the issue, 
which includes the review of existing perspectives in political theory. I will try 
finding answers to the questions (raised above) that interrogate the relationship 
between violence and politics by surveying some contemporary political 
theories. I will also think on the possibility of the judgment concerning the role 
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of violence in politics. In the face of violent conflicts, upheavals and tragedies 
of our times what stand we should take and which arguments we should use will 
be some questions I will have in mind. 
In the coming chapters, I will firstly present my review of some 
contemporary theories. Based on this review I will suggest three approaches on 
the relationship between violence and politics. There is a major paradigm in the 
literature: the liberal-democratic approach, which claims that politics, as an 
order and a process of consensus with reference to reason, does not involve 
violence and there is no relation between the two. Hence, this approach is 
characterized by a non-problematization of the relation between violence and 
politics. The idea of “non-problematization” may sound problematic. One can 
argue that the liberal-democratic approach has a certain judgment on the place 
of violence with respect to politics and I would agree with that by saying that 
place is the “outside”. My contention is that this approach excludes violence 
from political discussions as a phenomenon by labeling it as illegal use of force 
or an irrational act. Violence is constrained within the social, cultural or private 
domain and deemed apolitical at almost every instance.  School shootings, 
which have become common in the United States or in some other western 
countries, for instance, in that sense are debated within the framework of youth 
aggression, failures of socialization etc. Yet their links to the overall gun 
culture, discourses and practices of violence are hardly debated. Hence, the 
approach is called as non-problematization. I will present Jürgen Habermas and 
John Rawls as exemplary figures of this approach and explicate the contours of 
their work in the next chapter. 
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I will then argue that a variant of the critique of the liberal approach 
conceives and presents the relationship between violence and politics as an 
intricate one. While the first approach conceives and presents violence as an 
apolitical phenomenon by not taking into account the structural aspects of it, 
this approach we will see emphasize the link. At times, violence is celebrated 
first for its destructive capacity of the existing order because it is considered as 
defective. Further, it is seen as a constructive force in politics. Historically and 
even ontologically, the “illiberal” approach argues politics involves violence. In 
that sense, it is even possible to argue that this approach is characterized by a 
non-problematization as well. The relationship between violence and politics is 
affirmed positively and absolutely. I will show the illiberal front, or the critique 
of the liberal-democratic approach finds its most fervent expression in Carl 
Schmitt’s works, which assert that politics and violence are essentially 
interlinked. Walter Benjamin’s famous piece Critique of Violence is another 
example of this view, although he was concerned about the implications of his 
argument. According to Benjamin, violence and modern law are inextricably 
connected: both the act of founding and the act of the preservation of law 
includes violence. While Schmitt affirms the link between violence and politics 
for the rejuvenation of the political spirit, Benjamin is at pains to overcome the 
dependence on violence in the establishment of a new political order and in the 
protection of it. Another example of the critique of the first paradigm is Frantz 
Fanon who attacked western humanism with his argument that in the colonial 
contexts western rule is always violent and it operates as a destructive force on 
both the bodies and psyches of the native people. Like Benjamin’s theory of 
violence the colonial theory of is historical and it is further context-specific; it 
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also aims at overcoming the existing type of violence with a revolutionary and 
emancipatory anti-colonial violence. A contemporary figure Slavoj Žižek will 
be also reviewed to explicate the contours of this approach. Žižek we will see 
offers a critique of the contemporary discourse on violence and terror by 
pointing out the link between visible forms of violence and the political order of 
liberalism and capitalism.  
A third position, I call as the “position of ambivalence” I will argue 
leaves the answer to the question on the relation between violence and politics 
open. In contrast to the liberal-democratic paradigm that marginalizes the 
phenomenon of violence, this perspective understands violence as a rational 
phenomenon. Accordingly, violence has a particular objective. It has an 
expressive character in politics and at times, it is an efficient means in reaching 
political goals. Such a perspective differs from the first view by accepting that 
violence is a component of human relations. It differs from the second 
perspective, one that treats violence almost an essential feature of politics by 
treating the issue as a historical occurrence. Some works of the Marxist 
revolutionary thinkers, criticizing the liberal-democratic tradition for disguising 
the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, exemplify this position. Yet 
still, the Marxist critique fundamentally views revolutionary violence as a 
historical necessity for the elimination of the exploitative and violent 
mechanisms of capitalism.  
In the introduction to his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces a 
conceptual framework with several distinctions. He makes the epistemic 
distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge and the metaphysical 
distinction between ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ propositions. A priori 
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knowledge is knowledge postulated by reason excluding experience; a 
posteriori knowledge, on the other hand, is derived from experience. For a 
priori knowledge, there are two criteria: necessity and strict universality. The 
claim that necessity is a criterion of the a priori ends up with the statement that 
all knowledge of necessary propositions is a priori but not all propositions 
known a priori are necessary. In other words, necessary propositions are 
propositions the truth-value of which remain constant, namely true across all 
possible worlds.  
Against this background, I think, despite their opposing positions both 
the liberal-democratic approach and the illiberal critique present “necessary 
propositions” with regards to the relationship between violence and politics. 
The knowledge on the relationship between violence and politics presented is a 
postulate of reason, hence a priori. Although theorists of the critique of 
liberalism seem to derive their arguments from a posteriori we will see both in 
Schmitt and Benjamin, violence is part of the definition of politics. The 
necessity of violence for the destruction of the ‘violent’ order defended by 
Fanon and Žižek, on the other hand, in Kantian terms, is presented as 
a practical necessity—necessity stemming from a priori determination of the 
will; not subject to the approval of any further end, but is an end in itself. In that 
sense, my contention is that the first two positions do not to recognize the 
contingent nature of the relationship between politics and violence. In fact, I 
think they successfully address different aspects of the analytical questions with 
regards to violence and politics (what counts as violence or not, whether 
violence is involved in politics or not). We know politics involve violence that 
there is violence at the establishment and during the sustenance of a political 
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order thanks to Schmitt, Benjamin and others. We also know a continuous fact 
or threat of violence deems politics impossible. Non-violence, abstention or 
control of violence is required for the persistence of an order, the liberal-
democratic paradigm tells us. Yet, the two positions diverge from each other in 
very clear terms, it seems that we have to choose either one or two and take an a 
priori stand—being for or against political violence.  
In the face of political violence, statements like “I am against all forms 
of political violence” seem as naïve as the question “why do they hate us?” 
since they evade the responsibility of facing the historicity of violence and its 
relation to politics. Similarly, the idea that “the violence of the oppressed is not 
the same as the violence of the oppressor” should not rule out the possibility of 
judging certain acts of violence and the possibility of searching ways for non-
violent politics. As a result, my contention is that knowledge and propositions 
offered by the two positions on the issue of the relationship between violence 
and politics do not solve the problem of understanding the relationship between 
violence and politics in historical contexts.  
Within this  context, my contention will be that that the third perspective 
can be characterized by contingent claims, based on a posteriori, knowledge 
since it is unclear how pure thought or reason could tell us anything about the 
actual world as compared to other possible worlds. This stand does not neglect 
violence as an irrational, unconceivable phenomenon nor exalt it as an élan vital 
or an inescapable fact of political life. By accepting it part of human history and 
politics, it enables an analysis of violence in terms of its emergence, functioning 
and impact. Such analysis and understanding of violence as we will see in the 
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coming sections might vary from disapproval to excuse or to legitimation; 
hence, present multifariousness.  
Within this framework, I will pay a particular focus on Hannah Arendt 
and Michel Foucault, two contemporary political thinkers whose works have 
had significant impact on students of political theory. Both Foucault and Arendt 
cannot be associated with any political tradition; in fact, their reflections on 
politics include important critiques of traditional understanding of political 
concepts and phenomenon. Especially, their conceptualization of power 
diverges from classical analyses that incited me to read their works with my 
question asking the relation between violence and politics. I will try 
understanding their critique of and judgment on the relationship between 
violence and politics by reviewing some critical works. 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: In the following chapter, I 
will firstly provide a précis of the two paradigms, the approach that excludes 
violence and the one that views it as an essential aspect of politics in order to 
better elucidate my categorization. Chapter II will discuss the liberal democratic 
paradigm that I argue constructs politics on the basis of reason and order which 
does not problematize violence and its relation to politics and categorically 
excludes violence from politics. I will review Habermasian conception of 
politics and its confrontation with violence and then will discuss Rawls’ 
political justice to understand his treatment of the relationship between violence 
and politics. Chapter III will present a brief review of the second approach with 
its critique of the liberal-democratic approach. Carl Schmitt’s theory of the 
political, Benjamin’s critique of law and violence and Fanon’s ideas on colonial 
and revolutionary violence and Slavoj Žižek’s reflections on contemporary 
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violence will be reviewed as the representative of a second position that views 
the relationship between violence and politics as constitutive of the politics. 
Chapter IV will present the contours of a third paradigm that can be 
characterized with an ambivalent attitude towards the relationship between 
violence and politics. I will argue that this paradigm adopts a historical 
approach, treats violence as a structural, rational and even expressive 
phenomenon. It attempts to understand the relationship between violence and 
politics by looking into historical dynamics, structural conditions, the rationality 
of violence and its meaning within politics. Such an approach differs from the 
first paradigm with its recognition of the relationship between violence and 
politics and from the second with its rejection of an approach that claims 
violence is intrinsic to politics. I will argue that it is possible to assess 
divergences within the third position and at times theorists of ambivalence face 
the paradox of committing themselves to a position with respect to the use of 
violence in politics. These ambiguities or paradoxes with respect to the 
relationship between politics and violence may be considered as the limitations 
of the position of ambivalence. It is also possible to argue that they constitute its 
strength for its potentiality for a richer analysis.  
After stating that in Part II I will move to Hannah Arendt and Michel 
Foucault, two unorthodox thinkers in terms of their relationship with traditional 
political thinking and try to elaborate their view on violence and politics. By 
juxtaposing their views, I would like to broaden the vision of the understanding 
of violence and politics. Chapter V will discuss Arendt’s critique of traditional 
understanding of power, which is sovereignty based views rule as domination, 
and therefore is closely linked to violence, despite its discourse of rejection. I 
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will then move to the presentation of her phenomenological attempt of the 
refinement of the meaning of power, politics, action and freedom. Power, we 
will see, is a non-violent phenomenon and a result of collective free action. 
Chapter VI will review Foucault’s problematization of the traditional 
understanding of relations of power with the argument that a focus on 
sovereignty, law and violence carries the risk of overlooking modern forms of 
subjugation that operate in non-violent yet effective ways. Chapter VII and 
Chapter VIII will discuss Arendt and Foucault’s views on the relationship 
between violence and revolution, respectively. I will show, despite her 
acceptance and recognition of the role violence played in revolutionary 
moments, Arendt refutes violence to be the marker of revolution for the latter is 
not an act of destruction but of foundation. She associates violent upheavals 
with liberation, a pre-political act in her opinion and argues freedom that is non-
violent way of establishing political freedom should be understood as 
revolutionary. Foucault’s views on revolution, I will show, will stand in a 
striking contrast to Arendt. In his appraisal of the Iranian Revolution, he 
celebrates the will to ‘liberation’ in Arendtian terms. It is the argument, 
presented in Chapter VII that asserts the functioning of modern relations of 
power, in their disciplinary and bio-political forms render revolutions 
impossible in western contexts. A reincarnation of a political spirituality that 
engenders a massive act and a total negation of the present system, in 
Foucault’s view is astonishing and should not be denounced immediately. 
While Arendt commits herself to a non-absolute, not a priori non-violent 
position, Foucault, we will see side with a radical ambivalent position, like 
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Žižek that may even celebrate violence in history. Chapter IX will be a 
concluding review of the discussion. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE FIRST PARADIGM: NON-PROBLEMATIZATION OF 
THE RELATION BETWEEN VIOLENCE AND POLITICS 
 
 
 
This chapter will review the main tenets of the liberal-democratic approach, 
which excludes violence from the political. I will argue that the exclusion is 
based on a specific conception of politics. Such exclusion does not mean the 
rejection of (all forms of) violence from a moralist-pacifist standpoint, 
exemplified by Tolstoy or Gandhi. Rather, it denotes the exclusion of violence 
as an issue of politics by treating violence as a non-rational, hence non-political 
phenomenon. The only recognized form of violence is its use by the state as 
‘legitimate use of force’.  
 In early modern liberal thinkers such as Hobbes
11
 and Locke violence 
was a major concern (Buchan, 2001: 27; Creppel, 1996; Baumgold, 1993). For 
Thomas Hobbes (1968) violent conflict was an aspect of human interaction due 
                                               
11 I should note here that although Hobbes has not been regarded a liberal in its true sense, some 
scholars have claimed that he is among the founders of liberalism. For such a view see Frank M. 
Coleman. 1977. Hobbes and America: Exploring the Constitutional Foundations, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press & Peter. Berkowitz. 1999. Virtue and the Making of Modern 
Liberalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hobbes’s name should be included 
within the list of liberals because he had a significant impact on the later liberal thought in terms 
of being a source of inspiration and of the target of criticisms.  
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to individuals’ continuous will and desire for power. In the absence of an 
overarching force, individuals do fight over limited sources of property, 
necessity and over other sources and symbols of power. Violence emerges in 
the case of anarchy; however, in Hobbes’s account it constitutes a threat to 
individuals’ well-being and property. In his famous Leviathan he wrote, “where 
there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, 
and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues” (Hobbes, 1968:188). From a 
Hobbesian point of view, a reckoning about the costs of state of nature (the fear 
of a possible violent death) would end up with the decision of leaving the 
insecure state of nature and entering a compact with the absolutist monarch. 
Rather than being killed by an arbitrary attacker the citizens are expected to 
choose a relatively secure order and to obey an absolute ruler. The presence and 
even the threat of violence, therefore, justify the foundation of state authority. A 
stateless order does not necessarily lead to a state of war nor does anarchy 
denote a lawless condition for John Locke (1980: 10); yet for him arbitrary and 
excessive violence is an evil that should be avoided in the state of nature too. 
The state is needed for the regulation of violence, i.e. punishment of those who 
trespass the natural law and social order. Thence, constraining violence at civil 
and state level was an important part of early liberal theory; the choice of 
emphasizing one over the other has become a source of tension as well. This we 
see in Kant, the optimist and pacifist Enlightenment philosopher. Even though 
he seems to trust in the capacity of Reason in human beings, Kant follows 
Hobbes’s depiction of the state of nature and contends that the lack of state 
would denote a chaotic condition and a brutal life. For this reason, he opposes 
anarchy at any cost; even the worst form of government is better than anarchy 
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(Kant, 1989b: 118). In works such as Metaphysics of Morals (1999b), On the 
Common Saying (1989a: 81) and Perpetual Peace (1989b: 118), he explicitly 
rejects the citizens’ right to use violence. It is not possible to overthrow a 
government with violent means even if that government does not act in 
conformity with the principle of right. Furthermore, he argues, “everyone may 
use violent means to compel another to enter into a juridical state of society” 
(Kant, 1999b: 116). For him, someone who does not want to be a part of the 
lawful society cannot be exempt from law since his outlaw status represents a 
threat to the freedom of those who are part of a political order. The right to 
freedom requires and affirms the enforcement of those to join the political 
society and to live under positive laws.  
Early liberal thinkers, therefore, desire a political order based on a certain 
type of rationality and they require citizens’ agreement on that rationality. Such 
a depiction also foresees the enforcement of the ‘rationale’ of body politics to 
everyone via coercion. As a result, as some have argued liberalism’s fear from 
“spontaneous, uncontrolled and chaotic violence” (Buchan, 2001: 30) gives way 
to a paradox that they cannot manage to solve. The desire to escape from 
uncontrolled violence ends up with the attempt of taming and constraining it in 
the hands of the state. A strong state holds the right to use force against possible 
threats of violence, which by being outside the boundaries of the political order 
and out of the control of the political authority is defined as barbaric, irrational, 
and dangerous. 
 According to Buchan (2001: 28), among contemporary liberals, almost 
alone Judith Shklar paid attention to the question of violence. Her engagement 
concluded that a pervasive and ineradicable fear of violence, or ‘cruelty’ in her 
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words, defined as “the willful inflicting of physical pain on a weaker being in 
order to cause anguish and fear” (Shklar, 2004: 156), particularly of “invasive 
or arbitrary acts of cruelty by the state,” constitutes liberalism’s solid 
foundation” (Shklar, 1989: 29 in Buchan, 2001: 30). “This fear of state violence 
is an important feature of liberal thought,” Buchan (2001: 30) writes, but it is no 
more so than the fear of civil violence. Despite the noted role violence plays in 
the construction of the political in early modern state theories of Hobbes and 
Locke, and despite its claimed impact over the tradition, the contemporary 
liberal-democratic theory has remained mostly silent on the subject of violence. 
The argument John Keane (1996: 8) rose in his Reflections on Violence when he 
says that contemporary “theorists have clothed violence with ‘an aura of 
strangeness’ and absented it from the mainstream discourse then should be 
explored if not true. 
 It is against this background I will take Habermas and Rawls as the two 
contemporary figures of the approach that deem violence mostly as invisible, 
irrational and non-political phenomenon. In the following sections, I will 
present a précis of two thinkers’ views in order to better elucidate my argument 
on the silence of liberalism on the issue of violence. Being aware of the vast 
literature that explores the differences between two philosophers, I would like 
to note that their divergences are beyond the scope of this discussion. My 
treatment of Habermas and Rawls within the same category derives from the 
assessment that they share a similar normative ground. I contend that both value 
the neutrality and universality of human reason to establish a moral ground for a 
political order. Both argue that legitimate political systems sustain the co-
existence of differentiated yet benign interests, opinions and identities within 
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modern societies. The establishment of such systems is only possible with the 
proper understanding and functioning of the notion of ‘public reason’, they 
found in Kant as valuable. In their respective attempts of reformulating the 
concept of public reason, Rawls relies on the notions of ‘reasonability’ in order 
to develop his political conception of justice. Habermas, on the other hand, 
emphasizes an intersubjective conception of reason and offers communication 
as a politically relevant action. As I have stated above, in these conceptions, 
neither constitutive nor disruptive violence is taken as a problem. Both 
Habermas and Rawls, we will see, eschew the question of violence; they view it 
as an irrational, unreasonable and therefore non-political phenomenon. In the 
next section, I will firstly present a brief overview of Habermas’s critical 
project, his theory of politics and its treatment of violence wherever it can be 
found.  
 
2.1. Habermas and Communicative Action  
 
According to Bernstein (1992: 207), Habermas’s work can be read “as a 
rethinking and rewriting of the Dialectic of Enlightenment
12”, as it 
systematically seeks to fulfill the emancipatory promise of modernity and 
overcome its shortcomings and contradictions. While agreeing with Weber and 
Frankfurt School thinkers in their assessment that the project of Enlightenment 
is at jeopardy with increased domination of instrumental reason over socio-
cultural life and nature in modern societies, Habermas argues that a pessimist 
                                               
12 In the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas lays the contours of his critical 
approach and explains how his endevaour differs from the first generation of Frankfurt School. 
See, Habermas, Jürgen. 1987. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. 
Frederick Lawrence, tr. The MIT Press: Cambridge.  
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view would do an injustice to the Critical Theory and to the promises of 
Enlightenment.  
In his earlier works, closer to those of the Frankfurt School, he 
suggested to understand the Dialectic of Enlightenment: that is increased 
rationalization equated with objectification socio-historically. In his attempt to 
reformulate Critical Theory, he paid a particular attention to the functioning of 
the political, economic and cultural institutions and the contradictions of ‘late 
capitalism’. Contrary to the orthodox-Marxist view, for Habermas, in late-
capitalist modern societies, class-conflicts were smoothened via state’s 
increased intervention into the economic domain in the forms of “credits, price 
guarantees, subsidies, loans, secondary redistribution of income, government 
contracts guided by business-cycle policy, indirect labor-market policy, etc.” 
(Habermas, 1976: 35). However, being limited in nature, these interventions did 
not eliminate the class-based conflicts inherent to capitalism. Rather, they were 
transferred to the political sphere, turned “into normative crises, and eventually 
crises of the whole state” (McCarthy, 1976). 
Another important historical transformation one witnesses in late 
capitalism is the entwining of the state and society, epitomized with the social 
welfare state and mass democracy (Habermas, 1974). As we will see in the 
following chapters, Habermas, as Arendt does, opposes this development. He 
argues that the public sphere, an important heritage of bourgeoisie culture of the 
eighteenth-century, started to lose its mediating role and its critical function in 
modern societies. The public sphere was the domain where citizens engaged in 
rational-critical debates in the formation of a public opinion on the matters of 
general concern. Furthermore, it served the purpose of a civil control 
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mechanism over the state and its use of power. This domain enabled the rise of 
‘enlightened parties’ and engendered democratic transformations in western 
societies.
13
 In the so called “social welfare state mass democracy”, however, 
even though fundamental rights have been extended, the notions of public and 
the public sphere have structurally transformed. The function of the latter has 
been lost. Conflicts of the private sphere now intrude into the public sphere and 
dominate politics. Public debates and practices have turned into arcane policies 
of special interests (Habermas, 1974: 55).  
Habermas after focusing on the structural transformations brought 
forward by late capitalism, shifted towards the search for normative basis for 
the revival and of sustainment of democratic politics in his later works. In fact, 
he never returned to the analysis of capitalism, which he assessed to be crisis-
ridden both in economic and political terms. Rather, his specific attention was 
paid to the idea of reason, the seed of a productive approach found in Kantian 
epistemology and ethics. In his attempt of reformulating reason as a capacity 
relevant for politics, Habermas also aimed taking guard against the 
postmodernist and deconstructivist views of Enlightenment reason as a 
ahistorical conception with its claim to universality, totalizing in character and 
yet instrumental and ideological in its use.  
                                               
13 Habermas’s idealization of public sphere receives criticism on several accounts. For a critical 
interrogation that points out the exclusionary character of the bourgeois public sphere and 
reconstruction of it via mechanisms such as by enabling subaltern counterpublics to contest the 
wider public or creating plural public spheres see, Nancy Fraser. 1990. “Rethinking the Public 
Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy”. Social Text 25/26: 56-
80. For a remedial work that points out an emphasis on culture see: Seyla Benhabib. 2002. The 
Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton University Press: New 
Jersey. For an intervention that aims to include other form of communication such as greeting, 
rhetoric, and narrative to the traditional ‘Western’ ways of argumentation for an inclusive public 
sphere see Iris Marion Young. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford.  
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The central argument of Kant’s critique according to Habermas is that 
reason rather than being an instrument of contemplative activities is a practical 
faculty to be employed in moral and political domains. Separated from strategic 
and instrumental implications, reason is associated with freedom and autonomy 
in both domains. In developing knowledge of existing practices, the world, of 
one’s own understanding and in ruling self without any guidance or interference 
from another, freedom is seen as the prerequisite and result of the capacity of 
reason.
14
 In its private use, the rational faculty is treated as a source in reaching 
universalizable principles, which further provides guidelines for one’s moral 
actions. As we know, for Kant there are two different ways of justifying an 
action. One can either claim that the purpose of action would be good, or refer 
to a principle or rule, which is self-evidently good. The ‘categorical imperative’, 
in this sense, becomes the central concept of Kantian moral philosophy. Defined 
as an unconditional principle valid for every person and justifiable at every 
time, it obliges every person to act in accordance with the maxim, which can at 
the same time make itself a universal law (Kant, 2002).  
Habermas agrees with Kant on the point that moral judgments do and 
should have a rational basis with an appeal to reason and that they can be 
justified accordingly. He also affirms that the ideal of constituting society can 
be realized both on rational and moral bases (McCarthy, 1994). Though 
                                               
14 In What is Enlightenment Kant (1989: 55-56; emphasis original) writes, “The public use of 
one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men. The 
private use of reason, may quite often be very narrowly restricted, however, without undue 
hindrance to the progress of enlightenment. But by the public use of one’s reason I mean that 
use which anyone make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public. What I 
term the private use of reason is that which a person make of it in a particular civil post or 
office, which he is entrusted. Now in some affairs, which affect the interests of the 
commonwealth we require a certain mechanism whereby some members of the commonwealth 
must behave purely passively so that they may, by an artificial common agreement, be 
employed by the government for public ends (or at least deterred from vitiating them). It is, of 
course, impermissible to argue in such cases; obedience is imperative.”  
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appreciating the merits of Kantian reason, he argues that Kant’s overall 
conception of reason is “monological” (Habermas, 1987). The monological 
character of reason implies that the universal principles supposed to guide and 
justify the motives and ends of one’s actions are derived from the self, 
regardless of its supposed impartial position. Hence, it is subject-centered. It is 
also abstract because the principles of reason operate at the cognitive level and 
miss contextual and historical particularities. Not giving up the ideal of 
universality and normativity, Habermas proposes an intersubjective conception 
of reason, which can be translated into historical and practical contexts. For 
Habermas, the notion of “communicative rationality” provides the basis on 
which universality and normativity claims can be grounded. For him 
(Habermas, 1984: 10), communicative rationality, “the unconstrained, unifying, 
consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech,” is a central experience in 
the lives of human beings. Thence, it is unavoidable and universal. As opposed 
to other forms of actions, the communicative praxis is oriented towards the 
reaching of a truth via argumentation; therefore, it has the potential of becoming 
valid and morally binding for the participants.  
The theory of “discourse ethics”, based on such an approach, outlines 
the requirements of the claims of universality and validity of a contested norm 
within an argumentation and consensus-reaching process. “Argumentation 
insures that all concerned in principle take part, freely and equally, in a 
cooperative search for truth, where nothing coerces anyone except the force of 
the better argument” (Habermas, 1990: 198). The discourse ethics has to also 
assure that no agent affected by the norm in question is excluded from the 
debate. Each participant is required to have equal possibility to present and 
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criticize the validity claims of arguments. Participants are assumed to be willing 
and able to empathize with each other’s validity claims. Existing power 
differences are neutralized so that they do not affect the communicative process 
of consensus reaching. Finally, participants explicitly state the contents of their 
goals and intentions and prove their non-strategic content. Upon the guarantee 
of such discursive presumptions, anyone holds in dialogical practice, an agreed 
norm is held to be valid if all “the consequences and side effects that its general 
observance can be expected…for the satisfaction of the particular interests of 
each person affected” (Habermas, 1990: 120) are accepted freely by that all 
affected. 
The first implication of understanding rationality in communicative 
terms is that it presents a new view on political subjectivity, different from the 
atomistic conception of classical liberalism and also from the organic 
conception of republicanism, which tends to see the citizens as a unit-mass 
(Habermas, 1996a). By being social creatures, individuals engage with 
communicative and co-operative actions from motives other than self-interest. 
The political subjectivity, herein, not only is derived from the capability of 
deliberation, but also offered to be ‘practiced’ via rational argumentation, 
mutual understanding and consensus-formation.  
The second implication of the idea of communicative reason relates to 
the conception of politics. Formulated in his later works Habermas argues that 
his theory of communicative action and the discourse ethics prescribe a 
participatory and “deliberative” model of democracy. The deliberative model is 
differentiated from the liberal-contractual model, by not viewing politics in 
terms of the coordination of divergent interests among private persons in the 
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image of a market-structured network. Habermas’s ‘deliberative democracy’ 
underlines the importance of “the institutionalization of a public use of reason 
jointly exercised by autonomous citizens” (Habermas, 1996a: 23). Habermas’s 
previously mentioned vexation on the political crises mass democracies face in 
terms of their losing legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens and of weakening of 
political engagement is offered to be overcome with this intervention as well. 
Accordingly, in a political system all rules must be subject to rational 
discussions by relevant social agents in order to test their validity by receiving 
participants’ opinions, reservations and oppositions. This principle, it is argued, 
guarantees the system’s inclusiveness and sensitivity to the differences within a 
society. This form of politics also emphasizes the formal processes through 
which democratic, rational claims are brought forward and translated into 
political rules. The provision of an autonomous public sphere for rational 
debates to take place among citizens, opening channels of communication 
between the state and society and of incorporating them into legal-institutional 
structure are the prerequisites of a viable democratic politics.  
A third implication of communicative rationality pertains to the claim of 
legitimacy of a specific law and of the legal system in general. By ensuring the 
freedom and autonomy of the public use of reason, its practice by every 
political actor and the validity of claims via rational debates and 
institutionalization of the commonly agreed norms, the tension between legality 
and democracy is overcome. This approach also enables one to bring modern 
law, popular sovereignty and human rights together, securing both private and 
public autonomy in a balanced manner (Habermas, 1996b: 129). Furthermore, 
since law making (formulation of constitution, laws, policies, regulations etc.) is 
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conceptualized as an ongoing process and as an indispensible part of democratic 
politics, reflexivity of a political system and its openness to change are 
considered providing the legitimacy the system needs. Within this context, we 
might ask whether violence intrudes into such process of democratic process 
and if so on what terms. 
 
Habermas: “Did Somebody Say Violence?”  
It is apparent from a Habermasian perspective politics is a rational, 
dialogical, empathic and even therapeutic process. The reaching of a consensus 
is emphasized within this process with the employment of only the force of the 
better argument. For that matter, the issue of violence (and even conflict) 
becomes tangential if not absent. Violence does not have a place in the political 
domain nor it is touched upon within the theory of communication because it 
does not have an expressive character. From a Habermasian perspective, we can 
argue violence does not induce a claim to be verified, debated or rejected by the 
public. Hence, it is mute. By being coercive and counteracting the freedom and 
equality of the members of a given community, it is muting as well. Violence 
would undermine politics and cannot be a part of it. Even in the early works, 
which deal with the problem of legitimacy crisis in modern societies, Habermas 
does not reckon or give an account of cases where crises turn into violent 
conflicts. This is despite the fact that he did live through the Second World War 
and the violence of the Nazi regime. In fact, in his essay entitled Learning from 
Catastrophe he criticizes approaches that “oblige us to look at the gruesome 
features of a century that ‘invented’ the gas chambers, total war, state-sponsored 
genocide and extermination camps, brainwashing, state security apparatuses, 
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and the panoptic surveillance of entire populations” (Habermas, 2001: 45). 
These approaches are missing the reverse side of catastrophes. From a 
Habermasian view, Enlightenment in itself is an emancipatory process and it 
has no inherent totalitarian potentials. The catastrophes we have witnessed, in 
fact, are indicators that it remained an unfinished project and the task should be 
to bring this project to completion. For him, in this sense, the twentieth century, 
particularly the 1945 represents a ‘turning point’, a turn toward something 
better, toward the mastering of the force of barbarism that had broken through 
the very foundations of civilization in Germany (Habermas, 2001: 40-45) by 
looking for and establishing a new normative ground. The postwar period with 
the Cold War prevented the eruption of a hot war, the decolonialization process 
ended the dependence of colonial countries, and finally the establishment of the 
social welfare state sustains stable economic growth and relatively just 
redistribution systems (Habermas, 2001: 47-48). Witnessing these 
developments, Habermas writes, even the “Marxist historian such as Eric 
Hobsbawm to celebrate the postwar era as a ‘golden age’” (Habermas, 2001: 
48). Thus, he chose not to look into the phenomenon of violence. Not only is 
the debate on the direct use of force excluded from his theory. A whole range of 
means, which might be used to influence others’ will and opinions such as 
threats, persuasion, manipulation, or agitation is not differentiated either. He 
lumps them together in the category of instrumental use of reason, places them 
in stark contrast with communicative power and excludes from the public 
sphere. Politics is about rational communication and mutual understanding. 
Emotions such as passions, fears or jealousies, partialities like prejudices, or 
situations such as misunderstandings do not belong to the political sphere; 
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therefore, as argued, Habermasian politics inevitably becomes blind to social 
antagonisms (Palacios, 2009: 64-65).  
The eruption of violent acts is treated as either exceptional phenomena 
or the result of “distorted communication”. In the Learning from Catastrophe 
essay, his depiction of the Cold War period and the arms race that took place 
between the US and the USSR reveals his treatment of the issue as an irrational, 
excessive and mad phenomenon that can be assessed in his discourse as well. 
He writes, 
The continuing spiral of an arrogant, exhausting arms race certainly 
succeeded in keeping directly threatened nations in a state of 
continual fear. Nevertheless the mad calculations of a balance of 
terror - MAD was the self-ironic abbreviation for mutually assured 
destruction - did prevent the outbreak of a hot war (Habermas, 
2001: 47; emphasis mine)  
 
At another instance reviewing Herbert Marcuse’s excitement and 
celebration of the 1968 student movements, he criticizes the Frankfurt theorist’s 
reading of youth revolt to be linked with revolution “a conception of the total 
transformation of the whole” (Habermas, 2001: 161). The “illusory equation of 
rebellious youth with a revolutionary vanguard” is a result of the “impulse of a 
philosophy of life, tinged with Freudianism” and it “secured Marcuse’s wide 
influence for the grandchildren’s generation” (Habermas, 2001: 161; emphasis 
mine). For Habermas, only the approval of the impulse to revolt could explain 
Marcuse’s “ambiguous comments on the question of the use of violence” when 
he asserts, “I have in no way equated humanity with nonviolence. On the 
contrary, I have spoken of situations where a transition to violence is precisely 
in the interest of humanity” (Marcuse in Habermas, 2001: 161). Against 
Marcuse, Habermas argued that the employment of violent means by the 
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student protestors was “game-playing with terror” and had “fascist 
implications”. In the late 1960s, in his journalistic writings, Habermas entered 
debates with the leaders of student movements and accused Rudi Dutschke, 
(one of the most prominent figures of the German student movement in 1960s 
and the leader of the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund) with “leftist 
fascism” (Habermas in Specter 2010: 115; Wiggershaus, 1995: 619). One 
scholar (Specter, 2010: 115) notes that he corresponded
15
 with Marcuse in July 
1968 and asked him to clarify his argument that presents employment of 
violence as a natural right during protest movements in his Repressive 
Tolerance. Apart from the astonishment he felt in the face of Marcuse’s defense 
of violence, Habermas notes differences between Germany and the U.S., 
asserting that it is the ground that constitutes Marcuse’s reflections (Habermas, 
1969; Specter, 2010: 115)
16
. His remark quoted by Specter (2010: 115) verifies 
Habermas’s position on the extremity of violence and almost the impossibility 
of its justification within politics: 
Violence can be legitimately volitional and can promote 
emancipation only when it is enforced by the oppressive sway of 
a situation that enters consciousness as something totally 
unbearable. Only this kind of violence is revolutionary; those 
who ignore this fact wrongfully carry the nimbus of Rosa 
Luxemburg aloft. 
  
                                               
15 Specter (2010) notes the data of the correspondence as, Habermas, Jürgen . 1969. “Letter to 
Marcuse”, Krausharr, Frankfurter Schule 2:323, 625. 
16 In Toward A Rational Society, he (1969: 29) writes 
In the United States the underprivileged of the black population and the war in 
Vietnam are two acute, clearly defined and obvious conflicts, which daily produce 
new violence and therefore provoke counterviolence. In Germany, manifest 
conditions of a comparable order of magnitude are lacking. Naturally in the Federal 
Republic there are the permanent conflicts of organized welfare-state capitalism and 
the particular conflicts of a divided nation. But we have no ghettos that could 
possibly serve as the basis for urban guerrilla actions, and no students who are 
drafted to fight guerrillas in Southeast Asia…The attempts of our activists to 
challenge and make manifest the violence of institutions are therefore a bit superficial 
compared with the actions of the New Left in the United States.  
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The argument of ‘distorted communication’, on the other hand, points 
out the problems when strategic forms of rationality dominate lifeworlds, 
economic inequalities surmount and deprive individuals of their capabilities for 
autonomous participation to political life, when a group of people is excluded 
by the system or some others act under the impact of fundamental ideologies, 
communication channels become distorted. Violence, in that sense, is read as a 
symptom of the dysfunction within political system. 
The issue of global terrorism, which received particular attention in the 
aftermath of September 11, is analyzed within these parameters as well. In a 
series of interviews conducted by a scholar (Borradori, 2003) Habermas 
expressed his reflections on the issue of terror with the French philosopher 
Jacques Derrida. While Derrida considers terrorism as a problem intrinsic to 
modernity, according to Habermas, terror is a response to the structural 
problems brought by the uneven globalization process, intensified by unfledged 
and damaged channels of communication. However, he warns against the 
particularity of the phenomenon of terror. Accordingly, there is a difference 
between the global terror and violence that is seen in the paramilitary form of 
guerilla warfare. While the Palestinian and Chechnyan violence exemplify the 
latter form of ‘terror’, 9/11 carries  
“anarchistic traits of an impotent revolt directed against an 
enemy that cannot be defeated in any pragmatic sense. The only 
possible effect it can have is to shock and alarm the government 
and population…Global terrorism is extreme both in its lack of 
realistic goals and in its cynical exploitation of the vulnerability 
of complex systems” (Habermas in Borradori, 2003: 34).  
 
The global terror, Habermas argues, also differs from violence witnessed 
in the form of petty crimes, oppositions and conflicts within Western societies 
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(Habermas in Borradori, 2003: 34). Even though ‘structural violence’ (i.e. 
socio-economic inequalities, discrimination, marginalization) is a fact of 
Western societies and even though it can turn into direct violence in these 
contexts, he argues “practices that constitute…[people’s]…lives with 
others…rests on a solid basis of a common background convictions, self-
evident cultural truths and reciprocal expectations” (Habermas in Borradori, 
2003: 63). In terrorist actions, on the other hand, parties do not recognize each 
other as participatory members of a community (Habermas in Borradori, 2003: 
19). A ‘terrorist’, in that sense is different from a ‘rebel’, who Habermas thinks 
is a crucial actor of a democratic order, as it will be explained in following 
paragraphs. For Habermas, one should not confuse a terrorist with an enemy 
either. He criticizes the slogan of “war against terror” with the argument that 
such an approach elevates terrorists to the status of enemies in war. Global 
terrorism cannot be fought within the framework of and by the means of 
traditional warfare. “Only the effective coordination of intelligence services, 
police forces, and criminal justice procedures will strike at the logistics of the 
adversary” (Habermas and Cronin, 2006: 184) and remedied by the western 
rationality. Since politics is a therapeutic process, it is also the duty of Western 
nations to re-establish channels of communication by reducing the gap of 
economic inequalities between western and non-western contexts. In the 
formulation of nonviolent solutions to the problems of globalization, 
miscommunication and lack of communication, he emphasizes the importance 
of intercultural dialogue and cooperation. 
As presented, in a Habermasian democratic political system, deep 
oppositions do not seem to be likely. If there would be any (oppositions) they 
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could only be in a non-violent form. Habermas’s views on civil disobedience 
affirm this position. When civil protests became widespread in West Germany 
in the early 1980s in the case of the deployment of American nuclear missiles in 
the country, he indicated his consent on the form and content of such 
oppositions. Differing from his previous reactions to the ‘radical’ student 
movements in 1968 Habermas wrote civil protest movements are a “constituent 
part of the political culture of a developed democratic community” (Habermas, 
1985: 136). They are also challenges to be answered by a democratic Rechstaat. 
These oppositions demand legal corrections, jurisprudential innovations. For 
this reason, denying their demands or failing in answering them would 
undermine the legitimacy of the state and the validity of the democratic legal 
procedures (Habermas, 1985: 136). A ‘rebel’ in that sense is a potential 
guardian of state’s legitimacy. He writes, “normatively considered, a 
democratic state is based equally on two ideas: the state’s guarantee of internal 
peace and legal security for all citizens and the demand that the state order be 
freely and rationally acknowledged as legitimate by its citizens.” An emphasis 
on legal security, in a Hobbesian sense, demands ‘unconditional’ obedience 
while a claim for legitimacy asks for ‘qualified’ i.e. rational obedience to the 
law. Habermas argues even Kant was influenced by Hobbes’s fear from 
unregulated violence and rejected the right to resist, which might lead to 
insecurity and disorder. Such rejection, however, is problematic since it views 
any form of resistance as a challenge to state’s monopoly over use or force. The 
alternative approach, promoting a freely and rationally acknowledged political 
order, tolerates rebels and rebellions. In viewing oppositions as challenges, 
Habermas states that obedience to the laws and obedience to the constitution are 
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distinct issues. “The legitimating principles of a constitution must be 
independently acknowledged whether or not the written laws accords with it. 
When they clash, obedience to the laws is no longer demanded unconditionally” 
(Habermas, 1985: 136).  
All the same, one has to acknowledge that for Habermas civil 
disobedience cannot be legalized. It lies in an ambiguous terrain between 
legitimacy and legality (Habermas, 1985: 137). Civil disobedience “is justified 
in light of an idea of the Rechtstaat which is based on its full realization; but it 
is not in accordance with positive right as existent within the actual society” 
(Habermas, 1985: 137). Neither legitimate nor legal, the act of civil 
disobedience is at the mercy of the political authorities for toleration. In order to 
gain that toleration, the act is required to fulfill several conditions. First of all, 
civil disobedience must be “symbolic and non-violent in character and… [must 
have]…the intention of appealing to a majority” (Habermas, 1985: 137; 
emphasis mine). If a demonstration while opposing the launching of nuclear 
missiles (i.e. state’s preparation for the use of violent means) utilizes force, then 
it cannot have a rightful claim to ‘civility’ and ‘disobedience’. The argument 
that civil disobedience must be non-violent implies that the monopoly over the 
use of violent means belongs to the state only and no civil party can engage 
with such means. Furthermore, in order to be recognized as a challenge to the 
Rechtstaat, the action must fulfill three conditions: First, the legal procedure as 
a whole must remain intact. Secondly, the disobedient must accept 
responsibility for the legal consequences of her actions. And finally, the rebel 
must be able to ground her disobedience in acknowledged, constitutional 
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principles regardless of his subjective convictions. What makes a ‘rebel’ 
rebellious different from a ‘complaining citizen’, Habermas does not explain.  
As a result, as we have seen the Habermasian politics is a neat and well 
designed, thoroughly considered and elaborated theoretical construction. The 
assessment and presentation of ‘communicative reason’ as an inevitable aspect 
of human existence and the formulation of democratic politics on this basis are 
invaluable contributions.
17
 However, this politics is possible with the exclusion 
of too many issues including violence. The exclusion of violence takes place in 
three forms. First of all, violence is denied an expressive character. It cannot 
communicate anything; it is a malady and sometimes is a symptom of a 
structural problem or of the distortion of communicative channels. Yet no 
analysis that can dwell on the issue is offered. Secondly, violence is neglected 
as a problem of other domains such as an issue of the private sphere or of 
trouble of a particular culture.
18
 Thirdly, the violence of the system, the coercive 
mechanisms of the state such as police violence, is not problematized.  
                                               
17 Here a strong challenge comes from Jacques Rancière who argues that politics is not a 
rational debate between agreement-oriented parties rather is the struggle carried out by one (or 
group) to be heard or recognized as a voice to be listened. See: Jacques Rancière. 1999. 
Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. 
18 The treatment of the issue of violence against women in immigrant communities in Western 
contexts exemplifies this case. We see that ‘public discussions’ on the issue particularly focus 
on phenomenon such as honor killing or forced marriages and link them to culture or to religion 
or to the level of development of the origin country. These discussions not only lead to the 
stigmatization of a community and to the essentializing a particular culture but also with the 
display of a disapproving attitude it contributes to the reinforcement of the idea of the 
superiority of the western norms. Special measures are taken to treat the matter at hand, yet they 
fail to solve the problem of violence against women in general. A structural approach, on the 
other hand, might look into the possibility that those practices (re)emerge in the western 
contexts where immigrant communities feel unsecure, excluded from the public, threatened by 
the dominant culture, and might work on the transformation of such conditions. Furthermore, it 
might also argue that special measures could only solve the issue at the point yet they fail to link 
it with the general problem of violence against women within the framework of patriarchy. 
Hence, there is a possible problem of leading of public discussions from the perspective of 
western ‘reason’ and within the limits of western discourse, which might be positive rather than 
critical, therapeutic rather than empathetic. 
49 
 
As we will see in the following section, Rawls is not exempt from these 
problems either. The next part will present the Rawlsian conception of political; 
discuss it with references to the Habermasian politics and then will look into its 
understanding of the issue of violence within political liberalism. 
 
2.2. Rawls and Political Liberalism 
 
For Mccarthy (1994: 46), Habermas’s theory of ‘communicative reason’ 
involves procedural reformulation of Kantian categorical imperative. Rather 
than deriving maxims from one’s reason, Habermas submits them to others’ 
argumentation and tests their claim to universal validity by weighing reasons 
pro and con. Rawls agrees with Habermas on the moral and political importance 
of the concept of public reason in the establishment of a just political order 
within pluralist societies. However, his interpretation of categorical imperative 
differs from Habermas by being more foundational than procedural. Habermas, 
as a follower of the Continental political philosophy and its critical branch 
engages with the emancipatory potential of Enlightenment reason in his works. 
Rawls, on the other hand, belongs to the Anglo-American tradition, exemplified 
by social-contractarianism and utilitarianism (Ingram, 2002). As opposed to the 
utilitarian approach, he wants to rely on the social contract model and offers 
reason as a moral category, which is thin in substance and limited in scope yet 
still politically and morally relevant for the organization of a just society. In 
such a reformulation, violence as an issue does not find a place either.  
For Rawls (1989: 234; 1987: 4) the fact of pluralism i.e. the diversity of 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines is one of the characteristics of 
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modern societies. In Middle Ages, the existence of a political community was 
generally maintained within the framework of such fundamental doctrines, e.g. 
Christian faith backed up by coercive force of the state. In modern societies, 
however, diverse perspectives proliferate especially in the absence of a general 
affirmation one perspective by state’s coercive power. Furthermore, since they 
are generally conflicting and irreconcilable with each other it is unlikely that 
rational arguments and/or debates on important moral, religious, and 
philosophical questions would end up with consensus by all parties. Yet still, 
Rawls argues, it is possible and necessary to establish a political order, which 
successfully maintains some measure of societal agreement. In Rawls’s (1989: 
235) words, “an enduring and secure democratic regime, one not divided into 
contending doctrinal confessions and hostile social classes, must be willingly 
and freely supported by at least a substantial majority of its politically active 
citizen” (emphasis mine).  
“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of 
thought,” writes Rawls (1999: 3) in his introduction to his famous Theory of 
Justice. This assertion makes it explicit that from Rawls’s perspective an 
enduring and secure democratic regime can be founded only by the 
establishment of a just order. In the establishment of such an order, Rawls 
confers a trust upon a sense of fairness, which for him is found in every 
individual. That common sense might constitute a ground for the conception of 
‘political justice’ for Rawls and for this reason, he asks his readers to think of a 
hypothetical situation, similar to the ‘state of nature’ of social-contract theorists. 
The ‘original position’ in Rawlsian theory depicts a condition where individuals 
lack any knowledge about their place in society, their class position or status, or 
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about their natural assets and abilities, intelligence and strength, and the like 
(1999: 137). Individuals are also considered lacking of their conception of the 
good, particulars of their rational plan of life, or of even the special features of 
psychology such as optimism or pessimism, so that they would not know what 
effect their decisions will have on their own life conditions (Rawls, 1999). By 
being behind a “veil of ignorance”, Rawls argues, individuals would be tempted 
to agree upon the basic principles of a moral and political order. As reasonable 
beings, they would agree with most extensive liberties compatible with the 
liberties of others (equal liberty principle). Furthermore, they would desire an 
arrangement of socioeconomic inequalities in such a way that it could 
maximally benefit the least favored in society. A second stipulation of this 
principle is that everyone would want to have equal opportunity and equal 
means to compete for positions conferring socioeconomic advantage 
(difference/equality principle).  
Rawls tries to operationalize his conception of political justice in his 
later work Political Liberalism by elucidating the contours of the concept and 
shifting his emphasis from the ‘original position’ to the notions of 
‘reasonability’ and the ‘overlapping consensus’.19 Similar to the idea presented 
in the ‘original position’ he argues that personal interests, collective views must 
be excluded for the achievement of an ‘overlapping consensus’ (Rawls, 2005: 
22-29) in a given society. An overlapping consensus, “consists of all the 
reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to 
                                               
19 Numerous scholars have debated the shift from his early work, The Theory of Justice to the 
later corrections presented in Political Liberalism. I am not concerned with such arguments 
since although some differences can be detected, the general idea of a political justice based on 
the notion of a public reason remains intact. For a discussion see Alejandro, Roberto. 1996. 
“What Is Political about Rawls’ Political Liberalism?” The Journal of Politics, 58 (1):1-24. 
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persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more or less 
just constitutional regime, a regime in which the criterion of justice is that 
political conception itself” (Rawls, 2005: 15). An overlapping consensus 
signifies the acknowledgment of certain authorities, the compliance with certain 
institutional arrangements, founded on a convergence of self- or group-interests 
and the recognition and of sharing of the liberal principles and virtues (Rawls, 
1987). 
A political conception of justice, Rawls underlines, is limited with the 
basic structures (social, political and economic institutions) of a modern 
democratic society (Rawls, 1987: 3) meaning that it is not applicable to other 
domains such as personal relations. Secondly, he argues, a political conception 
of justice cannot be derived from general and comprehensive doctrines e.g. 
perfectionism and utilitarianism (Rawls, 1987: 4). Rather, it must be 
autonomous from such views but at the same time, “must allow for a diversity 
of general and comprehensive doctrines, and for the plurality of conflicting, and 
indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the meaning, value and purpose of 
human life… affirmed by the citizens of democratic societies” (Rawls, 1987: 4). 
The political conception of justice is not a comprehensive doctrine, since it does 
not present itself as “metaphysically or religiously true, but rather as a 
specification of the reasonable at the level of content” (Van de Putte, 1995: 
110). Yet still, the political conception of justice is a moral conception in itself 
since it asserts ideals, principles and norms, values with political and moral 
implications.  
In the previous section, I have sketched three points Habermasian view 
of communicative rationality brings forward with regards to the understanding 
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of subjectivity, politics and political legitimacy. A short review of Rawls’ 
theory makes it explicit that it operates on similar presumptions. Akin to 
Habermas, the political subject of Rawls is a minimally social being. For him, 
“while the atomistic individual can engage in rational inference, the reasonable 
individual is an individual in a social context—for to be reasonable means 
desiring a working social world in which reciprocity is possible” (Frazer and 
Lacey, 1995: 239). Rawls’s political subject is equipped with particular 
qualities such as a sense of justice, the tendency of being reasonable and with 
virtues of tolerance and civility, paving the way for a peaceful socio-political 
co-existence. “The virtues of tolerance and being ready to meet others halfway, 
and the virtue of reasonableness and the sense of fairness… constitute a very 
great public good, part of society’s political capital” (Rawls, 1987: 17). Unlike 
Habermas, however, the Rawlsian subject is assumed to leave personal 
concerns, interests, ideological or doctrinal beliefs, values and prejudices 
behind before entering the political domain.
 20
 In the original position, the ‘veil 
of ignorance’ ensures such a stripping; in modern societies, the distinction he 
makes between ‘public’ and ‘non-public’ uses of reason serve for this purpose.  
Since the ancient times many of the political philosophers have asserted 
that ‘politics’ is an activity with specific characteristics, the ‘political’ sphere 
differs from other domains (of human activities in terms of its foundational 
                                               
20On the difference between Rawls’s and his approach Habermas writes, “if we wish to preserve 
the intuition underlying the Kantian universalization principle, we can respond to this fact of 
pluralism in different ways. Rawls imposes a common perspective on the parties in the original 
position through informational constraints and thereby neutralizes the multiplicity of particular 
interpretive perspectives from the outset. Discourse ethics, by contrast, views the moral point of 
view as embodied in an intersubjective practice of argumentation which enjoins those involved 
to an idealizing enlargement of their interpretive perspectives.” For an exchange between 
Habermas and Rawls; See. Jürgen Habermas. 1995. “Reconciliation through the Public use of 
Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism”, The Journal of Philosophy, 92 (3): 
109-131 and John Rawls, 1995. “Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas”. The Journal of 
Philosophy, 92 (3): 132-180. 
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grounds and operating mechanisms). Rawls is not an exception in this sense, but 
his formulation of the ‘political’ and ‘politics’ are strictly delimited (Mouffe, 
1993: 41-59; Alexander 2010). As I have mentioned in the introductory section, 
such formulations and separation of domains are the critical features of liberal 
theories, which enable them to avid troubled issues such as violence. In Rawls, 
the political is demarcated from economic, personal and social domains, 
contrasted with the familial, domestic, associational, and communal affairs and 
institutions (Frazer and Lacey, 1995: 239; Rawls, 2005: 137). Personal 
reflections, deliberations or debates within associations such as universities or 
churches are considered as non-public use of reason (Rawls, 2005: 213). 
Therefore, many platforms, critical for the formation of public opinion even for 
Habermas for example, are considered as social and non-public domains by 
Rawls (McCarthy, 1994).  
The content of such debates is also limited in terms of its eligibility for 
being political. Rawls argues, for citizens and legislators the use of public 
reason do not apply to all political questions but only to those discussions on 
“constitutional essentials” and questions of basic justice within public political 
forums. (Rawls, 2002: 133; 2005: 214) Public reason is exemplified in “the 
discourse of judges in their decisions, and especially of the judges of a supreme 
court; the discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and 
legislators; and finally, the discourse of candidates for public office and their 
campaign managers, especially in their public oratory, party platforms, and 
political statements” (Rawls, 2002: 133; 2005: 220-223). When expressing their 
consent and/or objections to questions of basic justice or constitutional 
essentials, citizens are required to consider themselves as if they are 
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legislators.
21
 The requirement of identification with the public also necessitates 
citizens “to appear in public as interpreting the same political conception” (Van 
de Putte, 1995: 114) even if they do not reach the same conclusion on every 
issue.  
That being so the problem of legitimacy becomes a minor issue in 
Rawls’s political liberalism.22 While Habermas pays a specific attention to this 
question in modern societies and aims to ensure legitimacy via continuous 
democratic-deliberative procedures, we can say Rawlsian politics is established 
on solid grounds; for that reason it does not look for recurrent processes of 
legitimation. The argument that the legitimacy of the state must demonstrate the 
existence of a general obligation to obey the law is verified in Rawls’s liberal 
perspective: people’s agreement to live in a just society and their affirmation of 
just laws would result in a duty of obligation. In such a formulation, the 
question of the state as an institution becomes negligible as well. Its authority 
seems to be directional rather than coercive, its function is limited with 
administrative tasks such as the collection of taxes, allocating resources and 
providing social services (Höffe, 1995).
23
  
                                               
21Although the implication of such pretension is not clear, one can argue that with such 
requirement, Rawls wants to keep the Kantian categorical imperative. 
22 Rawls writes the “exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable…when it is in 
accordance with a constitution that all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational” (Rawls, 2005: 217; 
emphasis mine) Some of the commentators interpret this as a definition of legitimacy in Rawls. 
In fact, for Rawls legitimacy is a “weaker idea than justice” (Rawls, 2005: 428). For him, laws 
of a given regime (be it a monarchy or democracy) may have a claim to legitimacy by being 
accepted or confirmed by a majority of people. Legitimate enactment, however, does not 
guarantee the justness of laws. It may be true at some point injustices produced by legal 
regulations of a given regime may erode the legitimacy of the system but as a general 
observation, “[l]egitimacy allows an undetermined range of injustice that justice might not 
permit” (Rawls, 2005: 428) 
23The German scholar Otfried Höffe in his Political Justice problematizes Rawls’ simple 
assumption of the need for the existence of a state and negligence of the issue of legitimization 
of its coercive powers. For Höffe, any theory dealing with the issue of legitimacy has to provide 
a moral ground for state’s monopoly over the use force. This is particularly necessary in 
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I have already shown that the idea of public reason does not refer to 
unanimity, meaning that citizens might disagree with some of the jurisdictions 
at times. However, by accepting the fundamental principles of the political 
order they respect those laws and live with their consequences. Even in a well-
ordered society, Rawls argues, there may be times and cases where injustices 
may arise. In the first case, “current arrangements may depart in varying 
degrees from publicly accepted standards that are more or less just” (Rawls, 
1999: 309). The arrangements may also conform to the conception of justice of 
a particular group or of a dominant class but by being particular they may be 
unreasonable in the political sense and unjust as well (Rawls, 1999: 309). Even 
in such cases, Rawls argues, citizens should oblige with the legal procedures 
and this obligation should be fulfilled as long as the political structure is in 
conformity with the basic principles of political liberalism. The duty of civility 
requires one not to invoke defects of institutions, use those defects as excuses 
for non-compliance and not to derive benefit from loopholes by exploiting them 
(Rawls, 1999: 312).  
Having impact on Habermas’s views on the issue, and having been 
influenced by Kant on the issue, Rawls too acknowledges acts of civil 
disobedience in very special circumstances and in the case of fulfillment of 
particular conditions. In his definition, civil disobedience is a “public, 
nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the 
                                                                                                                             
modernity since rule and coercion have come to be questioned in this age in a way that ancient 
and medieval thinkers never had done. See Otfried, Höffe. 1995. Political Justice: Foundations 
for a Critical Philosophy of Law and the State , Jeffrey C. Cohen tr. Polity Press; B. Blackwell: 
Cambridge, UK; Cambridge, MA, USA. For a comparison of Rawls’ and Höffe’s account of 
political justice also see. Aslı Çırakman. 2003. Bir Meşruiyet Sorunu Olarak Siyasal Adalet: 
Rawls ve Höffe (Political Justice as a Question of Legitimacy: Rawls and Höffe) in Liberalizm, 
Devlet, Hegemonya (Liberalism, State and Hegemony) E. Fuat Keyman ed., Everest Yayınları: 
İstanbul. 
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aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of government” (Rawls, 
1999: 320). Disobedience is a political act on the condition that it has been 
guided and justified “by the principles of justice, which regulate the constitution 
and social institutions generally” (Rawls, 1999: 321). When a group of citizens 
decides to oppose a particular regulation, their resistance cannot be grounded on 
group interests or comprehensive views. Rather they must show that the 
injustice caused by that particular law is against the commonly shared 
conception of justice. A disobedient act must be public and must invoke public 
reason. By emphasizing this, Rawls’ aim seems to prevent disobeyers’ tacit 
withdrawal from the political system. For him, one should not break a law by 
not obeying it in private sphere. Rather one must address the injustice he 
assessed in law in public forums in order to make it a general and political 
concern. For this reason, civil disobedience cannot be violent, the disobedient 
can never invoke force, and he cannot engage with activities that have a 
potential of hurting the civil liberties of others (Rawls, 1999: 321). A second 
reason for the necessity of non-violence is that by being so dissenters show the 
majority their fidelity to law. They make it explicit that they do not represent a 
danger to the system as a whole. Rawls underlines, “civil disobedience is 
clearly distinct from militant action and obstruction; it is far removed from 
organized forcible resistance” (Rawls, 1999: 322). Although Rawls argues that 
at some cases the latter forms of resistance can be justified, he does not provide 
an elaborate account of the bases of such justifications. 
For Alejandro (1996: 10) Rawls simply asks the “dissenting minorities 
not to overburden the state with pressing claims it cannot address 
simultaneously.” In the previous section, I have shown that this is the case for 
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Habermas as well. Although both Habermas and Rawls seem to defend the right 
to resist, they limit this right with too many requirements and hesitations. For 
this reason, one contends as one scholar points out, for these philosophers “civil 
disobedience should be a form of persuasion, an address or an appeal made by 
the disobedient to the authorities to change voluntarily their unjust ways” 
(Haksar, 1976: 66). Haksar writes, even “Gandhi, at least in his more radical 
moments would have thought this position too conservative” (Haksar, 1976: 
66). This is because the Rawlsian approach strives to establish a society that 
“substitutes social unity for divisiveness and social harmony for instability” 
(Alejandro, 1996: 11) and for this reason excludes controversial issues from the 
political as much as possible.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
We have seen the political is an order of reason for both Habermas and 
Rawls. Feelings such as passions or resentments or ‘unreasonable’ ideas such as 
religious doctrines and personal interests are not allowed to infiltrate into the 
political domain. None of them pays an emphasis on the issue, so one can only 
find minor remarks. In Rawls, violence is a problem of the unreasonable: those 
who are under the impact of comprehensive doctrines, those who lack virtues of 
civility such as criminals employ violent means. A similar treatment is also 
assessed in Habermas. Although he thinks that violence could also appear as a 
structural problem, the analysis of the phenomenon has been constricted within 
the framework of discourse: violence erupts when communication channels are 
distorted. While ignoring the fact that this eruption is also transmitting this 
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message (as an act), Habermas does not pay attention to the structural (socio-
economic, historical, political) factors that contribute to the distortion of 
communication channels either. He does not answer the question, for example, 
how in class-ridden societies or in societies with increased marginalization of 
certain groups communication channels can be improved without having 
structural transformations. 
One might also challenge the idea that language is a medium of peaceful 
coexistence with the argument that violence is inherent in the very 
symbolization of a thing. Apart from the discussions of ‘symbolic violence’ that 
call exclusions of or neglects of certain type of knowledge from the hegemonic 
epistemological domain as violence, one can argue, historically, at the origin of 
the determination of symbols, laws and other norms violent struggles are 
present. Most of the modern nation states are founded on the basis of civil or 
religious wars. The victors determined the official language, religion and 
decided what the name of that state would be, for instance. This is a point dealt 
by Walter Benjamin in his Critique of Violence, as we will see in the coming 
chapter.  
Furthermore, as I have argued in the introductory section while 
liberalism cannot and does not do away with violence, it attempts to control it 
by locating it within the framework of the state. Rawls is criticized for depicting 
the state as an administrative body and reducing politics to a technical issue 
(Honig, 1993) but we see that he advocates a sufficiently strong and coercive 
state. State has the sole authority to use coercive force. Apart from its 
functioning for penal purposes, this force is used for the protection of the ‘basic 
structure’ and for the prevention of the intrusion of comprehensive doctrines 
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into the political domain. It functions as a guardian and keeps the unreasonable 
at bay. It applies sanctions against those who “may not accept the reasons 
widely said to justify the general structure of political authority... or… may not 
regard as justified many of the statutes enacted by the legislature to which they 
are subject....”(Rawls, 2005).24  
For Bonnie Honig (1993: 2) this is a tendency present in diverse 
intellectual and political positions (republican, liberal and communitarian) in 
the form of a desire for the elimination of dissonance, conflict, struggle and 
resistance from politics. The theoretical approaches, which she calls “virtue 
theories” “confine politics (conceptually and territorially) to the juridical, 
administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects. 
They also assume that the task of political theory is to resolve institutional 
questions, to get politics right, over and done with, to free modern subjects and 
their sets of arrangements of political conflict and instability” (Honig, 1993: 
2).
25
 One of the criticisms the feminist theory directs at the modern-liberal-
democratic structures is their lack of address to issues like violence against 
women. They have ignored this phenomenon for a long time and considered it 
as a problem of private domain. Similarly, violence implied by state institutions 
or agents such as police forces (Benjamin, 1996), or violence experienced in 
gray zones such as prisons (Buchan, 2001: 42) have not been problematized. In 
                                               
24This view is also extended to international relations. In his Law of Peoples, Rawls argues that 
there are societies, which are non-liberal and not well-ordered. People of the liberal and decent 
states should respect those societies as long as they comply with minimal set of rights, defined 
and shared and accepted as genuinely universal by liberal states. In his view, outlaw states, 
which violate such minimal set of rights, may be subject to condemnation, sanctions and, in 
some circumstances, actual intervention (Rawls, 2002: 90).  
25 For Peter Berkowitz virtue is an important feature of liberal theory for the maintenance of the 
political regime. A number of virtues, mostly on self-discipline and the exercise of judgment 
have crucial role in the works of political theorists and in their conception of politics see: Peter, 
Berkowitz. 1999. Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism, Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, NJ.  
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a similar fashion to Honig, Slavoj Žižek criticizes the Habermasian or Rawlsian 
ethics for attempting to “de-antagonize the politics by formulating clear rules to 
be obeyed so that the agonistic procedure of litigation does not explode into 
politics proper.” (Žižek, 2006: 87) Even Seyla Benhabib, who is among the 
defenders of the model of a deliberative democracy, argues for Rawls, “public 
reason is best viewed not as a process of reasoning among citizens but as a 
regulative principle imposing limits upon how individuals and agencies ought to 
reason about public matters” (1996: 75). 
Thence, the approach that can be characterized as the non-
problematization of the relationship between violence and politics has been 
criticized for constraining politics and political action by eliminating differences 
and conflicts; for being blind to structural or systemic violence and violent 
practices in so-called non-political domains and for establishing violence as the 
constitutive other of the political. Furthermore, although the coercive function 
of the state in its ideal condition assumed to be functioning legitimately and 
within the framework of law and justice in reality it includes some problems. 
This is particularly relevant for the emphasis on one particular type of reason 
and for the distinction between the ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ or ‘reasonable’ or 
‘unreasonable’. We have seen that this is the case in the issue of terrorism. 
Where Habermas contends that terrorists should be treated different than war 
enemies and be fought by police forces, in his Law of People Rawls divides the 
world into well-ordered and not well-ordered peoples. Well-ordered societies 
denote reasonable and liberal peoples while ‘outlaw states’ and their not well 
orders are equated with ‘burdened’ peoples. Such an approach attributes 
superiority to liberal systems in terms of their culture, institutions and moral 
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characters. It also acknowledges the right to deny non-well-ordered peoples and 
even implies intervention in order to make these systems (and their people) 
‘right’ and ‘well’. Rasch (2003:140) notes, from this perspective “non-liberal, 
non-decent societies do not have the right even “to protest their condemnation 
by the world society” because they violate liberal rights, decent peoples on the 
other hand, have the right if necessary to wage just wars against them. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
A CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL PARADIGM: VIOLENCE 
AS CONSTITUTIVE OF POLITICAL 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I have presented the contours of the theoretical 
approach, which does not problematize the relationship between violence and 
politics. I have shown that the two leading liberal political theorists, Habermas 
and Rawls, despite their differences exclude violence from politics. I have 
argued that I treat Habermas and Rawls within the same category because both 
of the thinkers share the same normative ground. Both attempt to rearticulate 
the Kantian notion of reason as a distinct, moral and political instrument in their 
formulation of a legitimate and just socio-political order. Within that 
formulation, politics is depicted as a non-violent and unruffled process. 
Violence as an issue of politics or even as a threat to this conception is hardly 
debated. This is because their conceptions of politics are idealistic: either to do 
with rational deliberation on a continual intersubjective basis (as it is the case in 
Habermas) or with the basic structures on which political life depends 
(exemplified in Rawls). Even in the case of an illegitimate regime where 
disobedience should be justified from a liberal perspective, among many other 
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limitations non-violence is required. A neat separation of domains in the form 
of private vs. public, domestic vs. international also enables them to ignore 
certain violent practices or to treat them as non-political issues. Nonetheless, by 
ignoring structural and systemic forms of violence, for instance, violence taking 
place within the political system, their political theories remain limited with 
idealistic depictions. Even though they are not contemporaries, Habermas’s and 
Rawls’s views on the relationship between politics and violence received 
criticisms from different political positions. In this chapter, I will present four 
examples of such critique in the works of three theorists, Carl Schmitt, Walter 
Benjamin, Frantz Fanon and Slavoj Žižek by focusing on the conception of the 
politics and its relation to violence. Schmitt’s opposition to the liberal-
democratic paradigm, as we will see, directly targets its negligence of conflict 
and of the role of decisionism within politics. Benjamin, on the other hand, aims 
at exposing the inextricable connection between violence and law, i.e. a 
political order. He contends that the politics is stigmatized with a vicious circle 
of violence, which cannot be overcome within the framework of instrumental 
rationality (violence as a means for the destruction/foundation/preservation of a 
political order). He will try finding a way out but as we will see, it will be only 
possible with an absolute destruction. Frantz Fanon’s attack to the western 
political tradition will rise from the periphery. It raises a voice from a 
geography that represents the neglected ‘outside’ or ‘darkside’ of the liberal-
democratic regime; the lands over which violence in its brutal forms were 
inflicted for a long time with no hesitation.
26
 Fanon’s work aims at unveiling 
                                               
26 Different scholars note the ethnocentrism within the European political tradition and the 
negligence of the colonial violence as well. For instance, according to Richard J. Bernstein, 
Hannah Arendt, one of the most prominent figures opposing political atrocities within Europe 
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the violent aspect of the Western political rule in these territories. While 
Schmitt wants to sustain the threat of violence and violent conflict for the 
sustenance of politics and Benjamin looks for the possibility of a non-violent, 
non-instrumental form of action that eliminates violence, Fanon cultivates a 
specific form of violence as an emancipatory force.  Similarly, I will 
show Slavoj Žižek, in his analysis points out the intricate and structural 
relationship between violence and politics in contemporary world and offers 
destruction of the system for the elimination of such a link. This position, 
correct in its critique of the liberal-democratic paradigm for its neglect of the 
practice and structural aspects of violence, shares the same epistemology in the 
sense that the violence and politics link is presented as a postulate of reason, 
hence a priori. As the first paradigm does not take into account the possible 
entry of violence into politics, this position views violence necessarily linked to 
politics.  
 
3.1. Schmitt and the Formal Constitution of the Political and Violence 
Under State of Exception 
 
 One can say the most famous and controversial figure who treats 
violence as a central category of politics is the legal theorist Carl Schmitt who 
                                                                                                                             
does not regard the massacres of the African tribes as horrific as the Nazi genocide.  Bernstein 
even argued that she shows sympathy towards the imperial rulers. Shiraz Dossa too emphasizes 
the ethnocentric strain in Arendt’s imperial history. Since these natives lack historical artifacts, 
and civilization (two concepts which for Arendt are crucially significant) and since they cannot 
be separated from the nature they have part in, violence which is applied to them Dozza (1980) 
argues, “is clearly unjust [but] it is somehow not immoral” for Arendt. See Shiraz, Dossa.1980. 
“Human Status and Politics: Hannah Arendt on the Holocaust,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 13 (2) 309-23. If one insists on such reading on can find possibly supportive arguments 
with regard to the comments Arendt made regarding the Back riots in On Violence and in 
Reflections On Little Rock, along with her conceptions of animal laborans in the Human 
Condition. 
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has received an unprecedented attention in the 1990s from various Anglo-
American scholars and especially from figures of radical-democratic theory.
27
 
Schmitt went through the constitutional crisis and the stages of the collapse of 
the Weimar Republic (1919-1933)
 28
 and for this reason his political works are a 
direct critique of liberalism, particularly the liberal-constitutional theory of the 
state and the parliamentarian conception of politics.  
 Against the pervasive and corrosive impacts of socio-political conflicts, 
some argue his primary concern was to affirm and reaffirm the capacity of the 
political, the primordial and constitutive force of the Volk and the sovereign 
state (Dyzenhaus, 1997).
29
 On this, one can note the impact of George Sorel’s 
theory of general strike on Schmitt’s work. To the question of revolution, in 
Reflections on Violence, Sorel expressed his contempt for the acquisition of 
state power which is equated with state violence. Adopting an anarchist political 
attitude he fended for a general strike, which is different from a ‘proletarian 
                                               
27Apart from Benjamin Schmitt had influence on some early twentieth-century theorists such as 
Leo Strauss, Friedrich Hayek. His impact also can be traced in the works of contemporary 
scholars like Chantal Mouffe, Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida and Slavoj Žižek. A Schmitt 
renaissance is especially triggered by the military and political actions of the US under Bush 
presidency after the 9/11 attacks. The declared “war on terror” with practices such as 
preemptive strikes and Guantanamo Bay, political thinkers thought invite a Schmittian analysis 
in pointing out the limit of legalism and liberalism.  
28 The post-war period in Germany in 1920s was troubled with millions of casualties of war, 
economic crisis, and unemployment and with ongoing internal bloody confrontations. The 
defeat in the First World War ended the Second Reich in Germany and followed by the 
foundation of the liberal Weimer Republic (1919-1933) but the early years between 1918 and 
1921 witnessed quite bloody confrontations and particularly the crush of the German 
revolutionary movement also known as the Spartacist uprising. The murder of Rosa Luxemburg 
and her friends is also one of the highlights of such crush. One scholar (Kellog, 2011: 4) noted 
the cover of The New York Times on November 11, 1918 summarizing the instability of 
Germany at that time: ‘‘Armistice Signed, End of the War! Berlin Seized by Revolutionists; 
New Chancellor Begs for Order; Ousted Kaiser Flees to Holland. 
29In contrast to the view, which argues Schmitt’s theory is an attempt of making the exception 
as the norm Dyzenhaus (1997: 46) writes, “while the vitality of the exception looms large as the 
theme of Political Theology, it is important to keep in mind that Schmitt was not arguing for the 
total negation of normality. Indeed, in other works of this period, he seemed to argue for the 
desirability of legally established normality. For he did not reject the idea of a society 
comprehensively governed by legal norms, on condition that the political decision that 
underpins that legal order is made explicit.” 
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strike’ offered by the left for the acquisition of state power. A proletarian 
‘general strike’ is a type of mass revolt in which the revolution emerges as a 
“pure and simple” act, which would not only eliminate the defenders of social 
reforms, and professional revolutionaries, but also the state as such. As opposed 
to the liberals and reformists that cry for the overcoming of conflict via reason, 
and of violence, which is merely a “relic of barbarism” through appeals to the 
“magical force of the State” (74, 180) Sorel advocated the “myth” of proletarian 
strike, a symbol of the massive, intensive, destructive moment of action.  
 Schmitt praised Sorel for his concept of myth because it brings forward 
an “anti-rationalist, anti-materialist theory of direct action and ‘unmediated 
concrete life’” (Müller, 2003: 463). The formal, bureaucratic and dull life the 
liberal-democratic approach imposes can be overcome with this dynamic and 
energetic view. He did not value the idea of class struggle, however. For him 
the class contradiction fell short of the existential aspect of difference he is 
looking for and it was further getting historically irrelevant. A scholar notes a 
Schmittian remark, “all that is moving today in the direction of national 
antagonisms, rather than class antagonisms” (Müller 2003: 463); hence his 
preference for national difference as the basis of collective identity.  
 Schmitt did not adopt the Sorelian violence that aimed at destroying the 
present political order either. He was an ardent supporter of the state (and, 
subsequently, the Reich) and used all of his means to promote the idea and the 
ideal of state sovereignty. The German legal jurist embraced the vitality 
introduced by Sorel’s idea of revolution only for the rejuvenation of the 
political spirit he thought was lost in modern political order. 
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 For some scholars (such as Wolin, 1992; McCormick, 1997; Rasch, 
2003), therefore, Schmitt’s critique is also a part of a broader response to the 
crisis the European civilization faced with the rise of technology, rationalization 
and increased individualism of modernity.
30
 Albeit carrying elements of fascism 
and authoritarianism, Schmitt’s attack on liberalism and his views on the 
autonomy of the political deserve attention, it has been argued, as a meticulous 
study of pathology (Deveci, 2002: 36) since it points out the actual contrary to 
the idealist and teleological views on politics. Schmitt draws attention to the 
violent aspect of the state and the conflictual nature of the political as opposed 
to the ideas on supremacy of law, pluralism and democracy (Deveci, 2002: 36).  
The central idea in Schmitt’s critique is that liberalism engages with a 
radical negation of the political and the state by ignoring their essential features. 
Liberalism treats the political as if it is one of other forms of social relations and 
it attempts “to tie the political to the ethical and to subjugate it to economics” 
(Schmitt, 2007: 61). The political, for Schmitt, is a distinct realm of human 
experience and is an independent domain with its own internal laws. All social 
realms are based on particular distinctions designating the specificity of those 
domains: “in the domain of morality, the final distinctions are between good 
and evil, in aesthetics between beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and 
unprofitable” (Schmitt, 2007: 26).  
 In the first chapter I have argued that the ‘political is a contested notion 
and there has been a confusion about the necessity of its distinction from 
politics and the state. On this, Schmitt has a clear answer. For him, the 
                                               
30Richard Wolin (1992) argues Schmitt’s critique of Enlightenment rationalism is of 
Nietzschean provenance and carries the influence of Lebensphilosphie. John McCormick shares 
this view as well; for him, however, a Weberian concern for rationalization is also present in 
Schmitt’s works.  
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‘political’ is different from ‘politics’ and the ‘state’ is a domain designated by 
the distinction between friend and enemy. One should understand the concepts 
of friend and enemy in their “concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or 
symbols” he reminds (2007: 27). Nor should they be “mixed and weakened by 
economic, moral, and other conceptions, least of all in a private individualistic 
sense as a psychological expression of private emotions and tendencies” 
(Schmitt, 2007: 28). He underlines that the enemy is not someone one competes 
nor is he someone one envies or hates in private. Inimucus is the private enemy. 
The equivalent of the word in the archaic English is the ‘foe’. The Roman word 
inimicus and the English word foe denote various forms of moral, aesthetic or 
economic negative feelings one has towards someone else. The concept of 
enemy, however, does not have a connection with the private feelings such as 
hate or moral concerns with which one judges someone else. It is the ‘public 
enemy’; the Roman equivalent of it is hostis. 31 “The political enemy need not 
be a morally evil or aesthetically ugly…but he is, nevertheless the other, 
stranger,” Schmitt (2007: 27) asserts. Yet, the idea that the enemy is a stranger 
does not imply that he is necessarily an alien. Schmitt’s existential approach 
contends that the enemy might be domestic as well (Schmitt, 2007: 46). “An 
enemy exists only when, at least potentially one fighting collectivity of people 
confronts a similar collectivity” (Schmitt, 2007: 28).  
 A simple antagonism between different groups is not a sufficient 
condition for the political; only ‘extreme’ antagonism between collectivities can 
constitute the ground. Accordingly, whenever a social domain is divided by a 
                                               
31 Pointing out the shared etymology of the notions of host, hostis and hospitality the French 
philosopher Derrida, for instance, makes an intervention that could be considered as a challenge 
to both Schmitt’s notion of enemy and to the Kantian notion of hospitality. See: Jacques 
Derrida. 2000. “Hostipitality”. Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities. 5 (3):3-18. 
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friend-enemy grouping, then that domain becomes political. If a competition 
between supporters of two different football-teams turned into a physical 
conflict, if the country divided over this conflict into two hostile groups as if a 
civil war would soon erupt, from a Schmittian perspective, we can assume that 
football became a political matter (Deveci, 2002: 45).
32
 This is a view that 
differs from Hobbes who inspired Schmitt with his theory of the sovereign. 
Hobbes conjectures the emergence of politics on the threat of individualistic 
violence. Not a group of people that is hostile to another collectivity, which is 
different from the first, creates the conflict but the atomistic individual who is 
aggressive faces the person with the same motives and enters into confrontation. 
In Hobbes’s universe, the formation of any collectivity is also banned when the 
state is erected. From a Schmittian point of view, on the other hand, a 
consciousness of collectivity, the formation of it in an antagonistic relation with 
the other, sustains the political.  
 Apart from having a collective connotation, the concept of enemy refers 
to a material and immediate possibility of combat in Schmitt. “Just as the term 
enemy, the word combat, too, is to be understood in its original existential 
sense… The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning 
precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing” (Schmitt, 
2007: 34; emphasis mine). In this sense, the possibility of war is the existential 
negation of the other, it is the most intense degree of the political; yet still the 
battle itself does not denote the political for him. As he (Schmitt, 2007: 37) 
claims 
                                               
32 He writes, “every religious, moral, economic, ethical or other antithesis transforms into a 
political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and 
enemy” (Schmitt, 2007: 37). 
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The political does not reside in the battle itself, which possesses its 
own technical, psychological, and military laws, but in the mode of 
behavior, which is determined by the possibility, by clearly 
evaluating the concrete situation and thereby being able to 
distinguish correctly the real friend from the real enemy. 
 
 Schmitt’s conception also suggests that a political collectivity is not a 
fixed entity; it may be formed against another group, dissolve in time and might 
be established by some other members opposing another group of enemy.
33
 
Therefore, unlike Weber who views (legitimate claim to the) use of violence as 
the defining characteristic of the state, Schmitt suggests it to be the defining 
feature of the political. While for Weber and as we have seen for the early 
liberals, the political emerges with the temporal and spatial transition from the 
threat of arbitrary and uncontrolled violence to the rationalized controlled and 
monopolized exercise of violence, for Schmitt the political only survives with 
the ever-present possibility and threat of (a particular type of) violence.   
For this reason, the political as a realm of experience displays an 
autonomous nature. By subsuming it under binary oppositions (with the 
possibility of changing social relations into friend-enemy grouping), the 
political domain reveals a superior nature, which for Schmitt needs to be 
recognized and promoted. “The concept of the state presupposes the concept of 
the political,” he (2007: 19) writes.  
Within the liberal tradition, the state is treated like an ordinary 
institution. It is either subordinated to Law in constitutionalism debates or 
reduced to a mere executive body carrying the decisions of the representative 
                                               
33Chantal Mouffe argues that the fundamental weakness of Schmitt’s thought is his 
‘essentialisation’ of the friend–enemy distinction. See Mouffe, Chantal. 1997. ‘Carl Schmitt and 
the Paradox of Liberal Democracy’, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 10 (1): 50. 
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legislative assembly. According to the liberals, states emerge and they are 
legitimized for the realization and protection of universal norms, which are the 
result of their logical deduction. For Schmitt such a conception is mistaken 
since all norms are relativized particularly in this age (Dyzenhaus, 1994: 6); and 
there is no basic norm, an originary source from which justification for political 
authority can be derived. Within this context, Schmitt’s famous theory of 
sovereignty fits here. Schmitt interested in the seventeenth-century as a source 
of inspiration for he thought the theological and political notions such as 
sovereignty and the state of exception would be helpful in the overcoming of 
the crisis of his times. Accordingly, until the beginning of the eighteenth 
century the idea of a God transcending the worldly realm were paralleled to the 
notion of sovereignty transcending the state; both of these thoughts were 
metaphysically self-evident. The personalist and decisionist elements inherent 
to the notion of sovereignty, however, were lost in the process of favouring of 
an organic conception of politics and of people and via the democratic 
assumptions of the equality and identity of rulers and subjects (Schmitt, 1985: 
60). For Schmitt, no matter what legal theorists argue, sovereignty constitutes 
the essential aspect of politics, which is the power to decide on the invocation of 
a state of exception (Ausnahmezustand, which can be translated as state of 
emergency). The state of exception is an inevitable aspect of every normative 
order. Emergence of urgent and unforeseen events may require immediate 
actions that may not be addressed (and may be forbidden) by the legal 
framework. In this sense, the sovereign is the body that passes the judgment on 
the existence of an existential crisis and the decision on suspending law and 
implementing specific emergency measures. The temporary suspension of law 
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enables the state to take every measure including violence to the groups that are 
defined as threats or enemies in order to protect or restore the present order.
34
 
These situations, not only refute the liberal belief in generalizable rules and pre-
established norms but also importance of the body/entity that decides and acts 
upon that decision. For Schmitt the crucial point is that “by its very nature the 
political entity is the decisive entity” (Schmitt, 2007: 43). It represents the 
power of going beyond the limits of laws including the coercive implements. 
The decision taken by the state might aim at preventing violence but more 
importantly, it might allow the exercise of violence, as said, beyond the limits 
of legal authorizations whenever it deems necessary. As a supreme body, the 
state provides some kind of formula for the decision of the (external or internal) 
enemy and declares it and it has the sole right to wage war. Only the state has 
“the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die and 
unhesitatingly to kill enemies” (Schmitt, 2007: 46). Therefore, it transcends all 
other associations and organizations such as unions, political parties or religious 
communities.  
Liberalism misses this necessity of decisionism and the extralegal 
powers in politics. Its “way of being is negotiation, procrastinating half 
measures, in the hope that the final clash, the bloody battle of the decision, 
                                               
34John McCormick points out a distinction Schmitt made between the commissarial and 
sovereign dictatorship in his earlier work Die Diktatur (1921). Accordingly, the commissarial 
dictatorship is a type of power, which is temporary and emerges in times of crisis with the 
specific task of restoring the order. A legislative body specifies the task of the commissarial 
dictator and monitors it. A sovereign dictator, on the other hand, is “a historically modern 
phenomenon which is unlimited in terms of its powers and may proceed to establish a 
completely new order. This distinction is later removed and left its place to the notion of 
sovereign. See, John P. McCormick. 1998. “The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and 
Constitutional Emergency Powers,” in Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism 
David Dyzenhaus ed., Duke University Press: Durham NC.  
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could be metamorphosed into parliamentary debate, and would allow itself, to 
be suspended in an eternal discussion” (Schmitt in Dyzenhaus, 1994:13).  
 I have shown the concept of ‘public reason’ is a central element in 
political theories of Habermas and Rawls. It is via the formation of public 
reason, different interests, identities and opinions co-exist and flourish in a 
political order. For Schmitt, however, the principle that “the truth can be found 
through an unrestrained clash of opinion and that competition will produce 
harmony” exemplifies the tendency of liberalism to convert politics into ethics 
and economics (Schmitt, 1992: 35). Liberalism gives a central place to 
discussion, emphasizes openness and expression of public opinion freely so that 
private opinions, wills and interests can compete. Parliamentarism, in this sense, 
appears to be something essentially democratic in the modern world (Schmitt, 
1992: 34). The reality, however, is that decisions are made behind closed doors 
by small exclusive committees or of parties or party coalitions in response to the 
more or less insistent demands of big capitalist interest groups (Schmitt, 1992: 
50). The metaphysical or maybe pragmatic attachment of liberalism to the idea 
of public reason derives from its incompatibility with democracy. The latter, 
according to Schmitt requires equality, homogeneity, and the identity between 
the rulers and the ruled in order to function properly whereas liberalism with its 
emphasis on individuality and pluralism presents a conflicting approach to 
democratic politics. 
 It is almost impossible for Schmitt to conceive a peaceful world 
(Schmitt, 2007: 54) since for him the unification of the world under the rule of a 
global state or the elimination of all differences are unlikely. Such claims are 
also ideological: Humanity is not a political concept and the “term “human” is 
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not descriptive, but evaluative” (Rasch, 2003:140). Wars that are claimed to be 
declared in the name of humanity or slogans like “crimes against humanity” are 
politicizing non-political terms with moral utterances.
35
 From Schmitt’s 
perspective, the friend-enemy distinction is a noble and fair political relation 
where each party is recognized as human and equal. He (2004: 77) writes, 
The enemy is not something that for some reason we should do 
away with or destroy as if it had no value […] The enemy places 
himself on my own level. On this ground, I must engage with the 
opposing enemy, in order to establish the very measure of myself, 
my own boundaries, my own Gestalt.  
 
 Therefore, the existence of the enemy is crucial for the self-
determination of a collectivity. Without it, no identity is possible. The liberal 
approach, on the other hand, strips the enemy from its humanness and destroys 
it without respect. The hostis is transformed into inimucus. Losing its political 
connotation, the foe becomes the instrument of propaganda and is used in 
justifying crusades of economic reckonings with moral necessity.
36
 “[A] new 
and essentially pacifist vocabulary has been created” by liberalism, Schmitt 
argues. “War is condemned but executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, 
pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and measures to assure 
peace. The adversary is thus no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace 
and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity (Schmitt, 2007: 79). The 
‘incomplete’ humanity of the foe in liberal construct, as opposed to the enemy 
                                               
35 For a conflicting view, which discusses the normative aspect of humanitarian interventions 
and Schmitt’s Realpolitik See: Jürgen Habermas. 2000. Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the 
Border between Law and Morality. Franz Solms-Laubach (trans.) available at: 
http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/011habermas.htm (The original: Jürgen Habermas.1999. 
Bestialität und Humanität, Die Zeit, 54, 18:1-8) 
36 This is an argument shared and elaborated by different scholars in their analysis of modernity 
and modern political orders. Hannah Arendt’s analysis of imperialism and totalitarianism, 
Agamben’s analysis of camps and concept of ‘homo sacer’ and Foucaut’s arguments on 
disciplinary and normalizing form of modern power are some of the examples. 
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in Schmitt, as argued “renders it infinitely inferior to the ‘fully’ liberal rights-
holders, which justifies the deployment of asymmetric subject–object relations 
in pedagogical practices of correction” (Prozorov, 2006: 95). This change of 
discourse reveals hypocrisy of liberalism: albeit being a primarily an apolitical 
and even antipolitical system of thought its reproduction of the logic of the 
political (Schmitt, 2007: 79). This attitude also enable liberal states to avoid the 
“political responsibility and visibility” (Schmitt, 2007: 77) of employing 
violence.   
 One can argue that Schmitt’s formulation is somehow dystopian in the 
sense that a recurrent friend-enemy grouping, an ongoing combat or the 
continuous threat of it seems to make an order almost impossible. In fact, for 
some scholars (for instance, Dyzenhaus, 1997) there is a central tension 
between an antagonistic conception of politics based on the confrontation 
between friend and enemy and the search for security and order in Schmitt’s 
works. On this, Leo Strauss (2007: 103) notes a discrepancy between Schmitt 
and Hobbes, whose conception of violent conflict as the structural fact of 
human life Schmitt finds inspiring. While Hobbes seeks to avoid or minimize 
violence by constraining it with the establishment of the body politic, Schmitt 
ultimately accepts and affirms this violence. In fact, Schmitt is not an offender 
of violence, nor he argues war is the continuation of politics by other means; for 
him “war is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of 
politics” (Schmitt, 2007: 34). He also states that war is an extreme case. All the 
same, the exceptional nature of this case confirms the relevance of his 
assessment: the conflictual nature of the political and the state’s decisive role. 
The political and the state is always backed up by the possibility of violence, 
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which he does not want to eliminate but affirms its continuity. He also argues a 
world without conflict, civil or international war is not possible. If all the 
conflicts and the friend-enemy distinctions cease and if the possibility of war is 
utterly eliminated, then there will be neither politics nor the state. In such a 
pacified world, only culture, civilization, economics and morality, law, art, 
entertainment etc. would remain (Schmitt, 2007: 53).
37
   
 In the previous chapter, we have seen that for Habermas and Rawls there 
is a distinction between a civil disobedient, (who they also equated with a rebel 
in ambiguous terms) and a terrorist in terms of their motives and relation with 
violence. The civil disobedient has no aim of overthrowing the system. Rather, 
as a protector of the system and of the constitution, her/his acts are corrective 
and non-violent in nature. As I have stated before, they do not even want to 
consider the option of a collective resistance or upheaval against the system. 
This is because in their ideally depicted system there is no need to abolish the 
order with an aim of establishing a new one. Such a view then cannot explain 
the existing violent practices and for this reason evaluates them as marginal or 
abnormal cases. A ‘terrorist’, in this sense, is conceptualized as different from a 
‘rebel’ and also from an ‘enemy’. This is certain for Habermas. The terrorist is 
the ‘other’, the irrational, the abnormal that cannot be communicated who, 
therefore, should be treated and punished if necessary by the police forces.  
When we come to Schmitt, we see that his categories differ from the ones 
the liberal-democrats suggest. In his theory, there is the ‘partisan’ and the 
‘revolutionary combatant’ (Schmitt, 1963). The reflections on the notion of 
                                               
37 We should remember that in Chapter 13, contrary to Schmitt, Hobbes writes no economy, 
culture and civilization would be possible in a world with continuous conflicts and antagonisms. 
In his formulation, the raison d'être of the state is the pacification of the social order. See, 
Thomas Hobbes.1968. The Leviathan, Penguin Books Classics. 
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partisan, Schmitt writes is based on the Spanish Guerilla War, where “pre-
bourgeois, pre-industrial, and pre-conventional people” (Schmitt, 1963:3) fight 
against a modern regular army. The partisan is an irregular and flexible unit of 
struggle. He is expected to be a mobile in active combat. Agility, speed, and the 
sudden change of surprise attack and retreat are among his features. He 
specifies his target and acts for the elimination of the threat. The intensely 
political character is another important defining feature of the partisan. In this 
sense, he is distinguished from “common thief and criminal, whose motives aim 
at private enrichment” (Schmitt, 1963: 10). This is an argument in an absolute 
disagreement with the liberals: whereas for Rawls and Habermas the partisan 
would be a non-political agent, an embodiment of the negation of politics, he is 
a political agent par excellence in Schmitt. Clausewitz’s “formula for ‘war as 
the continuation of politics’ is the theory of the partisan in a nutshell” (Schmitt, 
1963: 6) and this theory was extended to its logical limit by Lenin and Mao. 
Finally, Schmitt writes, the partisan is defined by his tellurian character. The 
scope of his actions is limited with the territory of the land. When this tellurian 
character is removed, when the partisan becomes radical ideologically and 
morally, and when the enemy is defined in absolute and abstract terms such as 
class, race or religion rather than contextual and real terms, then one speaks of a 
‘revolutionary fighter’. Lenin’s ideology represents what Carl Schmitt defines 
as the revolutionary fighter. His absolutization of the party, and of the partisan 
who fights a continuous and so-called ‘just’ battle on an indefinite scale against 
an absolute enemy who is also criminal, exemplifies this new type of agent of 
action. For Lenin (Schmitt, 2004: 46-7, 77 in de Benoist, 2007: 74-5) 
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The goal remains the communist revolution in countries all over the 
world. Anything contributing to this end is good and correct... For 
Lenin, only revolutionary war is genuine war, because it is based on 
absolute enmity...With the absolutization of the party, the partisan 
also became something absolute, and he was raised to the level of a 
bearer of absolute enmity.  
 
Thence, both the partisan and the revolutionary fighter are political 
agents and they employ violence whenever necessary. In that sense they 
significantly differ from a civil disobedient who at the end is a respectful 
citizen. The difference between a partisan and a revolutionary fighter is only in 
terms of the scope of the target of their enmity. For the partisan the hostility is 
temporally and spatially limited. For the revolutionary fighter, on the other 
hand, the enemy is absolute and eternal. From Schmitt’s perspective, therefore, 
there is no normative difference between the two as Habermas suggests existing 
between a war enemy and a terrorist. In fact, the partisan might connote what 
one might call today a ‘terrorist’ or a ‘guerilla’ at national contexts. As Schmitt 
mentions, however, the scope of the term might be broadened. With the 
substitution of irregularity by illegality, and the military battle by resistance, 
one can also reach the profile of an illegal resistance fighter or an underground 
activist (Schmitt, 1963: 12).
38
 As a result, it is not possible to condemn a 
particular type of act as ‘violence’ and of a particular political subject as a 
‘terrorist’ for Schmitt. The liberal categories of legality and legitimacy cannot 
be relevant from the perspective where enmity is seen as a constructive force. 
As we have seen, in the definition of the political and the state, violence 
becomes constitutive for Schmitt. Earlier in the previous chapter, I have shown 
                                               
38Here Schmitt refers to Rolf Schroers and his definition of the partisan in Der Partisan (1961).  
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that this was so for the early liberal theorists too. The threat of the possibility of 
one form of violence (either as a conflict or as violation) poses (to individuals’ 
life, liberty and property) justifies the necessity of a political order and political 
authority. The foundation of politics signifies the erection of temporal and 
spatial boundaries out of which violence can be colonized. Within the borders, 
it is constrained, docilized even utilized. The liberal-democratic approach 
accepts this construction as a fact and without problematizing it focuses on 
further regulations of the internal sphere. For Schmitt, on the other hand, 
pushing violence out of the borders does not change the fact that there is a 
threat. He does not give up the idea that a political collectivity fundamentally 
comes into being due to the threat raised by other collectivities. It is the 
presence of the others on the other side of the line, their threat of violence that 
makes us ‘us’ different from the ‘others’, so one cannot turn one’s gaze from 
the outside to the inside. Hence, violence cannot be excluded.  
As I have stated above, Schmitt’s theory of the political inspired many 
political theorist such as Chantal Mouffe in the formulation of their critique of 
liberal democracy, which they assess to be in crisis, and in their attempt of 
offering new forms of politics. For Mouffe (1999), the liberal theory fails to 
appreciate the antagonistic nature of the political. The negation of antagonism 
only leads to impotence, the result of the strong belief that conflicts are 
outcomes of archaic passions not controlled by reason. Nonetheless, she 
criticizes Schmitt for presenting an essentialist account, which therefore 
presents a potential of violent conflict. Mouffe attempts at a reformulation of 
Schmitt’s theory with her ‘agonistic pluralism’. With a presupposition of the 
existence of a common symbolic framework, she aims at opening the space for 
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the expression of dissent and manifestations of conflict and preventing 
violence.
39
  
 Similarly, the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek (2006) criticizes 
Schmitt for radicalization of binary oppositions.
 40
 By reformulating politics as a 
war between ‘us’ and ‘them’ Schmitt engages with a false radicalization since 
what he calls the Schmittian “ultra-politics” 41 leaves no ground for symbolic 
conflict between opponents. While noting the importance of the formation of a 
collectivity Žižek points out the difference between a ‘politicized’ and a 
‘radicalized’ unity. He calls attention to a protest that took place in the East 
Germany in the last days of the GDR. The crowd protesting the communist 
regime first shouted, “We are the people! (“Wir sind das Volk!”), he says and 
thereby they performed  
                                               
39 In fact, we have seen that for Schmitt the friend/enemy distinction is a dynamic construction 
and does not have any essentialist connotations. In this sense, Mouffe’s charge is unfounded, 
and it is possible to criticize her for constraining Schmitt within the liberal framework he wants 
to break. 
40One can argue that although Žižek criticizes Schmitt for the radicalization of the collectivity in 
terms of its internal unity, he follows a Schmittian path in his emphasis on the need for the 
radicalization of camps and the imposition of a leftist will in order to destruct the liberal order. 
41In this critique, Žižek is inspired by Jacques Rancière’s intervention that asserts a distinction 
between politics and policing that is the hierarchical regulation (policymaking, politicking, 
bargaining, ordering etc.) of a socio-economic domain. Against political theorists such as 
Habermas Rancière asserts that the political struggle is not a “rational debate between multiple 
interests, but the struggle for one’s voice to be heard and recognized as the voice of a legitimate 
partner” Žižek (2006). Politics is about contestation, “dissensus” (Rancière), the rising up of the 
excluded, and the insertion of the particular into the universal. Based on Rancière’s 
categorization Žižek argues the opening up of the space of politics for challenge and 
transformation is closed through several ways. There is the arche-politics, exemplified in the 
communitarian approach that defines “a traditional close, organically structured homogeneous 
social space that allows for no void in which the political moment-event can emerge”. Then, 
there is the para-politics, the type of political approach, I have debated and argued that it 
excludes violence from the political domain. Para-politics attempts to depoliticize politics by 
reformulating political conflict as a competition, “within the representational space, between 
acknowledged parties/agents, for the (temporary) occupation of the place of executive power” 
exemplified in the works of Habermas and Rawls. The third way of disavowal of politics is 
attempted by the Marxist (or Utopian Socialist) meta-politics (Žižek, 2006: 186-7). In this 
approach, Žižek (2006) writes “political conflict is fully asserted, but it is conceived as a 
shadow-theatre in which events whose proper place is on Another Scene (of economic 
processes) are played out”. The ultimate goal of ‘true’ politics then the cancellation of this form 
of politics with an order where a fully self-transparent rational order of collective Will is 
imposed. The category of “ultrapolitics” is added and elaborated by Žižek. 
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the gesture of politicization at its purest. They, the excluded 
counterrevolutionary “scum” of the official whole of the people, 
with no proper place in official space (or, more precisely, with only 
titles such as “counterrevolutionaries,” “hooligans,” or, at best, 
“victims of bourgeois propaganda,” reserved for their designation), 
claimed to stand for the people, for “all.” However, a couple of days 
later, the slogan changed into “We are a/one people!” (Wir sind ein 
Volk!”), clearly signaling the closure of the momentary authentic 
political opening, the reappropriation of the democratic impetus… 
(Žižek, 2006: 207) 
 
 For this reason, it is possible to argue that the problem of Schmitt’s 
friend-enemy distinction is the assumed identity or the unified character of the 
collectivity. This is a point underlined by Dodd (2009) as well. Although 
Schmitt does not essentialize the enemy, rather views its determination to be 
contextual, he attributes crucial importance to its presence for contributing to 
the formation of a collective identity. There is a continuous reference to the 
other and it makes one ask whether the identity is constructed purely in 
oppositional terms. The inter-group plurality is another question. This is so 
because Schmitt requires the confrontation of two collectivities in existential 
terms to qualify the criteria of being political. Such a confrontation suggests an 
absolute unity and homogeneity within a group. If this is the case, one then 
might take side with Chantal Mouffe (1999) on the point that the collective 
identity Schmitt suggests is essentialist since only in such case one collectivity 
can threat the other with extinction. Yet still, we know that for Schmitt internal 
divisions are possible but they are required to be in the form of an existential 
threat in order to be political. This produces a dilemma for Schmitt. If a given 
collectivity is not a homogenous unity, then continuous internal conflicts and 
divisions must be inevitable. This being so, one cannot ensure the stability of 
that collectivity rather witness its division and merging in order to sustain the 
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dynamism Schmitt wants from the political. Alternatively, the collectivity 
should have a great number of enemies that could outweigh internal divisions 
and keep the community together. If the collectivity is homogenous, then the 
enemy must be the same, eternal, which is an argument Schmitt does not 
defend, or again a process of continuous enemy creation is required for the 
political to be alert all the time. In any case, if not the enemy, the conflict seems 
to be essentialized in this thinking. Schmitt attributes friend-enemy distinction 
an ontological aspect but differing from the absolutist theorist of the 17
th
 
century, he does not seem to be looking for the finalization of the threat of 
violence. His theory we can argue asserts the existence of a permanent state of 
nature where collectivities rather than individuals clash.  
 Another crucial point in Schmitt’s theorization is his pointing out state 
as a political entity par excellence in terms of its capacity to operate fully 
outside of the scope of “politics”, which is understood by the liberals as a 
competition of partial interests (Dodd, 2009: 38) or by theorists such as 
Habermas as the formation of a mutual agreement. “The state as the decisive 
political entity possesses an enormous power: the possibility of waging war and 
thereby politically disposing of the lives of men” (Schmitt, 1996: 46) without 
having to obey the legally defined limits of state coercion. Hence, the state’s 
capacity to be violent constitutes an important aspect of Schmittian politics. 
Hence, the two elements, the extreme case of the possibility of violent 
confrontation, and its decision constitutes the definition of the political in 
Schmitt. 
 This definition of the political is formal and is constituted by the 
distinction of friend and enemy in a way that violence remains an ultimate 
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possibility. It is formal in the sense that it locates violence in one situation. For 
him enmity is what is necessary properly to understand the political. It is 
formal, in that it is a statement of necessity, not actuality. The state’s capacity of 
being violent at times where decision-making is required further makes violence 
again an important aspect of his definition of the political. He is not interested 
in what actually happens but what really the case is. He is not advocating a 
politics as such in his theory of the political but his depiction points out the 
aspects that liberals miss or ignore.  
 As a result, while the Schmittian perspective offers a more realistic 
account in terms of appreciating the role violence plays in history and politics, 
as shown it has the tendency of attributing violence or hostility an essential 
character. This tendency can be criticized, from a different normative-
theoretical ground such as the Habermasian politics, for neglecting other aspects 
of human existence but I think it is possible to criticize Schmitt within 
Schmittian ontology by arguing that his analysis disregards the range of 
exchanges and interactions that can take place between friend and enemy as 
well. As we will see in the next chapters, Arendt reminds how the friend/enemy 
distinction was treated as a possibility of founding a future alliance in Roman 
times. In one of the rare instances, she writes on law Arendt reminds the Roman 
times: laws were established not for the re-establishment of peace but they (as 
treaties and in the case of wars in Roman history. Arendt argues that at the end 
of wars, in the case of wars in Roman history. Arendt argues that at the end of 
wars, in the case of wars in Roman history. Arendt argues that at the end of 
wars, (as treaties and agreements) they were means of constituting new 
alliances and unities between entities, which were separate in the first instance, 
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became enemies by war and entered into a partnership with the finalization of a 
war (Arendt, 1963: 188). Therefore, neither war nor violence has to be the limit 
where political emerges or intensifies as it approaches to that limit. Politics, for 
thinkers like Arendt, may also begin with the termination of violence among 
parties.  
 
3.2 Benjamin: The Violence of Law and the Overcoming of Politics through 
Divine Violence 
 
Witnessing the turmoil of the Weimar Republic like Schmitt, Walter 
Benjamin opposed the liberal-democratic paradigm’s hypothetical distinction of 
violence form force, its appraisal of law as a rational, supreme principle of 
political order. The questions of the establishment and protection of an ‘order’ 
and ‘revolution’ (that is the destruction of an old and founding of a new order) 
and their relation to violence loom the background of the theorist’s work while 
reflecting on the crisis Germany was undergoing. 
 Despite their different and even opposing political stands, some 
affinities between Benjamin and Schmitt have been noted (Weber, 1992; for a 
view that underlines their differences Müller, 2003),
42
  
                                               
42 A letter penned by Benjamin (1930) addressing Carl Schmitt is suggested to be the proof of 
such affinity and admiration on Benjamin’s side (Weber, 1992; Müller, 2003; de Wilde, 2011). 
Benjamin expresses his indebtedness to Schmitt for the impact of his theory of sovereignty on 
his work, The Origin of the German Mourning Play. “We also know that after Benjamin’s tragic 
death, when Theodor Adorno was preparing a selection of Benjamin’s letters to publish, he did 
not include the mentioned letter and eliminated references to Schmitt from Benjamin’s Origins 
of German Tragedy in order to remove the traces of a suggested affinity between two theorists. 
According to Samuel Weber (1992) Benjamin’s interest in the work of Schmitt is for at least 
two related but very distinct reasons. “First of all, the ‘play of mourning’ at work in the 
Trauerspiel and above all the character of its “origin” both imply a certain relationship to 
history and to politics.” More specifically, however, he writes, “Benjamin encounters the 
question of sovereignty not simply as a theme of German baroque theater, but as a 
methodological and theoretical problem: as we shall see, according to Benjamin every attempt 
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 The first one pertains to their intellectual sources of inspirations and 
their methodological approach. Like Schmitt, Benjamin had a particular interest 
in the seventeenth-century but he majorly pondered on the theatrical and 
aesthetic aspects of the historical era. Weber (1992: 7) defined their 
commonalty as “methodological extremism” which is a kind of engagement 
with “a singularity that exceeds or eludes” the general. In Political Theology, 
Schmitt (1985: 15) writes 
Precisely a philosophy of concrete life must not withdraw from the 
exception and the extreme case, but must be interested in it to the 
highest degree. The exception can be more important to it than the 
rule, not because of a romantic irony for the paradox, but because 
the seriousness of an insight goes deeper than the clear 
generalizations inferred from what ordinarily repeats itself. The 
exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; 
the exception proves everything: it confirms not only the rule but 
also its existence, which derives only from the exception. 
 
Similarly, Benjamin explains his involvement in the ‘extreme’ “in order 
to indicate just how the “idea” distinguishes itself from the subsumptive 
generality of the concept” (Weber, 1992: 7) where he writes on the premises 
and implications of his reading of the German baroque theater:  
The idea is best explained as the representation of the context in 
which the unique and extreme [Einmalig-Extreme] stands alongside 
its counterpart. It is therefore erroneous to understand the most 
general references which language makes as concepts, instead of 
recognizing them as ideas. It is absurd to attempt to explain the 
general as the average. The general is the idea. The empirical, on 
the other hand, can be all the more profoundly understood the more 
clearly it is seen as an extreme (Benjamin, 1998: 35).  
 
                                                                                                                             
to interpret the German baroque risks succumbing to a certain lack of sovereignty. However, 
Schmitt was not the sole name who had impacts on Benjamin’s political thought, which was 
only a newly emerging interest for him. Ernst Bloch, Hugo Ball and as noted George Sorel’s 
work Reflections on Violence (1908) were influential on his thinking as well. 
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Another noted affinity is the impact of the Marxist thinker Georges Sorel 
(Hanssen, 2000: 16), whose views I have briefly reviewed in the previous 
section. Both Schmitt and Benjamin took Sorel’s theory of general strike 
seriously, adopted his problematization of the state and revolutionary 
power/violence, and responded differently in their works. While Schmitt 
embraced the vitality of the notion of conflict as a source for politics, Benjamin 
was drawn to his notion of ‘general strike’ in his formulation of the idea of a 
‘non-violent revolution’ that could overcome the violence inherent to the 
modern political system. Before coming to the details of that endeavor, I will 
firstly review the critique he directed at the liberal-democratic paradigm with 
regards to their separation of violence from politics 
 The Critique of Violence
43
 is a complex and ambiguous text, open to 
differing interpretations from Derrida to Žižek (Derrida, 1992; Agamben, 1998; 
Butler, 2006; Žižek, 2008). It constitutes an exception in Benjaminian oeuvre 
since the thinker does not have many political writings rather is first and 
foremost a literary critic; in fact, as proclaimed to the friends, Critique was 
planned to be part of a greater work Benjamin was working on. It was written 
during the turbulent years of Weimar Republic, hence shares the historical 
background with Carl Schmitt It reveals Benjamin’s reflections on the issue of 
violence in its revolutionary or statist forms.  
“The task of the critique of violence can be summarized as that of 
expounding its relation to law and justice,” Benjamin writes at the beginning of 
the essay. This is so because for him the question of violence belongs to the 
                                               
43 The work would be consisting of two parts, The True Politician and True Politics but the 
manuscripts are not currently available; they are guessed to be lost or considered as remained 
unfinished before Benjamin’s suicide at the French- Spain border in 1940.  
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moral domain, which is ruled by the concepts of law and justice. Two 
approaches, namely the natural law tradition and the positive law tradition offer 
responses on this topic that, conflicting with each other at the end. Within the 
framework of natural law, use of violence is deemed possible with reference to 
just ends. This is the argument used for the justification and legitimation of the 
terror during the French Revolution, Benjamin asserts. Transcending the 
worldly and political notions of legality or legitimacy, violence proves itself a 
just means if it serves for the reaching of just ends. A mother’s killing of a man 
attacking her child cannot be violent; or children’s breaking a window and 
stealing some bread because of hunger is not counted as unjust violence. The 
positive law, on the other hand, refutes the addressing to natural or divine 
rights, and therefore rejects the argument that violence can be justified with 
reference to just ends. By abolishing the concern for the telos, it focuses on 
means and declares that only just means will produce just ends. The problem 
with both approaches, however, is that they cannot reconcile law with the issue 
of justice. Law or legality, as historical constructions, will always fall short of 
justice: they will fail their claim to justice. Müller (2003: 469) notes an 
argument from Benjamin’s 1920 fragment ‘The Right to Use Force’ where he 
“placed law in opposition to justice and morality, but grouped it with guilt, fate, 
and myth.” This is so because Benjamin (1996: 232) argues that “the law’s 
concern with justice is only apparent… in truth the law is concerned with self-
preservation. In particular, with defending its existence against its own guilt.”  
Law’s defending its existence against its guilt refers to the impossibility 
of its legitimation in an absolute sense. Law would be always partial, relative, 
historical and political. Thus, for him law destructs its own foundation in every 
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moment of foundation, it betrays itself and then re-emerges. For this reason, the 
only absolute thing about law is that it in its origin there is violence. Regardless 
of its use for just or unjust ends, violence is intrinsic to any law. Rather than 
securing justice, as natural law theories and certain positivist doctrines held law 
is in dire need of reaffirming itself through the acts of violence. According to 
Benjamin, there is always going to be a ‘law-making violence’ and ‘law-
preserving violence’. Law-making violence denotes the violence at the moment 
of foundation. The law-preserving violence, on the other hand, denotes the reign 
of law that is the capacity of deciding what constitutes ‘violence’ (meaning 
what counts as a threat to the law) or whether the law is going to use coercion 
against the threat or not. For this reason, Benjamin (1996: 242) writes,  
“law-preserving violence is a threatening violence…[I]ts threat is 
not intended as the deterrent that uninformed liberal theorists 
interpret it to be. A deterrent in the exact sense would require a 
certainty that contradicts the nature of a threat and is not attained by 
any law, since there is always hope of eluding its arm. This makes it 
all the more threatening, like fate, which determines whether the 
criminal is apprehended. The deepest purpose of the uncertainty of 
the legal threat will emerge from the later consideration of the 
sphere of fate in which it originates.”  
 
This logic, then suggests that the state’s denouncing of violence does not 
derive from a moral-rational standpoint. The state does not oppose violence 
because it is immoral, inhumane or unjust. It is mainly because violence in the 
hands of individuals is seen as a danger that undermines the legal system. The 
idea of state’s monopoly on violence aims to constrain violence that may pose a 
threat to the law, order and the state: “violence, when not in the hands of the 
law, threatens it not by the ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence 
outside the law” (Benjamin, 1996: 239). The figure of the great criminal is 
suggestive here. We should remember Habermas’s accusation of Rudi Dutschke 
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(the leader of the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund) with “leftist 
fascism” for his defense of the use of violent means against the state. If we had 
a chance to ask Benjamin what his opinion is on this he would probably tell us 
it is Dutschke’s historical ability to confront the violence of law with the threat 
of declaring a new law that makes him intolerable to the state and to the 
defenders of it. It is also, his falling outside of the law; hence, reminding of the 
originary violence, which lies at the source of law that makes him both 
charismatic and horrifying in the eyes of the public. 
The phenomenon of capital punishment reveals the violent and fragile 
nature of law. In the case of the capital punishment, Benjamin argues, the 
“purpose is not to punish the infringement of law but to establish new law. For 
in the exercise of violence over life and death, more than in any other legal act, 
the law reaffirms itself” (Benjamin, 1996: 239). Since “violence, violence 
crowned by fate” referring to a myriad of random events, “is the origin of law, 
then it may be readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life 
and death, occurs in the legal system, the origins of law jut manifestly and 
fearsomely into existence” (Benjamin, 1996: 242).  
A very special mixture of the law preserving and law making violence 
within modern state structure is the police, Benjamin suggests. While the police 
force seeming to be law preserving for it enforce existing laws, it also operates 
as law making, because its violence often functions beyond the realm of the 
law. The police often intervene “for security reasons” in an arbitrary fashion, 
with reference to special decrees that fall outside the parameters of the law 
(Benjamin, 1996: 43).  
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It is against this background Benjamin raises his critique of 
parliamentary democracy. For him, that type of regime contains an irresolvable 
contradiction. He (1996: 244) says, parliamentary democracies “offer the 
familiar, woeful spectacle because they have not remained conscious of the 
revolutionary forces to which they owe their existence; they lack the sense of 
the violence of their own origins, unsettled by the pure positing force of their 
own inauguration.” Like Schmitt, he criticizes the ignorance or the forgetfulness 
of the liberal-democrats on the role violence plays in the establishment of the 
political regime. “No wonder that they cannot achieve decrees worthy of this 
violence, but cultivate in compromise a supposedly nonviolent manner of 
dealing with political affairs” (Benjamin, 1996: 244). He further notes the 
degrading impact of such unfaithfulness and writes (1996: 244) “when the 
consciousness of the latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, 
the institution falls into decay.”  
All in all, the interdependence of law and violence what he calls as 
mythical violence’ is an inescapable politico-historical reality for Benjamin44 as 
it is for Schmitt.  
                                               
44 In fact as Habermas (1979: 38) notes, for Benjamin, “the continuum of history consists in the 
permanence of the unbearable; progress is the eternal return of the catastrophe”. His famous 
interpretation of the Klee painting named Angelus Novus exemplifies his approach on the issue. 
In the ninth thesis of his essay Theses on the Philosophy of History, Benjamin (1968) writes: 
A Klee painting named Angelus Novus shows an angel looking as though he 
is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes 
are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures 
the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a 
chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage 
upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, 
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is 
blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that 
the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the 
future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows 
skyward. This storm is what we call progress.  
See, Benjamin Walter. 1968. Iluminations, Hannah Arendt. ed. With an introduction.Harry Zohn 
trans. Schocken. 
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A true political question and a genuine ethical critique concerning 
violence, then, pertain to the task of formulating a type of political action that 
could eliminate its recurrence in law. Benjamin’s solution is a notion of “pure 
praxis”, a non-instrumental type of action with no origin or an end. He differs 
from Schmitt, who wants to revive the dangerous liaison between politics and 
violence to keep the political spirit alive. While for Schmitt, the state of 
emergency represents the political moment par excellence Benjamin calls for a 
real emergency or an exceptional event that represents a real break within the 
history. That event is the moment of true justice, the arrival of the Messiah, the 
emergence of the final and redemptive force, the moment of ‘divine violence’. 
In a sense, it has been argued Benjamin’s divine violence resembles Schmitt’s 
sovereign decisionism. “Where Schmitt’s ruler made a momentous decision to 
restore order, reinstate law and a world split into discrete, homogeneous 
political units, Benjamin’s pure, striking violence left nothing to be imagined 
beyond the apocalyptical moment” (Müller (2003: 470). It is the abolition of the 
notion of legality and the negation of the instrumental logic of the mythical 
violence. He (1986: 297) writes 
If mythical violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-
destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly 
destroys them; if mythical violence brings at once guilt and 
retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, the 
latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without 
spilling blood. 
 
 Hence, divine violence is a ‘non-violent’ violence. Despite its 
paradoxical and Messianic connotations, for Benjamin the Sorel-inspired 
‘proletarian general strike’ is an example of divine violence. The distinction 
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Sorel made between a ‘‘proletarian general strike’’ and a ‘‘partial strike,’’ 
becomes important for Benjamin as well since he argues a partial strike operates 
within the existing legal framework because of its use of violence (e.g. the 
stopping of line of production in a factory). It is a means to an end in the sense 
that it has particular demands such as the shortening of working hours, better 
working conditions etc. A partial strike fundamentally is not an attempt of 
changing the relationship between the laborers and the capital holders. The 
proletarian general strike, on the other hand, does not put forward specific 
demands that can be accommodated by the legal order. Rather, it seeks a 
complete transformation of relations of production and the socio-political order, 
which is constructed on the basis of economic relations. The violence of the 
general strike, therefore, is a pure means; it calls for the abolition of the existing 
order.  
 
3.3. Fanon: Colonial Violence and the Revolutionary Constitution of a 
Politics 
 
After presenting the critique directed at the liberal-democratic paradigm by 
Schmitt’s and Benjamin’s work, which assert that violence plays a constitutive 
and sustaining role in the political with occasional appearance, and that violence 
and law are interconnected, I would like to move to Frantz Fanon the 
psychiatrist, existentialist and the revolutionary theorist of Algeria. Fanon 
directed a harsh critique at western civility and humanism with the argument 
that violence primarily is a western-originated and enslaving phenomenon.  
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 This is a direct challenge to the liberal position that associates peace and 
reason with the foundation of a political order and the state and equates violence 
with irrationality, with the prepolitical or the natural domain. Fanon, like 
Schmitt and Benjamin views violence as a determinant in the political; unlike 
the ontological approach of the German jurist, he offers a historical and 
contextual analysis. For Fanon, violence is an inherent feature of the ordering 
and control mechanism of the colonial world. Although capitalism as a system 
includes coercion for its operation, in the colonial context its exploitation needs 
no concealment. It is brutally and blatantly there. In western countries, a 
“multitude of moral teachers, counselors and “bewilderers” separate the 
exploited from those in power” (Fanon, 1963), he writes. For this reason, the 
liberal system enables the smooth and non-violent functioning of capitalism. In 
colonial countries, the rule is lent to police officers and the soldiers, which for 
Benjamin are the special agents of modern state, embodying both the law-
preserving and law-making violence of any rule. While in western contexts both 
police and armed forces are kept in reserve and they become visible only during 
the times of crises, upheavals or emergencies, they are immediately present in 
the colonial contexts and generally involve with direct relations with the natives 
“by means of rifle butts and napalm.” According to Fanon (1963:)  
The agents of government speak the language of pure force. The 
intermediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide the 
domination; he shows them up and puts them into practice with the 
clear conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of 
violence into the home and into the mind of the native.  
 
  
 While Schmitt criticizes liberalism for reducing politics into a process of 
bargaining over small issues and neglecting the real dynamics of the political 
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and even for docilizing them, Fanon shows that such pacification is not an issue 
in the colonial regions. Employment of violent means might have been limited 
in the western societies; alas, it was transferred to colonies and used against 
colonial people with no concern or hesitation about limitations on its use. The 
colonial region was treated as if it is a Hobbesian state of nature but the thing is 
it was the western men who acted in accordance with Hobbesian principles. The 
establishment of a ‘state’ in the colonial state did not constrain violence rather 
centralized and intensified its level and scope.
45
  
 For Fanon, the brutality of the colonial violence is not limited with the 
bodies of colonized people. He notes the psychological injury caused by 
violence by saying that colonial violence taunts the ‘souls’ of the colonized 
people. While in the European context an increasing emphasis has been put on 
the awakening and use of rational minds, envy, lust and bitterness that is 
feelings that are considered as irrational and irrelevant for politics, are injected 
into the minds of the oppressed people in colonies. The colonial world, for 
Fanon, is a Manichean world (Roberts, 2004; for an opposing view Gibson, 
2003). It is divided into binary compartmental zones such as black vs. white, 
settler vs. native, master vs. servant with boundaries and hierarchical relations 
between the natives and the settlers. Everything about the settlers display 
narcissistic features: their domains denote civility, culture and humanity, their 
physical or personal features are always considered as superior, moral and 
                                               
45 The argument Fanon develops here, that was also noted by Schmitt early on with the notion of 
‘state of exception’ and by Benjamin has been invoked by later theorists as well. Giorgio 
Agamben, one of the most famous of them,  implies that whenever such will to unlimited use of 
violence emerges, a ‘mental’, ‘spatial’ or ‘temporal’ ‘state of nature’ (read as state of exception) 
is created. The working principles of concentration camps in 1940s or the Guantanamo camps in 
2000s are analyzed within this framework. This being so, the liberal approach does not 
problematize the discrepancy between its ideals and the violent practices extensively to fulfill its 
claim of universality and of substantiality. 
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aesthetic. In contrast to this, “the native society is not simply described as a 
society lacking in values… [it is]…declared insensible to ethics; …[the native] 
represents not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values. He 
is… the enemy of values . . . the absolute evil” (Fanon, 1963). In this world, the 
natives’ consciousness is filled with inferiority complexes. Hate, envy, 
resentment and jealousy are combined with the will to possess things they were 
taught to be lacking. Fanon argues that the oppressed native desires to seize the 
settler’s domains, settler’s features and her form of relations. Nonetheless, the 
native also fears from this desire. The border that was drawn between him and 
the master has a paralyzing impact. It makes the colonized subject nervous and 
anxious. These paradoxical feelings e.g. inferiority, anger, desire and envy the 
natives experience troubles them and led to the transfer the resentment that was 
built inside against themselves and their own society. Various forms of fights, 
religious rites, libidinal acts, violent engagements etc. are seen as the result of 
the colonial rule and the master slave relationship.
46
  
As seen, the master and slave dialectic has certainly nothing to do with the 
friend/enemy distinction Schmitt made to make his point on the essentiality of 
the existential-political antagonism between different yet equal collectivities for 
the sustenance of the political. There is some sort of reciprocity in Schmitt. In 
that sense, Fanon’s argument rather resembles Schmitt’s critique of liberal 
paradigm with the argument that as non-political ideology liberalism has a 
                                               
46 One can also make a comparison between Hegel and Fanon’s formulation of the master-slave 
dialectic in order to dwell on the implications of the domination of the white master over the 
black slave.  For such comparisons See Parris, T. LaRose. 2011. Frantz Fanon, Existentialist, 
Dialectican and Revolutionary. The Journal of Pan African Studies, 4 (7) 4-23; Rollins, Judith. 
2007. ‘And the Last Shall Be First’: The Master-Slave Dialectic in Hegel, Nietzsche and 
Fanon, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. 5( 3) 163-178; 
Vallega, Alejandro A. Unbounded Histories: Hegel, Fanon, and Gabriel García Márquez. 
Idealistic Studies, 38 (1-2): 41-54. 
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tendency of transforming the hostis into inmicus, the political enemy into a 
private one. In Fanon’s critique, we see the lack or the rejection of the 
recognition of the humanity of the other.
47
 It clearly does not denote an equal 
form of relationship and operates as a process of physical oppression, material 
exploitation and psychological infliction for the native people. The colonial 
context and the post-colonial period also suggest that there is a possibility that 
the Hegelian master/slave dialectic may not be transcended. It may 
metamorphose in another form. It can be mimicked and reproduced in the form 
of ethno-national chauvinism, for instance, and may be directed against ‘newly 
discovered’ internal minorities. Again, it is possible to see that the western 
oppression might turn into a form of manipulation and control of the post-
colonial states via newly emerging dictators, national bourgeoisie and 
intellectuals.  
For this reason, like Schmitt and Benjamin before him, Fanon criticizes 
ordinary politics and its elements. Political parties are alienated from the people 
and they never lay stress upon a collective violent upheaval for the good reason 
that their objective is not the overthrowing of the existing system. For this 
reason, he contends, the only way to do away with colonialism, exploitation and 
oppression is to reverse it by a revolutionary violence (Fanon, 1963: 48). Yet 
                                               
47 This is a point elaborated by the French philosopher Jacques Rancière in his Disagreement. 
Going back to Aristotle’s definition of slave as the one that lacks the capacity for speech, and to 
Arendt and Habermas who emphasize speech to be an essential aspect of human capability, he 
argues what counts as human, as the relevant speech or the official language is a political 
question from the outset. It is the exclusion and the will to be included or to be heard that 
defines politics. It is not the slave who does not have the capability to speech but the master 
who is neither able to speak nor to hear the language the slave is speaking.  The French director 
Michael Haneke’s psychological thriller Caché (2005) can be also linked to this discussion. In 
his film, Haneke addresses the historically established and currently ongoing race relations in 
the Western world, the psychological distress a former colonized subject experienced in a 
modernized master-slave relationship, the ‘violence’ of non-recognition and the tragedy of 
asking for recognition in a beautiful and sad way.  
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since bourgeoisie demand more power for their class interests and because 
colonial elites remain ambiguous regarding the role of violence in the process of 
liberation and decolonization they might be violent in their words but remain 
reformist in their attitudes (Fanon, 1963: 46‐51). One cannot fight against the 
systematic violence inflicted upon the indigenous people and the social and 
psychological corruptions colonialism brought by relying on ordinary politics of 
the parties, elites and bourgeois. Sharing the similarity with Benjamin who 
suggests for the necessity of a ‘divine violence’ for the elimination of a ‘mythic 
violence’, Fanon argues the only way is the employment of a direct 
revolutionary violence, undertaken only by the peasants who have nothing to 
lose and everything to gain. Having outlined the violent nature of the colonial 
rule and its devastating impacts on the psyches of native people as well, Fanon 
reasons that counter-violence should be inserted for cleansing, liberating and 
emancipating purposes.  
 
Emancipatory Violence: Agere Aude?   
 As a revolutionary force, violence serves several purposes within 
Fanon’s politics. Firstly, it unifies the tribal structures such as chieftaincies and 
old Marabout confraternities, which were separated from each other with 
colonial rule (Fanon, 1963: 93). It contributes to the liquidation of regionalism 
and tribalism, fosters nationalism and the unification of the people. Such 
unification in violent action frees territories from colonizers. The second 
contribution of violence is its liberating impact on the individuals. In the 
previous paragraphs, I have shown how the colonial oppression has destructive 
impacts on the psyche of the natives. The colonized subject, for Fanon, suffers 
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from inferiority complex, despair, envy and anger, which cannot be obviated 
within the master and slave relation, therefore is directed towards his own 
community. When engaged in a direct violent action with the true source and 
the subject of their negative feelings, the native would restore his self-respect in 
Fanon’s opinion. He would overcome the complexes and liberate from the 
sickening and immobilizing master/slave relationship (Fanon, 1963: 93).
48
 
Thus, the Algerian revolutionary writes “the native discovers that his life, his 
breath, his beating heart are the same as those of the settler. He finds out that 
“the settler’s skin is not of any more value than a native’s skin; and it must be 
said that this discovery shakes the world in a very necessary manner” (Fanon, 
1963: 45).  
 Besides having the cleansing and liberating impact, violence plays a 
transformative role on individuals in Fanon’s theory for it enables political 
agency: “when the people have taken violent part in the national liberation, they 
will not allow anyone to set themselves up as ‘liberators’… they mean to 
understand everything and make all decisions” by themselves (Fanon, 1963: 
94).  
 Some consider Fanon’s writings on colonial modernity to be a “part of a 
tradition of critique that has sustained in some ways our engagement with the 
project of the Enlightenment…Revolutionary violence, in this context, is 
recuperated through that critique” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2002: 86). In the second 
                                               
48 By quoting Césaire’s novel, Fanon underlines the cleansing impact of violence: 
The master’s room was wide open. The master’s room was brilliantly lighted, and the 
master was there, very calm… and our people stopped dead…it was the master…I 
went in. “It’s you,” he said, very calm. It was I, even I, and I told him so, the good 
slave, the faithful slave, the slave of slaves, and suddenly his eyes were like two 
cockroaches, frightened in the rainy season…I struck, and the blood spurted; that is 
the only baptism that I remember today. Aimé Césaire, Les Armes Miraculeuscs (Et 
les chiens se taisaient) 133-37 
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chapter, I have shown how the liberal-democratic approach reformulated the 
Kantian conception of public reason for the development of a non-violent 
conception of politics.  
 In this sense, it is also deemed possible to treat Fanon’s theory of 
violence as analytically at the same level with Kant and normatively in contrast 
with the categorical imperative (Roberts, 2004). The categorical imperative 
exemplifies a moral theory premised upon intrinsic values. While Kantian 
theory focuses on the use of reason in the formulation of a moral theory, Fanon 
calls attention to aggressiveness and to the existence of intrinsic values in 
relation to violence. Like Kant, the Algerian theorist aims at a theory of 
freedom.  
 Unlike Kant, who focuses on the mind or reason, his concern pertains to 
the souls of the colonized subject (Roberts, 2004:146). In The Wretched of the 
Earth, Fanon asserts, “colonialism is not a thinking machine nor a body 
endowed with reasoning faculties.” The emphasis on the emancipation process 
of the natives, opposes the individualistic approach advocated by the liberal 
approach (Seshadri-Crooks, 2002).  
 In Fanon’s view, attributing exceptionality or leadership to individuals 
during the process of decolonization and in the organization of political action 
should be avoided. He contends, “we [the colonial people] ought not to cultivate 
the exceptional or to seek for a hero, who is another form of leader”. The 
revolutionary action must be taken by the masses in toto. He writes, “we ought 
to uplift the people; we must develop their brains, fill them with ideas, change 
them and make them into human beings” (Fanon, 1963: 196).  
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3.4. Žižek: Divine Violence Revisited 
 
Another figure who praises violence as the ultimate means to destroy the 
current order is the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek. In his rather recent 
work Violence: Six Sideway Reflections Žižek (2008) asserts a twofold 
distinction between types of violence to make a clarification for the 
understanding of 9/11 and post-9/11 instances of violence such as bombings, 
mass killings, or acts of martyrdom. The incidences of violence we have been 
increasingly exposed to in the last decade all around the globe, for him, are 
examples of ‘subjective violence’, the type of violence, which is visible, and has 
a distinguishable and accountable agent. The subjective violence has been 
receiving increasing attention in the contemporary world, and arousing fear and 
anger on the side of sufferers and observers. Nonetheless, they obscure the 
functioning of ‘objective violence’ that is the unseen violence inherent to the 
system. According to Žižek “to chastise violence outright, to condemn it as 
“bad,” is an ideological operation par excellence” is “a mystification which 
collaborates in rendering invisible the fundamental forms of social violence” 
(Žižek, 2008). The objective violence, reproduced by increasingly complex 
capitalist relations of production and capital, takes the form of either the 
‘symbolic violence’, unfolding its impact in language and other forms of 
representations and the ‘systemic violence’, the catastrophic consequences of 
the functioning of the capitalist system such as exploitation, environmental 
damages and the widening of the gap between classes and regions.  
Žižek’s analysis does not suggest a simple causal relationship between 
subjective and objective violence, such as increasing gap of inequality between 
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rich and poor gives rise to terrorist activities rather he points out the complexity 
of the dynamics that are operating in the background. It is for this reason, local 
and incremental acts or practices that operate within the means and ends 
rationality cannot abolish the system and its violence. To undo the complexities 
that unfold in objective and subjective forms of violence, Žižek, like Schmitt 
calls for radicalization of polarizations and like Fanon requires a spontaneous, 
bold, violent mass revolutionary act that can bring the system to halt. 
Benjamin’s notion of ‘divine violence’ comes in handy here, albeit in a 
paradoxical manner. For Žižek, one of the most obvious candidates for divine 
violence
49
 “is the violent explosion of resentment which finds expression in a 
spectrum that ranges from mob lynchings to organized revolutionary terror” 
(2008: 87). Another example is the Jacobin violence of France in the 1790. 
Again, he writes (2008: 202) 
Divine violence should thus be conceived as divine in the precise 
sense if the old Latin motto vox populi, vox dei: not in the perverse 
sense of “we are doing it as mere instruments of the People’s Will,” 
but as the heroic assumption of the solitude of sovereign decision. It 
is a decision (to kill, to risk or lose one's own life) made in absolute 
solitude, with no cover in the big Other. If it is extra-moral, it is not 
“immoral”, it does not give the agent license just to kill with some 
kind of angelic innocence. When those outside the structured social 
field strike “blindly”, demanding and enacting immediate 
justice/vengeance, this is divine violence. Recall, a decade or so 
ago, the panic in Rio de Janeiro when crowds descended from the 
favelas into the rich part of the city and started looting and burning 
supermarkets. This was indeed divine violence. 
 
                                               
49 Upon presenting the problems in the understanding and the experience of violence in 
contemporary societies and pointing out the violence inherent to the system, Žižek puts forward 
the idea of divine violence as a radical act. In doing this, he also feels the need for clarifications 
regarding the term’s usage by popular media and some other commentators. He opposes 
interpretations that ask whether 9/11 would represent ‘divine violence’ or the concentration 
camps of Hitler regime or Agamben’s ‘state of exception’ corresponds to what Benjamin meant 
with the term. 
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Yet still, the Slovenian philosopher makes an interesting twist and 
argues that in today’s world “it is difficult to be really violent, to perform an act 
that violently disturbs the basic parameters of social life” (2008: 202). It is 
almost impossible to commit a violent act with an impact on the system. That 
violent act either is subsumed by the system or subsumes the actor of the act. 
Hence, violence cannot acquire its destructive character Žižek desires. The 
movie, The Taxi Driver is a good example in proving his point. The system 
makes an individual who has motives for violence directed towards others 
destruct himself since his actions cannot be more than reactions (Žižek, 2008: 
208). The mass killings of the Jews during the Second World War, is also read 
from this perspective. According to Žižek, all Hitler’s actions were 
fundamentally reactions too and they were also misdirected:  
he acted so that nothing would really change; he acted to prevent 
the communist threat of a real change. His targeting of the Jews was 
ultimately an act of displacement in which he avoided the real 
enemy-the core of capitalist social relations themselves. Hitler 
staged a spectacle of revolution so that the capitalist order could 
survive (Žižek, 2008: 209-10). 
 
Reactions are certainly different from authentic political gestures, for 
Žižek. For him, they are outbursts of impotent violence. Authentic political 
gestures are, on the other hand, active; they impose and enforce a vision (Žižek, 
2008: 212-3). The meaning of being active and enforcing a vision is equated 
with the total destruction of the system by the Slovenian philosopher.  
For this reason, at one point, somehow oddly, he suggests that, a mass 
withdrawal from the system rather than violent acts might be an effective 
strategy as well. In a system where the relation between subjective and systemic 
violence is intricate and even the judgment on what constitutes violence or not 
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is not certain: “The same act can count as violent or non-violent, depending on 
its context; sometimes a polite smile can be more violent than a brutal outburst” 
(Žižek, 2008: 213).  
In the second chapter, I have presented Habermas’s reading of the rise of 
terror and other forms of violent acts in the last decades interprets them as a 
result of the problem of the distortions of the communication channels. In order 
to overcome the problem of non-communication, hence violence, provision of 
the active participation of excluded groups and the establishment of dialogue 
between parties are suggested. For Habermas, despite its deficiencies, the 
liberal-democratic order proves itself to be superior than other forms of regimes 
and for this reason its protection is necessary. In the following chapters, I will 
show that like Žižek, the French philosopher Michel Foucault argues that within 
the complex socio-political and economic relations actions with revolutionary 
impacts are quite difficult if not totally impossible. For this reason, it will be 
shown that Foucault encourages local resistances, small interventions and 
transformative activities to be undertaken by subjects wherever they are 
possible.
50
 As opposed to these views, Žižek raises an interesting argument and 
suggest a total withdrawal from the system as a relevant political action. Unlike 
Habermas, he asserts that the problem of the contemporary world is not 
passivity but pseudo activity. The problem, today, he argues, “is the urge to “be 
active”, to “participate”, to mask the nothingness of what goes on. People 
intervene all the time, “do something”, sign petitions, and engage with petty 
                                               
50 Foucault even receives criticisms from the Habermasian sect (for instance Kelly, 1994) for 
offering oppositions with no aims or visions (Habermas, 1987; 1994). 
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activities and protests. Academics, similarly, participate in meaningless debates, 
and do nothing else.
 
 
A debate between Simon Critchley and Žižek, fuelled upon the latter’s 
critique of Critchley’s Inﬁnitely Demanding illustrates this point. Critchley 
(2007) too evaluates the events of contemporary violence as nihilistic responses 
to the motivational deficits afflicting modern democracies. In order to overcome 
that problem, he calls for the construction of an anarchistic motivating ethics 
based on which individuals could resist the system, engage with a continuous 
demand from it. Žižek criticizes this ‘non- violent anarchistic politics’ with the 
argument that such resistance cannot realize the promise of an infinite ethical 
demand for justice rather engenders the state’s ensuring of the reproduction of 
its pragmatic and strategic goals. For him, this is a position that defends a 
revolt, which poses no effective threat to the system. Hence, all forms of 
resistance are futile unless they seize hold of the state.
 51
 
Since a total seizure is not possible for Žižek the truly difficult yet 
necessary thing to do is to step back, to withdraw (Žižek, 2008: 217). “Those in 
power often prefer even a “critical” participation, a dialogue, to silence just to 
engage us in “dialogue”, to make sure our ominous passivity is broken” (Žižek, 
2008: 217). Upon seeing the difficulty of finding pure acts, of breaking free 
                                               
51 Critchley responds to these criticisms and provides a critical and even satirical analysis of 
Žižek’s position. For the whole script of the debate see: Simon Critchley. 2007. Inﬁnitely 
Demanding. Verso Books: London; Slavoj Žižek. 2007. “Resistance is Surrender,” London 
Review of Books 29(22); Simon Critchley. 2008. “A Dream of Divine Violence”, Independent; 
Responses to Žižek by T. J. Clark.2008. “Resistance is Surrender” London Review of Books 
29(4) and David Graeber. 2008. “Resistance is Surrender” London Review of Books 30(1); 
Response by Slavoj Žižek. 2008. “Resistance is Surrender”. London Review of Books 30(2); 
Simon Critchley. 2008. “Resistance is Futile”; available online: 
http://slackbastard.anarchobase.com/?p=1147 and Simon Critchley. 2008. “Critchley’s Violent 
Thoughts about Slavoj Žižek”, Naked Punch 11: 3-7; available online:  
http://issuu.com/naked_punch_review/docs/supplement?mode=embed&documentId=09021218
5419-5bc1ed88f6c94b06b755ea4cd951f0b0&layout=grey%3E  
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from the system, its complex rationality and violence no matter what does, he 
argues 
the voters’ abstention is thus a true political act: it forcefully 
confronts us with the vacuity of today's democracies. If one means 
by violence a radical upheaval of the basic social relations, then, 
crazy and tasteless as it may sound, the problem with historical 
monsters who slaughtered millions was that they were not violent 
enough. Sometimes doing nothing is the most violent thing to do 
(Žižek, 2008: 217). 
  
Conclusion: 
 
 In this chapter, I have presented the approach that views the relationship 
between violence and politics as necessarily interlinked.  Fanon, Žižek Schmitt 
and Benjamin attribute violence a central role in politics. Yet, as shown, there 
are differences between Fanon’s existential-historical approach, Benjamin’s 
critique of law and history, Schmitt’s ontological approach and Žižek’s complex 
analysis of contemporary politics and violence. For Schmitt, violence is an ever-
present possibility that engenders the political. For Benjamin it is inherent to 
any political order; for Fanon, violence constitutes the rationale of colonialism. 
Finally, for Žižek violence is inherent to the liberal capitalism.  Benjamin, 
Fanon and Žižek think that violence inherent to the existing system cannot be 
changed by available political mechanisms e.g. parliamentary regime, reformist 
attitudes, negotiations or partial strikes. It should be eliminated once and for all. 
The revolutionary violence, called as ‘divine’ in Benjamin and Žižek’s case and 
and ‘anti-colonial’ in Fanonian world, is liberating, therefore. I have already 
pointed out the difference between Schmitt’s friend enemy distinction and 
Fanon’s master slave dialectic so that we know in the former’s formulation 
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violence denotes a relation of recognition of difference albeit in a hostile mood. 
His notion of state of exception, again, refers to a moment of violence (a ‘law-
making’ violence in Benjamin’s words) that would set or restore the order. 
Schmitt does not want to eliminate violence, which he sees as a constitutive and 
equilibrium providing force. Both Benjamin and Fanon argue, however, the 
‘state of exception’ is the rule and a true or real exception could be realized only 
by a total abolition. Hence, all theorists attack the liberal-democratic approach 
for its neglect of the relationship between violence and politics. The idea that 
occurrences of violence are marginal, irrational, apolitical and subjective 
phenomena is defied with arguments that mainly assert violence is something 
that backs up and sustains the political order. By being so, it becomes crucial 
and even necessary for the elimination of the problematic order.  
Within this context, as seen, violence acquires too much meaning and 
value in itself. In Schmitt’s theory, for instance, conflict in extreme form, —
physical force or a threat against the existence of one’s own or against the 
opponent— become essential features of politics. As opposed to the idea of 
deliberation, willful decision, which puts an end to dull discussions are 
emphasized and bold action against dissidents are advocated. It is through the 
threat of violence i.e. physical confrontation, political subjectivity and 
consciousness take shape. This perspective conceives politics as a form of 
continuous struggle and even a symbolic warfare defining the relationship 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
In the works of some revolutionary thinkers like Sorel and Fanon again, 
violence presupposes a certain type of consciousness but at the same time, it 
engenders the development of a political consciousness and the formation of 
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political subjectivity. Georges Sorel’s (1999) Reflections on Violence offers an 
analysis in line with this presumption. Sorel directly challenges the liberal 
premises and its notion of violence as an irrational phenomenon and even 
reverses its conception of violence by attributing it a normative value. For him 
(Sorel, 1999: 165-166; emphasis mine) 
Sometimes the terms ‘force’ and ‘violence’ are used in speaking of 
acts of authority, sometimes in speaking of acts of revolt. It is 
obvious that the two cases give rise to very different consequences. 
I think that it would be better to adopt a terminology which would 
give rise to no ambiguity, and that the term ‘violence’ should be 
employed only for the second sense; we should say, therefore, that 
the object of force is to impose a certain social order in which the 
minority governs, while violence ends to the destruction of that 
order. The bourgeoisie have used force since the beginning of 
modern times, while the proletariat now reacts against the middle 
class and against the State by violence. 
 
For having dramatic and radical impacts, including emotional aspects 
violence becomes an appealing act regardless of its results, therefore the 
justification of its use is considered to lose its sincerity. According to Hanssen 
(2000) although “Fanon’s endorsement of violence never assumed force as an 
end in itself, but as the situated, historical response to colonial violence… it was 
infused by a theory of Sorelian spontaneous and a highly problematic creative 
vitalism. 
 “Benjamin's Critique of Violence opposed founding the political in 
belligerent violence”, writes Beatrice Hanssen (2000: 22) “for to do so would 
risk installing violence as an absolute end in itself.” All the same, she asks 
whether the essay reintroduces “a theological foundationalism, that is, a 
decisive, authoritative ground, which was to sustain secular forms of violence.” 
Benjamin’s endeavor of “politics of pure means” by remaining within the 
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framework of Judeo-Marxist Messianism “fell short of providing an incisive 
differentiation between just and unjust uses of violence, and therefore, in the 
final analysis, of offering a credible critique of violence” (Hanssen, 2000: 22). 
For Habermas, similarly, Benjamin’s politics of pure means amounts to an 
“anarchistic praxis” in its rejection of instrumentality, purposive and goal 
oriented action, and therefore, allies with Schmitt in a radical denouncing of 
normativity (Habermas, 1987 in Hanssen, 2000: 17). Similarly, Frazer and 
Hutchings (2008) note this when they analyze the political discourses of 
theorists such as Fanon and Schmitt. One can assess a discourse of aesthetics 
with elements of ‘sublime’ or ‘tragedy’ in these theories, which presents a 
striking contrast with the rational liberal democrat approach. They argue that the 
employment of the discourse of aesthetics, however, is due to the will to 
persuade the reader to accept the necessity and inevitability of violence. This is 
so because affirming violence as an effective means for achieving political ends 
cannot be rationally justified.  
As a result, as we have seen the critique of the liberal-democratic 
approach evaluates the relationship between violence and politics as structurally 
and even essentially interlinked. This emphasis on the structural link between 
violence and politics is an important aspect of this approach. In its different 
variants its assertion of violence as a necessarily disruptive and constructive 
force in politics is one other feature. This approach then assumes historically 
and even ontologically, politics involves violence. For this reason, we can even 
argue that the position of the illiberal radicals can be characterized by a non-
problematization as well. Here, the relationship between violence and politics is 
positively and absolutely affirmed. For this reason, I think, despite their 
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opposing positions both the liberal-democratic approach and the illiberal 
critique present “necessary propositions” with regards to the relationship 
between violence and politics. Their argument on relationship between violence 
and politics is a postulate of reason, hence a priori.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
AN ALTERNATIVE POSITION: THEORISTS OF 
AMBIVALENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE RELATION 
BETWEEN VIOLENCE AND POLITICS 
 
 
 
Up until now, I have presented the liberal-democratic paradigm, and the 
critique of that approach that views the  relation between violence and politics 
interlinked. I have argued that for the contemporary liberal thinkers violence 
has not become a political issue. Led by an enlightened reason, freed from 
prejudices and beliefs, equipped with capabilities of communication, 
exemplified in Habermas’s thought, and agreement, as Rawls suggested, 
citizens are expected to live in a harmonious and non-violent order. The liberal-
democratic approach, I have argued, does not problematize the relation between 
violence and politics by mainly treating the issue of violence as an irrational, 
marginal and abnormal phenomenon.  
In contrast to this, I have introduced Schmitt, Benjamin who in their 
works treat violence as an essential aspect of political order, an irreducible and 
even constitutive element of sovereign power and law. I have also included 
Fanon and Žižek in the discussion to present their challenge to the liberal 
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assumption of civility, rationality and docility of the western capitalist order. In 
each figure of the critique of the first paradigm, violence is deemed as an 
essential aspect of politics: it constructs politics, sustains it in the form of a rule 
or domination and even abolishes it for the establishment of a new form of 
politics.  
Based on my review I argue that both the liberal-democratic approach 
and the critical illiberal position assert “necessary propositions” with a priori 
knowledge on the relationship between violence and politics. One denies any 
relationship between violence and politics, the other almost essentializes it; 
hence, neither suggests problematization that is a critical evaluation of the 
relationship between violence and politics in historical contexts.  
In this chapter, I would like to probe third position, a position of 
ambivalence with respect to the relation between violence and politics. I would 
argue that theorists that can be included within this category differ from the 
liberal-democratic paradigm in their treatment of violence as a historical and at 
times political phenomenon. This position is also characterized by its argument 
that violence might operate within a rational framework. Without necessarily 
defending it, the theorists of ambivalence attempt at looking into reasons, 
motives of the use and justifications provided for the employment of violence. 
According to Michel Foucault (1996: 299), for instance,  
All human behavior is scheduled and programmed through rationality. 
There is a logic of institutions and in behavior and in political relations. In 
even the most violent ones, there is a rationality. What is most dangerous in 
violence is its rationality. Of course violence itself is terrible. But the 
deepest root of violence and its permanence come out of the form of the 
rationality we use. The idea had been that if we live in the world of reason, 
we can get rid of violence. This is quite wrong. Between violence and 
rationality there is no incompatibility. 
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In this sense, the relation between violence and politics is considered as 
instrumental: violence is evaluated within the category of means and ends and 
considered to be employed in order to reach particular objectives. Many also 
suggest that at times it is an efficient means in reaching those goals. Such a 
conception also suggests that violence may have an expressive character in a 
way that it puts forward the demands, worries and angers of those who 
employed violent means. Apart from the outlined features that can be called as 
‘diagnostic’ aspects of the analysis of violence at a normative or prognostic 
level the theorists of ambivalence reveal positions that vary from disapproval to 
excuse or to legitimation of violence.  
Hence, a wide range of analyses can be located within the category of 
the position of ambivalence. For Sheldon Wolin (1963: 24-5), for instance, 
Machiavelli is an important figure, one whose impact can be compared to 
Galileo’s importance to modern physics. This is so because Machiavelli 
fathered the shift in political theorists’ understanding of violence from being an 
expression of passion to the “measured application of force”, which he calls the 
“economy of violence” (Wolin, 2006).52 Accordingly, despite being a crucial 
means for the foundation and preservation of political order, violence is 
something the dose of which requires a delicate and decent arrangement so that 
the ruler can avoid excessive use of violence. In his Prince Machiavelli 
                                               
52
 While Wolin suggests Machivalli’s conception of politics to have an instrumentalist approach 
on the use of violence, for Frazer and Hutchings (2008: 90), the Italian political theorist views 
violence and politics as inextricably intertwined. One possible explanation of this difference in 
interpretation is because Machiavelli like Hobbes, “look[s] at politics, more or less, from the 
point of view of the political dominator, the state organization” (Frazer &Hutchings, 2008: 91). 
His analysis of the use of violence is analytically at a different level than of Sorel or Fanon. One 
can look at the handling of violence from the point of view of the ruler, such as the prince, the 
state or the sovereign. Alternatively, one can read it from the perspective of the dominated, the 
oppressed such as women, workers or colonized people, as we have seen was the case in 
Fanon’s analysis of colonial rule and theory of liberation.  
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underlines the adaptability of the means for strategic rule and writes that a 
prince ought to adapt the manners of a fox or a lion whenever necessary and in 
the face of differing threats to his rule: “for the lion cannot defend himself from 
the traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore, 
be a fox to recognize the traps and a lion to frighten the wolves. Those that wish 
to be only lions do not understand this” (Machiavelli, 1950: 64).  
 The Marxist revolutionary tradition is another example of the third 
position that elaborates on the issue of violence in historical and instrumental 
terms. From a Marxist perspective, oppression is inherent to capitalism
53
 and it 
will or should be ended with a proletarian revolution. The issue of violence 
becomes crucial with regards to the question of revolution and this constitutes a 
major source of ambivalence within Marxism since as it has been pointed out 
Marx, as the theorist of revolution has no theory of violence nor does he provide 
or a systematic account of violence (Schaff, 1973; Basso, 2009).  
 Appreciating the reserved place violence as an instrument has in both 
Marx’s and Engels’ account of revolution and in the following Marxist 
revolutionary thinkers, one scholar (Finlay, 2006) notes that the attitude ranges 
from a position of justification to excuse and to legitimation. Accordingly, 
(Finlay, 2006: 376) Marx in The Civil War in France depicts the revolutionary 
violence witnessed in the Paris Commune of 1871 as a defensive attitude 
                                               
53As known, according to Marx, every society can be analyzed in terms of two basic and 
inseparably related structures: the structure (economy) and the superstructure (social cultural 
structures). The structure (or the base) is determined by the relations of production, which are 
characterized by the presence of an oppressor-oppressed relationship. The oppressors, relatively 
a smaller group who holds capital in their hands, exploit the labor of the remaining masses for 
the accumulation of more capital and a continuous growth of production. The superstructure, on 
the other hand, denotes the matrix of norms and institutions such as laws, religion, culture and 
the state, which functions to protect and propagate the interests of the capital holders. The 
superstructure, that is the bourgeoisie socio-political and cultural order aims at protecting the 
functioning of the system by the coercive function of the state, during times of crisis becoming 
manifest and blatant.  
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against the reactionary forces, which are willing to perpetrate all manner of 
brutality. At a second step, the Marxist theory asserts a judgment that predicts a 
historical progress towards revolution and communism. Therefore, it presents a 
doctrine on the necessity of violence enabling an excuse of the violent acts of 
revolutionaries. Thirdly, for Finlay (2006: 378) albeit being minor, a 
legitimating view can be also found in Marx’s writings during the time of a 
closest engagement with Hegelian philosophy in the early 1840s. This view, one 
should note was not fully articulated in the writings of Marx and Engels but is 
more radicalized by the following theorists like Fanon, Sorel and recently by the 
Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek. Accordingly, the normative framework 
within which the sociopolitical order operates is based on bourgeois values and, 
for this reason, it can be undermined. In fact, the creation of a new moral 
universe in a new proletarian political order requires the eventual abolition of 
the existing system.
54
 In the previous chapter, I have presented how Frantz 
Fanon or Slavoj Žižek attribute a normative value to this destructive violence 
and argued that they therefore, shift from an instrumentalist perspective to a 
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 To the question of the significance of this view in terms of the conceptualization of 
revolutionary violence, Finlay, for instance, proposes a twofold answer. For him, one can 
conclude that from a Marxist perspective “whatever the bourgeoisie with its individualist and 
rights-based conception of political ethics and legality has to say the morality of violence is 
likely to be invalid since it reflects the particular class interests and therefore the perverted 
humanism of its proponents” (Finlay, 2006:379). In fact, this line of reasoning does not 
necessarily give way to the justification or legitimization of violence rather questions or rejects 
the bourgeoisie denouncing of violence. In this sense, the second answer becomes suggestive 
and it asserts: 
 
whatever the proletariat and its political leaders have to say about violence – its 
justifications, its scope and its limitations – will be valid to the extent that it truly 
reflects the perspective of the last social class at its final, revolutionary stage of 
oppression and contributing to its dissemination and radicalization (Finlay, 
2006:379). 
 
Thus, the rejection of the bourgeois’ notion of violence and its replacement with the violence of 
the revolutionary subject has come to be one of the important aspects of some of the twentieth 
century Marxist revolutionary thinkers. 
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more absolutist, essentialist position with regards to the relationship between 
violence and politics. 
 Žižek’s defense of total destruction and negation of the system is 
criticized by Simon Critchley (2008a; 2008b), who can be considered as a one 
of the figures of the position of ambivalence. According to Critchley Žižek’s 
emancipatory revolutionary violence framed within Benjaminan notion of 
‘divine violence’ neglects all other forms of political action, including the non-
political language-based human interaction suggested by Benjamin himself. A 
genuine dialectical opposition seems to be only possible when violence sets 
itself against the system in a total manner. While this is the case, Critchley also 
attacks Žižek for proposing to do nothing in the end and accuses him for 
engaging with an “endless postponement and over-production” of rhetoric while 
ridiculing “others’ attempts of thinking about commitment, resistance and 
action.” Accordingly, Žižek’s “work is a dream of divine violence, cruelty and 
force and “behind its shimmering inversions” he leaves readers in a “fearful and 
fateful deadlock: the only thing to do is to do nothing. We should just sit and 
wait” (Critchley, 2008a; 2008b: 4).  
  In fact, Critchley’s theory of a neo-anarchism in the modern world 
developed in Infinitely Demanding (2007) fends for non-violence. According to 
the philosopher, modern politics suffers from active and passive nihilisms. The 
passive nihilist is characterized by a “mystical stillness” and “calm 
contemplation” since the world as it is proves that any political action is useless. 
“Rather than acting in the world and trying to transform it, the passive nihilist 
simply focuses on himself and his particular pleasures and projects for 
perfecting himself” with activities like taking up yoga classes, bird watching or 
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learning botany (Critchley, 2007: 4). “Active nihilism”, on the other hand, tries 
“to destroy this world,” which is found meaningless, in order to “bring another 
into being” (Critchley, 2007: 5). In order to overcome the nihilist attitudes of 
contemporary societies, Critchley suggest formulating a new political 
subjectivity, which is peaceful, and non-violent but anarchic at the same time.  
 In this task he relies on Levinas’s ethics, which is defined within the 
dissymmetrical relation of the self to the wholly Other. The relationship with 
the Other is established in the disclosure of the face. This face-to-face 
relationship does not call for violence but responsibility. “This presentation is 
pre-eminently non-violence, for instead of offending my freedom it calls it to 
responsibility and found it. As non-violence, it nonetheless maintains the 
plurality of the same and the other” (Levinas, 1969: 203).  
 It is against this background Critchley asserts that he does not reject 
violence against properties on moral grounds but he has uneasiness with 
violence against persons. Repeating a statement made by one of the characters 
in Godard’s movie Notre Musique he avows “To kill a human being in order to 
defend an idea is not to defend an idea, it is to kill a human being.” In fact, this 
position was criticized and degraded by Žižek with the argument that a call for 
resistance to the system while refraining from violence is futile and cannot seize 
the state power. According to Žižek, we cannot “expect a radical change in the 
state of human beings in the world if we exclude violence as a matter of 
principle.” In response to this critique, then Critchley asserts his recognition of 
the complex nature of political events and argues that it does not make “sense to 
assert and hold to some principled and a priori conception of non–violence” 
(Critchley, 2008a; 2008b: 5). He further adds, 
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To this extent, the abstract question of violence versus non-violence 
risks reducing anarchism to what Jacob Blumenfeld has called the 
politics of the spectator position where non-violence becomes an 
abstract value, principle or categorical imperative. In specific 
political sequences, and it is always and only a case of such 
specifics - an evental site, as Badiou might say - the move to 
violence is often entirely understandable. The turn to violence by 
protestors, critics and opponents of a regime is most often simply a 
response to the provocations of the police and legal violence. 
(emphasis mine) 
 
 Hence, although Critchley aims to present an ethical commitment to 
non-violence in politics, he seems open to the recognition of the relationship 
between violence and politics in historical contexts. This understanding, being 
open to the possibility of violence in politics does not have to be necessarily 
affirmative. It is possible to pass a judgment on violence for being unnecessary, 
harmful and unjustified at times. The important point here is that differing from 
the first two approaches; an ambivalent position engenders analyzing the 
relationship between violence and politics in concrete and historical contexts. 
 Oksala (2011) has raised a similar argument when she suggested a 
Foucauldian critique of violence in her essay. She has argued out that the 
political debates revolving around questions of violence usually operate at 
analytic level of diagnosis and deal with the questions of “what counts as 
violence and whether or not it is unavoidable” (Oksala, 2011: 155). I have 
already pointed out this point when I stated the liberal-democratic approach and 
its critique assert ‘necessary propositions’ on the relationship between violence 
and politics. Both of the propositions, “there is no relationship between violence 
and politics” and “violence and politics are interlinked” are based on reason 
postulated definitions (a priori) on politics and violence with universal 
implications. A liberal-democratic approach, by labeling certain acts of violence 
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as terror fails addressing possible reasons of such violence, messages these 
violent acts aim to transmit or to get attention to, and of course ways of 
eliminating violent politics after developing.  
 The counter position, one of the examples of which is found in Frantz 
Fanon’s theory of colonial violence, on the other hand, would reject any critical 
evaluation of the colonial violence with the argument that there can be no such 
thing as the “violence of the oppressed”  (since violence is the act of the western 
colonizers). The counter-violence’ in this case is seen as necessary and 
unavoidable for emancipation. Hence, problematization or a critique of violence 
at certain contexts becomes impossible. It is my contention that an alternative 
approach which provides a way of countering the ‘necessary propositions’ for 
the exclusion of violence from the political and for the inseparability of 
violence from the political should be sought. This should be done for the 
understanding of the relationship between violence and politics in its concrete, 
historical forms and in terms of its physical and symbolic meaning. 
 In other words, as one scholar noted such a critique “must establish as a 
preliminary move that political violence is ontologically contingent” (Oksala, 
2011: 155). In her essay, Oksala proposes invoking a Foucauldian critique of 
violence. In the coming chapters, I will present how the French philosopher 
defines his own work (within a Kantian tradition) as‘ontology of the present’, a 
critical engagement with the present in historical terms.  For Oksala (2011: 116) 
A Foucaultian approach to violence would thus question the 
ontological necessity of it—for example, all such views that 
violence is either an anthropological constant or an essential feature 
of human nature, human sociality, or the political. In his framework, 
violence cannot be thought in such terms, but must always be 
analyzed as contingent, historically specific, practices. 
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 Secondly, as I have already pointed out, such an approach by 
recognizing its intelligible nature aims to uncover the implicit, or sometimes 
explicit, rationality of violence and its relation with politics. As we will see, at 
particular historical periods, the relationship between violence and politics is 
seen in positive terms, and the manifestation of violence can be considered as 
the affirmation of political power. Public executions or tortures served for the 
sustenance and verification of political power in middle ages, in colonial 
contexts or in modern times during so called ‘extraordinary’ times.  
 It is against this background, in the coming chapters I would like to 
survey the works of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, who I consider to be 
sharing the position of contingency on the relationship between violence and 
politics.  
 
4.1. Probing Ambivalence: An Introduction to Hannah Arendt and Michel 
Foucault 
  
 Foucault and Arendt are two names that cannot be located under a 
category of tradition in the western political thought and display divergences in 
their works in terms of their intellectual engagements—the concepts they chose 
to focus for reflection and the ways they develop and discuss notions of politics. 
In fact, they differ from each other in significant terms: their epistemological 
levels are not the same; their theoretical and even political engagements reveal 
conflicting and opposing persuasions (Allen, 2002). For this reason, they are 
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rarely read together.
55
 Yet still, it is possible to find some common themes and 
similar concerns in their works. In the coming, I will briefly point out these 
convergences and divergences without necessarily implying a comparative 
analysis. My attempt can be summarized as juxtaposition of Arendt and 
Foucault’s ideas on the question of the relationship between violence and 
politics to elaborate more on the contours and the premises of the third position, 
which I suggest is characterized with contingent propositions on the relationship 
between violence and politics. This is so because both raise a critique of the 
premises of the liberal-democratic approach and the position that views 
violence and politics as essentially interlinked. Having separated themselves 
from the tradition of political thought, the two theorists offer their own 
formulations of politics, political terms and relations. By reviewing their 
thoughts, I would like to see whether a new ways of understanding the 
relationship between violence and politics is possible.     
 At a general level, one can firstly notice that both Arendt and Foucault 
raise a critique of modern society, its normalization process and the 
transformation of individuals into docile bodies who are unwilling to act and to 
think. The critique of modern society particularly revolves around a certain type 
of political thinking that conceives people, politics and even history in organic 
(or for some biological, Blencowe, 2010) terms. They further oppose the 
                                               
55 There are a limited number of works, which compare and contrast Foucault and Arendt. I had 
a previous attempt of reading Arendt and Foucault together with a particular focus on their 
engagement with Kant, late in their careers, in terms of the meaning and ends of a critical 
theoretical enterprise. I argued that both value a Socratic impulse, which is an activity of 
creating disturbance, puzzlement and questions on commonly accepted values and opinions, in 
Kantian critique and both aim to invoke that Socratic impulse in their own works in their own 
ways. Gülbanu Altunok. 2005. “Arendt and Foucault on Thinking and Ends of Theory: 
Philosophy of Limits, Politics of Possibilities”. Critical Sense, Graduate Student Conference, 
University of California: Berkeley.  
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emphasis on ‘reason’ and aim to uncover the dangers of the processes of 
rationalization and modernity.  
 One of the tracks they follow in this critique points out the impacts of 
the articulation of rationalities within specific domains such as economics, 
science or technology and their diffusion into and regulation of other realms of 
life. For Michel Foucault economic rationality is one that has infiltrated into 
cultural, political spheres and transformed the relations in these spheres based 
on efficiency, profit and effectiveness. For Arendt, similarly, economic 
mentality is something that has destroyed the public sphere and public spirit and 
promoted a consumerist and conformist society in the contemporary world.  
 Although they exhibit a skeptic attitude with respect to the promises of 
modernity and rationalization, Arendt and Foucault differ in their assessments 
of the relationship between the formation of subjectivity and society (or 
between the particular and the general or norm) within modernity. In Arendt’s 
opinion, the normalizing force of modern society is opposed to all individuality 
and spontaneous political subjectivity. In Foucault’s view, individuation is 
engendered by modern socialization and normalization, so he does not argue for 
an authentic subjectivity that was destroyed or limited by the general society 
(Blencowe, 2010). Although presented in different terms, for both Arendt and 
Foucault, subjectivity is constructed via power. Individuals come together and 
act in concert so that they can perform power in Arendtian political universe; 
they are settled within power relations that can be challenged or reproduced by 
political agents in the Foucaldian cosmos.  
 An appeal to an aesthetic model in the formulation of ethical or political 
and action is again a common ground the two theorists share. For Foucault, the 
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formation of subjectivity or the self is a continuous work of art; it requires the 
endeavor of understanding of the historical context one is situated, examining of 
the relations of knowledge and power, and of working on the self in terms of 
probing of the potentials and limitations of the self and the general context.  
 For Arendt the display of subjectivity is a performative act. It is prepared 
in the backstage as part of a process of reflection on world and within the 
framework of political principles. The act is performed in the political domain 
with the others and at the presence of the spectators and therefore is at the 
mercy of the others’ judgments. While for Foucault others’ gaze is disciplinary 
(for it monitors the acts and deeds and judges them in terms of their compliance 
to the norm), for Arendt it is appraising. In a true public sphere, the viewers 
pass their judgment on excellence of one’s performance.  
 In their theoretical enterprise both Arendt and Foucault, reject 
metaphysical accounts of truth and foundationalist epistemologies (Allen, 2002: 
132). One crucial feature they share and that lets me consider them as theorists 
of ambivalence is that they adopt historicism as a method of philosophical 
reflection (Allen, 2002; Edwards, 1999) and refrain from grand, absolute and 
essentialist theories.  
 I have already asserted my will for a juxtaposition of Arendt and 
Foucault on the question of violence and politics. I will pursue this endeavor by 
focusing on two theorists’ conceptions of power and revolution in resonance 
with their views on violence. It is possible to argue that the critique of the 
conventional understanding of power constitutes the most important aspect of 
the theorists’ contribution to the political thought. Their opposition to the 
formulation of politics in juridical-legal terms and of power as a repressive 
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instrument in the hands of a ruling class or a group constitutes an important 
commonalty they share. I will present that each views power in relational terms, 
that is for both Arendt and Foucault, power emerges out of interactions among 
agents and that it exists only in its exercise. In relation with this, either 
explicitly or implicitly both criticize the treatment of violence as related with 
power. Quite contrary to the classical understanding, for Arendt and Foucault 
power at its best operates by being non-violent. Despite their shared emphasis 
on historicity, relationality and positivity of power, Arendt attributes power an 
affirmative role in politics. Foucault, on the other hand, seems to be neutral on 
even suspicious of its effects. For him, power is not always bad, but it is always 
dangerous. Where violence defines what is opposite of power for Arendt, it 
seems to be a defining characteristic of pre-modern power in Foucault.  
 Violence is a critical theme for Arendt. It is the assessment that both 
political action and tradition are in crisis in modernity, and even the argument 
that they came to an end, which urged Arendt to think politically and to think 
action and critique together. The symptoms of the crisis became manifest, for 
her, with the catastrophic events of the twentieth century—a century of wars, 
revolutions, mass destructions, totalitarianism, racism—“hence a century of that 
violence which is currently believed to be their common denominator.”56 
(Arendt, 1972: 105) Violence, subsequently, becomes a crucial matter for 
Arendt and it is possible to argue that, she writes ‘on’ violence (not only in her 
1969 essay) but more importantly ‘against’ violence throughout her career 
                                               
56 Margaret Canovan even argues that “virtually the entire agenda of Arendt’s political thought 
was set by her reflections on the political catastrophes of the mid-century” See Margaret 
Canovan. 1995. Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought. Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Press. 
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(Altunok, 2008). The operative distinction I raise between writing ‘on’ violence 
and writing ‘against’ it, aims to emphasize the differing levels of analysis of 
violence in Arendt’s work.  
By writing on violence, I think she wants to historically deal with the 
phenomenon: how it was appropriated, justified and glorified by political 
ideologies, actors and by thinkers; what role violence played in political events 
throughout history and how this role has changed from ancient times until 
twentieth century. At the same time, she writes against violence, hence, asserts 
a ‘critical judgment’ that rejects any role violence plays in politics.  
In this attitude, the experience of totalitarianism plays a major role 
(McGowan, 1997; Canovan, 2002). Nazi camps represent a dystopia or “Hell on 
earth” in her own words because not only they were the instruments of mass 
scale killing but also they represent the destruction of politics and human 
capacities for political action. The totalitarian experience, for her, is not an 
event of the past: “totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian 
regimes in the form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it 
seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a manner 
worthy of man.” As Richard Bernstein (2002:) has noted “anyone who has lived 
through the uses of terror and torture, the massacres, genocides and ‘ethnic 
cleansings’ that have occurred all over the world during the past few decades is 
painfully aware of how strong and ever present these temptations are.” Thus, 
writing against violence aims at cautioning against such temptations and at 
dislocating the elements, she assessed in the way to totalitarianism as 
dangerous, from the understanding of politics.  
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 Writing against violence, however, does not mean condemning it as an 
illegal, irrational, immoral or inhumane act. It means firstly, to show the 
shortage of such evaluations: It is not possible to argue that the violent practices 
of Nazism and Stalinism were illegal. On the contrary, the legal framework 
enabled the violent acts, and even freed the committers from the responsibility 
of their crimes. Max Weber assessed the peculiarity of modern state in its 
successful claim over the monopoly of legal enactments and the legitimate use 
of force. The conception of violence in political science mostly refers to this 
definition and evaluates violence as the employment of force, which falls 
outside the legal framework established and protected by the modern state. 
While in Weber the ‘use of force’ by the state was presented as legitimate with 
reference to rationality (along with legality), Arendt argues to consider violence 
(as opposed to the ‘use of force’) as irrational is to make it an ahistorical and 
marginal phenomenon hence impossible to understand and reflect upon. 
(Arendt, 1972) She asserts that violence is rational and by doing so, 
problematizes the claim of rationality and its close relationship with modernity. 
She also rejects any form of moralism in politics: the search for a natural 
inclination in human beings in the form of good or evil is a futile effort for her; 
nor it is possible to defend a universal human ethic, which could provide shelter 
in times of crisis. Further, making the issue more complex, she recognizes 
violence as part of human life. There are instances of violence in certain human 
activities; according to her conceptual triad of human condition, labor and work 
impose violence. She asserts that the rejection of violence must be done with 
political arguments, which denotes a phenomenological approach adopted and 
presented in her works. The problems one assesses in ‘politics’ today, for her, is 
127 
 
due to the distortions that happened in the meaning of human existence, 
political life and political notions such as freedom or equality. Hence, the 
complaint about the persistence of violence within politics should lead us to 
question the meaning of politics and violence. In the coming chapters, I will 
present her twofold endeavor, historical and phenomenological analysis of the 
relationship between violence and politics.  
When we move to Foucault, we see that violence does not constitute a 
central topic in his works but it looms in the background that points out the 
historicity of modern institutions, existencies and relations. Unlike Arendt, he 
does not engage with the activity of passing a judgment on violence’s role in 
politics, rather traces the historical transformation of the relationship between 
the two. For him, violence, historically, may be a political phenomenon but 
(again) historically, it has been ruled out in modernity. Modern forms of 
political power operate non-violently and in accordance with logics, which 
significantly differ from the functioning of violent mechanisms. His corrective 
points out a historical transformation in the functioning of power in western 
societies since the sixteenth century and the position of violence (that is its 
relation with power) weakened and even cut the relationship between violence 
and politics. Overlooking the aspect of political relations within modern 
societies leads us to be blind to the functioning of controlling, constructive 
forms of non-violent power relations.   
Arendt will affirm the radicality of violence with reference to its 
historical registry; yet she ends up with a judgment that derives from her 
phenomenology and that separates her from Foucault significantly. Arendt does 
not want to credit a radical change for the sake of change. Changes, or rather 
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beginnings in her words, should be constructive and politically enabling. Hence, 
although both theorists recognize that violence may alter things radically their 
stand, we will see differ from each other.  
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PART II 
CHAPTER V  
 
 
ARENDT ON POWER AND VIOLENCE 
 
 
 
 This chapter will look into Hannah Arendt in order to understand and 
discuss her views on the relationship between violence and power. I will firstly 
discuss Arendt’s critique of the classical understanding of power, the rise of the 
discourse of violence in politics, and her analysis of the relevance of violence as 
an instrument in reaching political goals in politics. I will move to her 
discussion of power as the essence of politics. The distinction she draws 
between force, strength, authority and power will also reveal her conception of 
violence as an instrumental and non-political notion. Then I will move to 
Foucault and I will firstly present his analysis of the sovereign power, the 
working of power mechanisms in modern societies and its exclusion or taming 
of violence in order to show his argument on the problematic nature of 
understanding politics within the model of the sovereign. In western contexts, 
modern forms of power operate in an economic, productive and normalizing 
ways that render violence unnecessary, inefficient and ineffective. Presenting 
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the contours of his notions of ‘disciplinary power’ and ‘bio-politics’, I will also 
present his rejection of the liberal-juridical and Marxist theorization of power. 
In the last section, his search for an alternative conception of politics will be 
explored. 
 
5.1. Arendt’s Historical Analysis of the Relationship between Violence and 
Politics 
 
At the beginning of her book On Violence, Arendt writes that her 
reflections on the topic were provoked by the violent events and debates of the 
twentieth century, which can be called “as Lenin predicted, a century of wars 
and revolutions, hence a century of that violence which is currently believed to 
be then- common denominator” (1969: 105). In the twentieth century, violence 
has reached to a dangerous level and to a scope in terms of its destructiveness, 
wider application and glorification. Engels’s or Clausewitz’s understanding of 
violence/war as a continuation of politics, she argues, was reversed after the 
Second World War. The War was not followed by a peace. Rather it gave way 
to the rise of ‘Cold War’, which in reality is a continuation of war with other 
means. Furthermore, she notes “a strange interrelationship” and argues that a 
relation of reciprocation and mutual dependence between war and revolution 
has developed in modern times. A war might end up with a revolution and a 
revolution can give way to a civil or even a regional war. Increasingly, she 
argues, the emphasis has shifted more and more from war to revolution
57
 
                                               
57 In fact, this argument has been proved wrong with the fall of the USSR and of the socialist 
regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989. These developments not only corresponded to “the end of 
history” as some (for instance Fukuyama, 1989; 1992) claimed but also denoted the “end of the 
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(Arendt, 1963: 7) and it unfold its impact on politics by making all governments 
live on a borrowed time.
58
  
 Apart from the increasing role of the threat of violence in international 
politics, Arendt assesses a rising discourse, the one I have discussed in chapter 
four on the critique of liberal-democratic paradigm with the argument of 
violence as part of politics, in the works of Schmitt, Benjamin and Fanon. 
Particularly, she problematizes the glorification of violence by the new left, 
black movement, and by theorists like Fanon and Sartre, anticolonial rebels and 
by other oppositions, which she called as apologists for violence. She attacks 
them for exalting a non-political phenomenon
59
 and even argues despite the 
claim the glorification of violence is contradictory to the Marxist rhetoric. 
 Although violence has played enormous role in politics, Arendt notes, it 
has been singled out so seldom for special consideration (Arendt, 1969: 110). 
This ignorance reveals that violence has been considered as an arbitrary and 
marginal phenomenon and its arbitrariness is taken for granted. Whenever it 
receives attention as an object of study, however, it is examined within the 
framework of aggressiveness and in terms of its correspondence in natural life 
(with reference to the instincts to fight for territories in ants for instance). 
Alternatively, violent behavior is studied as a natural reaction with a natural 
                                                                                                                             
revolutions” implicitly. Furthermore, we witnessed an increased number of civil wars, religious 
and ethnic conflicts in Europe and in other parts of the world, and many other confrontations 
that have escalated since the early 1990s. Arendt’s hypothesis on the persistence of (the 
possibility of) revolutions is based on the historical reality of the Cold War, during which the 
discourse of being for or against communism dominated politics, and a division between 
Marxists and liberal thinkers characterized the field of political philosophy. 
58 For another scholar, Arendt’s argument on the persistence of revolutions derives from her 
belief that revolution “has a primordial basis in the political cause of freedom and the struggle 
against tyranny”. See John Grumley, 2008. Revolting Liberties: Revolution and Freedom in 
Arendt and Foucault, The European Legacy, Volume 3, No 1: 50-71. 
59 For Dodd (2009), therefore, On Violence is more polemical than philosophical and has some 
limitations.  
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function. Such a perspective, for example, suggests that the suppression of 
aggressive tendencies and the desire to control them cause violence (Arendt, 
1972: 159).  
 As opposed to these presumptions Arendt asserts that violence is 
“neither beastly nor irrational” (Arendt, 1969: 160) as a phenomenon. She 
recognizes its role in history and that it may be rational, at least comprehensible 
in terms of its motives, function and its objectives. In her opinion, the orthodox 
judgment on violence is closely related with the understanding of power. If 
power is understood as an instrument of rule and rule is suggested to exist 
because of an instinct to domination, then violence becomes nothing than a 
derivative of power.  
 
5.1.1. The reasons of the persistence of violence in politics: 
 
Sovereignty/Will versus Freedom/Action:  
In the first chapter when I was discussing the difficulty of providing a 
definition for the political I referred to scholars like Agnes Heller (1991) who 
have argued that the abolition of the monarchy led a crisis in the conception and 
definition of politics. By the absence of a supreme figure embodying political 
power, a ruling class associated with the state and its strict distinction from the 
ruled we have lost the criterion, which enables us to define what makes political 
distinctive as a domain, as an activity or as a type of relationship.  
Within this context, both Arendt and Foucault’s critique point out the 
problematic nature of the persistence of the use of the traditional grammar of 
politics. Sovereignty is emblematic of such persistence since a closer look at 
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politics and the use of political notions such as law or right or power would 
reveal that their conceptions remain within the framework of absolute power 
that accompanied the rise of the sovereign European state. From an Arendtian 
perspective, a politics of sovereignty formulates politics as a relationship of 
domination, the effectiveness of which then is substantiated by violence.  
Arendt criticizes the French Revolutionaries (and the Enlightenment 
thinkers) for replicating the political structure of ancient monarchy. The notion 
of sovereignty is an act of mimicking the absolute power of the king. In the 
background of the notion of sovereignty, on the other hand, there lies the idea of 
God and the unconscious will for mimesis. For Arendt this turn to the religious 
realm for inspiration or establishment of the laws by the image of God, was not 
those men’s conscious choice: they were enlightened and deist, not traditional 
or religious. Yet, the “enormous risks inherent in the secular realm of human 
affairs caused them to turn to the only element of traditional religion whose 
political usefulness as an instrument of rule was beyond any doubt” (Arendt, 
1963: 192). Even Machivalli, who in Arendt’s view is the spiritual father of the 
Revolution
60
 with his passionate yearning to revive the spirit and the institution 
of the Roman antiquity, which was adopted later by the eighteenth century 
revolutionaries as well, was puzzled with the task of foundation and had to 
recourse to God. His appeal to ‘high heaven’, Arendt argues, was certainly not 
                                               
60Arendt’s views of Machiavelli seem to differ in On Revolution and in What is Authority? and 
they somehow contradict. In On Revolution, she argues that Machiavelli is the father of 
revolution not by his insistence on violence nor for his conception of revolution as a history 
breaking event, which makes him different from the men of revolutions but due to his 
understanding of foundation—as a renovation (rinovazione) as the only beneficial alteration 
(alterazione a salute) (Arendt, 1963: 29) and for being the first to “think about the possibility of 
founding a permanent, lasting, enduring body politic” (Arendt, 1963: 29) . In What is 
Authority?, however, she asserts that the “double respect, because of his rediscovery of the 
foundation experience and his reinterpretation of it in terms of the justification of (violent) 
means for a supreme end Machiavelli may be regarded as the ancestor of modern revolution” 
(Arendt, 1968:140). 
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inspired by any religious feelings but exclusively dictated by the wish to escape 
the difficulty of finding an irrefutable authority and establishing a stable 
political order.  
Unlike the American Revolution (in Arendt’s opinion is a successful 
example of revolution), which was a successor of a ‘limited monarchy’61 the 
French Revolution was founded on the ruins of an absolutism, which explains 
the obsession with an ‘absolute’. She (1963:154) writes  
“nothing, indeed, seems more natural than that a revolution should 
be predetermined by the type of government it overthrows; nothing, 
therefore, appears more plausible than to explain the new absolute, 
the absolute revolution, by the absolute monarchy which preceded 
it, and to conclude that the more absolute the ruler, the more 
absolute the revolution will be which replaces him” 
 
Paradoxically, then for Arendt, the secular rulership construed by the 
French Revolution assumed the same framework and political grammar of the 
Plato’s idea of the rule of the philosopher-king that had nested at the thrones of 
the Christian kingships with references to divine sources for a very long time. 
The new Republic was founded on the model of a King-God, both omnipotent 
and the legislator of the universe.  
  Philosophically, on the other hand, Arendt contends that the modern 
notion of sovereignty stems from the idea of a free will
62
, which denotes “being 
                                               
61 The Founding Fathers’ falling back on the charters and agreements of the colonial structure in 
America is also explained by the historical heritage. With this argument, she makes an 
interesting twist and locates the act of foundation in the process of colonization rather than the 
revolution. The revolutionaries in America, in that sense, were saved from the trouble of 
“initiating a new order of things” (Arendt, 1968a: 140). 
62 Andreas Kalyvas (2004) criticizes Arendt for repudiating any association with will and 
freedom. In fact, he even argues that Arendt’s views on the notion of will are ambivalent. In The 
Life of the Mind, in her latest work, she seems to associate the capability of will with her own 
conception of political freedom, that is, with the spontaneous power of starting something new 
and with the faculty of new beginning. In On Revolution, however, she reads it through the 
notion of sovereignty as arbitrary, commanding and violent and explicitly repudiates its 
association with freedom or politics. Here, however, I rely on her earlier conception of will in 
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independent from others and eventually prevailing against them” (Arendt, 1954: 
163). The model here is the divine will, which was unknown in classical 
antiquity and fully elaborated in Christianity (Arendt, 1960; 1968). With the 
historical retreat of subjects from polis life under the shadow of the Roman 
Empire, thinkers like Epictetus introduced the notion of a free inner world as a 
subject of reflection. This inner world was thought to be shielded from outside 
interference; possible inner disturbances were cleared as well. The ancients’ 
will to liberation from necessity and mastering of worldly desires, needs and 
other concerns was articulated in the reflections on one’s relation with himself. 
The ‘nilling’ voice has always been considered to be in a struggle with the 
‘willing’ voice. While Christianity orders the overcoming the voice of the will63 
later centuries witnessed the emergence of philosophies (like Nietzsche) which 
promotes the will-to-power as the driving force of life and politics.  
According to Arendt, the notion of ‘will’ “which essentially excludes all 
processes of exchange of opinions and an eventual agreement between them” 
(Arendt, 1963: 71) was introduced into modern politics with the French 
revolution. She particularly expresses her antipathy to the concept ‘general will’ 
for its assumed representation of the interests of the nation as a whole and her 
dislike towards Rousseau for developing that concept and being a source of 
                                                                                                                             
terms of her critique of its relation with sovereignty and its difference from freedom. For 
Kalyvas’s arguments See Andreas Kalyvas. 2004. “From the Act to the Decision: Hannah 
Arendt and the Question of Decisionism,” Political Theory 32(3): 320-346. 
63 She (1960: 39; 1968: 162) writes,  
Christian will-power was discovered as an organ of self-liberation and 
immediately found wanting. It is as though the will immediately paralyzed the I-
can as though the moment men willed freedom, they lost their capacity to be free. 
In the deadly conflict with worldly desires and intentions from which will-power 
was supposed to liberate the self, the most willing seemed able to achieve was 
oppression. Because of the will’s impotence, its incapacity to generate genuine 
power, its constant defeat in the struggle with the self in which the power of the I-
can exhausted itself, the will-to-power turned at once into a will-to-oppression. 
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inspiration for the French revolutionaries. The notion of general will, 
accordingly, is a replacement of the raison d’etat, which in reality denotes the 
will of a monarch, seemingly abolished by the revolution (Arendt, 1963: 71-72). 
The appeal of Rousseau’s theory lies in his successful placement of the 
“multitude into the place of a single person; for the general will was nothing 
more or less than what bound the many into one” (Arendt, 1963: 71-72). 
Another dangerous aspect of this organist conception of body politic implied 
with the notion of general will is its look for unity, homogeneity and equality in 
all matters. Such a conception views any form of dissent, criticism or presence 
of difference or plurality as threats to the collective unity. The assumption and 
the will for perfect unity, unfolds itself in witch-hunts, processes of looking for 
‘enemies’ that constitute a threat to the unity of the body politic.64 This was well 
exemplified in the French Revolution and represents one of the reasons why 
there was great scale of violence and terror.  
 Within this framework, Arendt assesses two emergences that present an 
interesting tension. . On the one hand, the subject is constructed to be ‘free’ 
within her private domain in the absence of external interferences, obstacles or 
influences. Such thinking on freedom (as being free from outer impacts) is 
exemplified in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century thinkers, who equated freedom with 
security: “The highest purpose of politics” and “the end of government” became 
to guarantee of security of individuals whose freedom lies in the engagement of 
activities other than politics (Arendt, 1968: 149).  
                                               
64 In Origins of Totalitarianism she writes “Whenever equality becomes a mundane fact in 
itself, without any gauge by which it may be measured or explained, then there is one chance in 
a hundred that it will be recognized simply as a working principle of a political organization in 
which otherwise unequal people have equal rights; there are ninety-nine chances that it will be 
mistaken for an innate quality of every individual, who is ‘normal’ if he is like everybody else 
and ‘abnormal’ if he happens to be different.” (Arendt, 1973: 54, emphasis mine) 
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On the other hand, politics has come te be understood with reference to 
the volition to impose one’s will upon others. Quoting Nietzsche, Arendt (1981: 
161) writes “what is called ‘freedom of the will’ is essentially a passionate 
superiority toward a someone who must obey, I am free; “he” must obey’—the 
consciousness of this is the very willing.” With the emergence of this 
philosophy of will, freedom understood as being liberated from others. has 
turned into a philosophical problem in the first order; power equated with 
command, rule and domination then has become a political problem (Arendt, 
1968: 163).  
 For Arendt Schmitt is the modern theorist who “recognizes clearly that 
the root of sovereignty is the will: sovereign is who wills and commands” 
(Arendt, 1960: 40). In On Revolution, she also argues that Rousseau is a 
consistent representative of the political theory of sovereignty. His substitution 
of will for consent in the form of general will and unity for plurality and 
difference (Arendt, 1968: 163; Arendt 1963) is an example of such conception. 
The notion of ‘general will’ is a replacement of the raison d’état, in other 
words, the will of the monarch, which is only seemingly abolished by the 
revolution (Arendt, 1963: 71-72). The representative government that is 
supposed to replace the absolute power of the monarch with the will of the 
people proved itself to be “oligarchic government” too. This is so because “the 
ageold distinction between ruler and ruled…has asserted itself again; once 
more, the people are not admitted to the public realm, once more the business of 
government has become the privilege of the few“ (Arendt 1965, 273, 240). 
Hence, the doctrine of free will, which seems to be a model of tyranny or 
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authoritarianism, remained present within a Republican tradition with its 
troubling impacts.  
According to Arendt associating free will with freedom is problematic 
because the will is a politically irrelevant and even an antipolitical notion 
(Arendt, 1960). Equating freedom with sovereignty is more troubling because 
sovereignty always violates the freedom of others. It leads to the understanding 
of politics within the framework of conflict and warfare (exemplified in the 
theory of the political in Schmitt). Such a mentality also “leads either to a denial 
of freedom ...or to the insight that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body 
politic can be purchased only at the price of the freedom, i.e. the sovereignty of 
all others” (Arendt, 1968: 165). Furthermore, this illusionary idea of 
sovereignty can be “maintained only by instruments of violence that is with 
essentially non-political means” (Arendt, 1968: 164). She writes 
[T he] basic error seems to lie in that identification of sovereignty 
with freedom which has always been taken for granted by political 
as well as philosophic thought. If it were true that sovereignty and 
freedom are the same, then indeed no man could be free, because 
sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and 
mastership, is contradictory to the very condition of plurality. No 
man can be sovereign because not one man, but men inhabit the 
earth. (Arendt, 1998: 234) 
 
 According to Arendt, human plurality is the basic condition of politics 
(Arendt, 1998: 175). It includes the twofold aspects of equality and distinction. 
Equality denotes the equal access to political domain where one can speak to 
others and act with others. Distinction, a more important aspect of political 
subjectivity and the meaning of the political, is not the same as otherness. 
“Otherness in its most abstract form is found only in the sheer multiplication of 
inorganic objects, whereas all organic life already shows variations and 
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distinctions, even between specimens of the same species” (Arendt, 1998: 176) . 
For human beings, on the other hand, distinction becomes a defining 
characteristic and it refers to the uniqueness of a person revealed in speech and 
action. Men and women disclose themselves through speech and action. The 
disclosure of the self via speech
65
 and action, the answer to the question asked 
“who are you?” (Arendt, 1998: 178) differentiates human existence from other 
forms of life.
66
  
 In ancient times, freedom was not a concern of philosophy, Arendt 
argues, since it was a phenomena of the political realm such as justice or 
equality; hence, irrelevant as an issue of reflection. Freedom only seldom—in 
times of crisis or revolution—seem to be the direct aim of political action but in 
fact it is the reason that men live together in political organization at all (Arendt, 
1968: 146). As opposed to the free will, freedom requires plurality; it needs the 
company of others. It means being in public, meeting and acting with others and 
acting in concert. Therefore, a politically guaranteed political realm that is a 
worldly space open to everyone should let freedom to make its appearance. 
 Appearance is an important term in Arendt’s political thought since, as I 
have indicated earlier, acting with others and acting in public is like a 
performance for her. She makes an association with Machiavelli’s concept of 
                                               
65 Arendt’s emphasis on the revelatory nature of speech gave Jürgen Habermas the inspiration to 
develop his theory of communicative action and the idea of deliberation as a form of democratic 
politics. I have to note however, Arendt does not focus solely on speech nor does she offer 
speech to be a medium of consent formation or require it to be rational. The reaching of a 
consensus may only be a moment in politics but for her consensus formation is not the ends of 
politics. 
66 Adriana Cavarero, in her Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood elaborates on the 
issue of subjectivity, the formation of identity and its revelation via storytelling. See Adriana 
Cavarero. 2000. Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood, Routledge. Judith Butler, on the 
other hand, engages with Cavarero’s Arendt inspired “politics of ‘the who’” and asks for the 
possibilities of the development of the notion of an ethics on the basis of a reciprocal exposure 
and vulnerability. See Judith Butler. 2005. Giving an Account of Oneself. Fordham University 
Press.  
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virtú, “the excellence with which man answers the opportunities the world 
opens up before him in the guise of fortune” (Arendt, 1968: 153) and points out 
the necessity of virtuosity in action.
67
 In making the emphasis on virtú Arendt 
further argues that for an action to be free, motives, intentions that cause one to 
act in a particular way and any intended goals must be stripped from it (Arendt, 
1968: 151). “This is not to say that motives and aims are not important factors 
in every single act, but they are its determining factors”, in a way that they 
constitute the framework or the background of a particular case. The important 
thing is that “action is free to the extent that it is able to transcend” such 
concerns (Arendt, 1968: 151). In this sense, freedom becomes inherent in 
action, which seems to require some sort of a ‘semi-transcendental’ mood. The 
accomplishment of the action lies in the performance rather than the end- 
product.  
Having liberated the notion of action from particularistic concerns and 
from dictates and commands, which are the features of will, Arendt asserts that 
in fact action may be guided and such guidance can be provided by principles 
such as justice, glory, honor, love, equality or charity. A principle, let’s say the 
idea of justice may ‘inspire’ an action without dictating any specific behavior as 
it is the case with absolute truth claims. Unlike an interest or will, a principle 
does not lose its strength or validity through execution either. “In distinction 
from its goal, the principle of an action can be repeated time and again, it is 
                                               
67 Arendt’s emphasis on virtú and excellence has received criticism from some scholars like 
George Kateb and Dana Villa. For Kateb, excellence or greatness cannot offer us moral criteria 
in judging a particular action, for Villa “the moral vacuity of ‘greatness’ leaves Arendt’s 
conception of political action all too vulnerable to charges of subjectivism or arbitrariness”. See 
George Kateb. 1984. Hannah Arendt. Politics, Conscience, Evil. Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc.: Totowa, NJ.; Robertson, Martin & Dana Villa. 1996. Arendt and Heidegger. 
The Fate of the Political. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
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inexhaustible, and in distinction from its motive, the validity of a principle is 
universal, it is not bound to any particular person or to any particular group” 
(Arendt, 1968: 152).  
 In order to substantiate her point on the importance of acting, Arendt 
refers to two interrelated but separate words in Greek, archein and prattein. 
Accordingly, archein means beginning or leading and prattein means seeing 
action through or achieving. Although these two words denote the two aspects 
of acting, she argues prattein (emphasizing the achievement) has become the 
accepted word for action. Hence, political actors are expected to enter politics or 
to act in order to achieve certain objectives. Yet, in her conception, an actor, 
(like an artist) does not care about the results of his own actions. She leaves the 
mundane concerns of life behind (more specifically the necessities in Arendtian 
terminology—as it will elaborated more in the coming chapter) and enters the 
public realm to act on matters beyond her own concerns. In acting, she reveals 
her uniqueness, which is somehow beyond herself, since action is supposed to 
be spontaneous and ambiguous in terms of its motives, expression and in terms 
of its effects. 
 
Equation of Power with Domination and Violence:  
 While Arendt considers political subjectivity within the framework of 
arts, more like an ad-lib performance and argues that there has been a shift in its 
meaning from ‘beginning’ (archein) to ‘accomplishment’ (prattein), she directs 
another challenge to the conception of the power, rule and the ruler in politics.  
 In On Violence, she notes that there is an implicit agreement among 
political theorists from Left to Right which views violence as the most flagrant 
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manifestation of power. Quoting C. Wright Mills, “All politics is a struggle for 
power; the ultimate kind of power is violence,” and Weber who defines the state 
as the “rule of men over men, based on the means of legitimate, i.e. allegedly 
legitimate, violence” (Arendt, 1969:134) Arendt argues that the agreement is 
very strange since almost all theorists equate political power with “the 
organization of violence” which confirms “Marx’s estimate of the state as an 
instrument of suppression in the hands of the ruling class” (Arendt, 1969: 134). 
These definitions, she points out, are derived from a misconception that goes 
back to the Ancient Greeks, particularly to the Platonic philosophy that defines 
government as the rule of man over man. The “force of this ancient vocabulary” 
for Arendt has been strengthened by modern scientific and philosophical 
convictions that declare so-called laws with regards to the nature of man. “An 
inborn instinct of domination and an innate aggressiveness in the human 
animal” explicated in philosophical or political texts as a will-to-power (e.g. 
Thomas Hobbes, Friedrich Nietzsche) consolidated the equation of power with 
rule and implicitly with violence. 
 Arendt goes back to the Ancient Greece and notes that archein that 
designates the beginning of action has gained dominance in political language 
particularly since Plato (Arendt, 1998: 189). It is with this specialization of 
word “the role of the beginner and leader, who was a primus inter pares (in the 
case of Homer, a king among kings)” turned into a ruler who gives commands 
and expects obedience. Since Plato a hierarchical relationship is constructed 
between the ruler and the ruled where the isolation of one from the other is 
idealized, the strength of each is seen as a threat to the other and a tension for 
control over each other’s domain is present. In the Statesman, Arendt argues, 
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Plato firstly opens a gap between praxis (or action) and theoria (or knowledge) 
and through the devaluation of vita activa, an active political life, as an 
untrustworthy and irrelevant form of existence he presents vita contemplativa, 
life of contemplation as a superior way of life. With this, opinion, a personal 
and, for her, a political form of knowledge is renounced and truth as an absolute 
knowledge is elevated to the highest place in the realm of ideas. In Plato’s 
theory, politics is identified with the dominion of the philosopher who acquires 
the true knowledge of ruling of himself, his household and the polis (Arendt, 
1981; 1990; 1998). This introduction of truth into political domain, Arendt 
argues, was for Plato “searching a way to compel men without using external 
means of violence” (Arendt, 1968: 107). The only possible form of action in 
return is suggested to be obedience. In a second twist, he makes a distinction 
between archein and prattein (beginning and achieving) and associates archein 
with the rule of the master. As I will discuss in the coming chapter in more 
details, Plato’s understanding of action reveals another transformation too. Her 
views action or praxis in Greek in the image of ‘work’ poiesis, an activity of 
fabrication, producing results with designed and fully implemented plans.
68
 
Here, action gains an instrumental character that stands in stark opposition to 
the one defined by Arendt as an ‘artistic’ performance as well. Apart from 
introducing instrumentality into political realm, Arendt, argues that Plato’s idea 
of mastery can be evaluated also as the application of a type of relationship, 
which characterizes the private realm on the public domain (Arendt, 1998: 221-
223). The specificity of the private domain is that it is organized around the 
                                               
68 In her analysis of the three activities that characterize human existence, ‘labor’, ‘work’ and 
‘action’ in The Human Condition, Arendt argues that labor is an activity bound up with 
necessity, work is an activity realized with instrumental rationality for the fabrication of durable 
objects and action is the true form of political activity.  
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activities of labor, aiming to attend the cyclical necessities of life such as eating, 
sleeping or reproducing. This domain is kept under the control of the head of 
the household, to whom the inhabitants of the house—wife, children, slaves and 
others must obey. The division between ruling and being ruled was first 
experienced in private domain on the basis of being subject to necessity. The 
public-political life, Arendt argues rested on the division between the ruled and 
the ruler as a pre-political condition, but the concept of rule originally had no 
role in politics (Arendt, 2007: 944). 
 As a result, with the separation of archein (beginning) and prattein 
(achievement), the association of latter with acting in general and archein with 
the activity of ruling on the basis of a true knowledge, a conception of rulership 
inspired by household mastery applicable to all domains has contributed to the 
rise of the idea of sovereignty. The idea of sovereign, a God-like ruler 
overarching everyone and everything, as said above is an attack to plurality 
(Arendt, 1998: 202). It prevents citizens from being active, equal and free 
members in their own political existence. The totalitarian rule, the radical 
example of the will to total domination were tried in the extermination camps 
with the belief that “everything is possible” from the point of the ruler. There 
were no limit in the will of doing things to the camp inmates who are reduced to 
“living copses” (Arendt, 1973), zombies in other words. Totalitarianism 
attempts the destruction of man as a political and moral agent and as an 
individual for Arendt. According to her, this process has been realized in three 
stages. At the first stage is the killing of the juridical person is realized by 
stripping of persons of their legal rights via denaturalization. At the second 
stage, is the killing of the moral person by making the person taking decisions 
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of conscience, which are questionable and equivocal. The moral dilemma of the 
Greek mother, who was allowed by the Nazis to choose which of her children 
should be killed, is the most famous example of this murder of the moral 
person. Finally, at the third stage lies the most radical attempt to destroy human 
individuality, unpredictability, plurality, and spontaneity by making them act 
alike without thinking at all. Human beings, behaving like dogs in Pavlov’s 
experiments were the objective of the functioning of totalitarian camps.  
  
Conceptualizing Violence as an Originative Force:  
 The glorification of violence by the “New Left” (Arendt, 1969) is 
another problem Arendt assesses that has roots in tradition but somehow has 
gained a new character in modern era. The most obvious and perhaps the most 
potent factor that contributes to the investment of all hopes with regards to 
political action in the form a violent eruption and destruction is the 
technological progress. It is the proliferation of techniques and machines that 
has the capacity to threat “the very existence of whole nations and, conceivably, 
of all mankind” (Arendt 1969: 119) that could make violence an attractive 
means for political ends.  
  When I was discussing Fanon I have noted that a tendency of attributing 
a moral character or a constitutive role to violence in the formation of political 
subjectivity. Sartre’s statement “violence like Achilles’ lance, can heal the 
wounds that it has inflicted” (Arendt 1969: 122) is an example of such a view 
and it is severely criticized by Arendt. The most interesting aspect of her 
critique is that she argues this rhetoric to be contradictory to the Marx’s theory. 
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By arguing so, she diverges from her earlier views on Marx
69
 and writes that 
“Marx regarded the state as an instrument of violence at the command of the 
ruling class” but he never argued that the actual powers of the ruling class 
consist of or rely on violence (Arendt, 1969: 113). Furthermore, she adds, in 
Marx the use of violence during revolution is controversial too. “The 
dictatorship of the proletariat—openly repressive in Marx’s writings—came 
after the revolution and was meant, like the Roman dictatorship, as a strictly 
limited period” (Arendt, 1969: 113).  
 The attribution of a moral aspect to violence, treating it as if through 
which man creates himself might be Hegelian or Marxist as part of a leftist 
humanist rhetoric. Yet, for Hegel man realizes himself via thought, for Marx via 
labor. Although one could possibly argue that the thought of self-creation 
implies a violent process, self-creation through both thinking and laboring 
significantly differ from creation through destruction, in other words 
implementing violence. “To shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one 
stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there 
remain a dead man and a free man” (Sartre, in Arendt, 1972: 115) is a statement 
Marx would never have penned, she writes. “If one turns the ‘idealistic’ concept 
of thought upside down, one might arrive at the ‘materialistic’ concept of labor; 
                                               
69
 As we will see in the next chapter, in On Revolution she accuses Marx for introducing 
necessity as a driving force into the political domain and therefore for opening the way for the 
violence of necessity (Arendt, 1963: 57). Yet still, in On Violence she asserts that even though 
Marx recognizes violence to play a role in history and during revolution, in his theory violence 
is secondary. This change of heart is not limited with Marx for some; McGowan (1998: 293) 
thinks On Violence represents a departure for Arendt from her earlier, “idealized, and utopian” 
view of politics that excludes violence as a nonpolitical phenomenon. Although the argument 
that Arendt pays a greater attention to the issue of politics and recognizing its relevance as an 
instrument in reaching political goals more, I think, previously too she had some moments 
where her argument that violence might be morally justified can be found.  
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one will never arrive at the notion of violence” (Arendt, 1969: 115; emphasis 
original).  
 Another conceptual misapprehension of violence as a destructive yet 
emancipatory or originative force pertains to the understanding of history, “as a 
continuous chronological process whose progress, moreover, is inevitable” 
(Arendt, 1969: 132).
70
 Arendt (1969: 132) argues  
if we look upon history as a continuous chronological process, 
violence in the shape of war and revolution may appear to constitute 
the only possible interruptions of such processes. If this were true, if 
only the practice of violence would make it possible to interrupt 
automatic processes in the realm of human affairs, the preachers of 
violent actions would have won an important point, although, so far 
as I know, they never made it. However, it is the function of all 
action, as distinguished from mere behavior, to interrupt what 
otherwise would have proceeded automatically and therefore 
predictably. And the distinction between violent and nonviolent 
action is that the former is exclusively bent upon the destruction of 
the old and the latter chiefly concerned with the establishment of 
something new. 
 
 It is true, she admits, like action, violence interrupts regularities. It 
attacks, shatters and even destroys the established system, albeit unjust, 
authoritarian or unequal. Yet, action has the superiority of creating something 
new which is absent in violence in Arendt’s views.  
 The praise of violence, Arendt argues, is due to its employment by a 
discourse of brotherhood, which suggests that engagement with collective 
violence, fighting the enemy and facing death together is what makes a 
                                               
70 The notion of movement has a particular importance in Arendt’s thought. In the nineteenth 
century, she argues, this “idea of progress left its place to the notion of movement” (Arendt, 
1969:132). Elaborated in Origins of Totalitarianism and in other essays, she points out motion 
became almost the motto of a destructive ideology. In the interpretation of totalitarianism, for 
instance, all laws have become laws of movement, which is transcending human life, transforms 
of destroys them in accordance with an ever changing, natural and unrestrained, hence arbitrary 
law (Arendt, 1973; 1953).  
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collectivity, reminding us of Schmitt’s thesis on the political. For Arendt, “it is 
undeniably true that the strong fraternal sentiments, engendered by collective 
violence, have misled many good people into the hope that a new community 
together with a ‘new man’ will arise out of it” (Arendt, 1969:165). Equating 
revolutionary action/organization with military, in both of these structures 
individualism is replaced by group coherence.
71
 This coherence, for her is more 
intense and is stronger than other types of bonds such as friendship. Yet, she 
argues that no body politic was ever founded on the equality before death 
(Arendt, 1969: 165) and on the basis of organism of violence. This discourse 
stands in a direct contrast to her conception of human togetherness, the 
experience of human life and politics.  
 Death, whether it is real experience of dying or the consciousness as 
suggested by Heidegger of one’s own mortality, for her is “perhaps the most 
antipolitical experience there is” (Arendt, 1969:164). It is usually faced in 
complete loneliness and impotence. The most important aspect of death is that 
by dying, one leaves the company of his fellow men, the experience of “being-
together and acting in concert which make life worthwhile” (Arendt, 1969:164-
165). Politics, she argues, is “precisely a means by which to escape from the 
equality before death into a distinction assuring some measure of deathlessness” 
made possible.  
                                               
71 Arendt’s argument made with regards revolutionary action and military can be challenged 
with Yael Tamir’s work which interrogates the paradoxical relation between nationalism and 
liberalism. Tamir shows how liberal states, despite their claim to be the protector of individual 
liberties, life and property demand their citizens to go to the battlefields, fight and die for them. 
Hence, collective identity on the basis of violence is not a problem of revolutionary collective 
action but the nation-state. See Yael Tamir. 1997. Pro Patria Mori! Death and the State in 
McKim and McMahan (eds.), The Morality of Nationalism: 227-4. 
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 Additionally, acting as it will be presented is characterized by its 
capability of introducing something new; creating opportunities, opening the 
way for novelties and possibilities. Violence, on the other hand, seldom creates 
rather destructs; it ends and limits. Despite being so, theorists like Fanon in their 
praising of the experience of violence and death contends that life is an 
unending contest and the struggle, aggressiveness, rage and violence are 
elements of life. Similarly, Sorel inspired by Bergson's elan vital, praised 
violence as a manifestation of the life force, and specifically of its creativity 
(Arendt, 1969: 167). Labeling this as an “organic thought in political matters”, 
Arendt declares (1969: 172) that nothing is more dangerous than interpreting 
power and violence in biological terms. Whenever these phenomena are 
understood with reference to “life and life’s alleged creativity”, “the precedence 
of violence is justified” (Arendt, 1969: 172).  
 Taking up the matter in non-political, biological ways, will make it 
possible to defend violence as it is the case in nature or in the household 
according to Arendt with the argument that “destruction and creation are but 
two sides of the natural process, so that collective violent action, quite apart 
from its inherent attraction, may appear as natural a prerequisite for the 
collective life of mankind as the struggle for survival and violent death for the 
continuing life in the animal kingdom” (Arendt, 1969: 172). The racist 
discourse, which has its roots in the colonial experience as she dwells in Origins 
of Totalitarianism and finds its way in Europe with the rise of Nazism, used and 
disseminated this organic thought of politics and exemplified the tragic results 
of it.  
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5.1.2. Arendt’s Recognition of the reality and rationality of violence: 
 
 In the previous précis, I have presented Arendt’s historical analysis of 
the emergence and persistence of violence within politics and her criticisms of 
the discourses that praise violence for different reasons. In this section, I would 
like to point out her recognition of a line of reasoning that runs through the 
threads of the defense of violence in the works of Fanon and Sartre. Here I will 
substantiate the arguments Arendt made when she does reject violence as an 
inhumane or irrational phenomenon. I will present how she considers it mostly 
as a rational response and at times an effective means in bringing some changes 
in politics or voicing injustices, demanding and acquiring rights.  
 Despite her emphasis on action and speech as political actions par 
excellence according to Arendt, sometimes violence may work as a 
‘therapeutic’ process and this is particularly relevant when it springs from rage. 
Rage is a reaction, some sort of a reflexive response, which by no means is 
given in response to misery or a suffering to a problem that lies beyond the 
control of oneself. She (1969: 160) writes,  
no one reacts with rage to a disease beyond the powers of medicine 
or to an earthquake, or, for that matter, to social conditions which 
seem to be unchangeable. Only where there is reason to suspect that 
conditions could be changed and are not, does rage arise. Only 
when our sense of justice is offended do we react with rage.  
 
It is possible for rage to be irrational and at times pathological, but so can 
be every other human affect, she writes. She quotes William O’Brien who 
asserts “violence is sometimes needed for the voice of moderation to be heard” 
(Arendt, 1969: 176). With this argument, she minds the gap the liberal-
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democratic approach ignored with its assumption of a perfectly inclusive 
political order. A liberal-democratic position cannot understand why a group of 
people who cannot access the political order or cannot speak the language or the 
discourse of the political system would resort to violence; thence cannot 
establish communicative channels with the excluded. Furthermore, Arendt 
argues, “to resort to violence in view of outrageous events or conditions is 
enormously tempting because of the immediacy and swiftness inherent in it” 
(Arendt, 1969: 160). The reflexivity of violence is emphasized here with 
reference to its source of origin that is ‘feeling of injustice’, its emergence and 
direction. It should be immediate and has a specific target or objective. For 
Arendt, “there are situations in which the very swiftness of a violent act may be 
the only appropriate remedy” (Arendt, 1969: 160) both in private and public 
life.  
The point is not that this will permit us to let off steam—, which 
indeed can be equally well done by pounding the table or by finding 
another substitute. The point is that under certain circumstances 
violence, which is to act without argument or speech and without 
reckoning with consequences, is the only possibility of setting the 
scales of justice right again. In this sense, rage and the violence that 
sometimes, not always, goes with it belong among the “natural” 
human emotions, and to cure man of them would mean nothing less 
than to dehumanize or emasculate him (Arendt, 1969:161).  
 
As the passage illustrates, Arendt does not seem to fear from violence as 
an eruption of rage as much as she fears from dehumanization. She avows that it 
is possible to create conditions such as concentration camps or use instruments 
such as torture, threat, imprisonment through which human beings turn into not 
animal-like but dehumianized creatures, epitomized by the conspicuous absence 
of rage and violence (Arendt, 1969: 160). In other words, sometimes it is the 
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use of reason, which makes human beings to engage with dangerously irrational 
undertakings such as the building of concentration camps or the invention and 
use of the atomic bombs.  
 Apart from the will to break free from the shackles of the unjust 
conditions, Arendt assesses hatred, some sort of contempt for the bourgeois 
society in the works of thinkers like Sorel, Pareto and Fanon. By equating 
bourgeoisie with hypocrisy, they suggest violence to be a medium of unmasking 
the ‘true’ nature of the system and this will “to provoke action even at the risk 
of annihilation so that the truth may come out” (Arendt, 1969: 163). In the 
discussion of hypocrisy Arendt, again underlines the rationality of such violence 
and raises a very peculiar challenge that can be directed to the liberal disavowal 
of violence with the charge of irrationality:  
And this violence again is not irrational. Since men live in a world 
of appearances, hence depend upon manifestation, hypocrisy’s 
conceits - as distinguished from temporary ruses, followed by 
disclosure in due time—cannot be met with what is recognized as 
reasonable behavior. Words can be relied upon only so long as one 
is sure that their function is to reveal and not to conceal. It is the 
semblance of rationality, rather than the interests behind it that 
provokes rage. To respond with reason when reason is used as a 
trap is not “rational”; just as to use a gun in self-defense is not 
“irrational” (Arendt, 1969:163).  
 
 Yet still, she cautions against a possibility of when rage and violence 
turn irrational and this takes place “only when [they] are directed against 
substitutes” (Arendt, 1969: 161). Arendt does not elaborate much on the 
meaning of this statement and indeed makes a quite strange and controversial 
argument. She contends that “for example… it has become rather fashionable 
among white liberals to react against “black rage” with the cry, we are all 
guilty, and black militants have proved only too happy to accept this 
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“confession” and to base on it some of their more fantastic demands” (Arendt, 
1969: 161-162).
72
 She then moves to a discussion on collective guilt and 
innocence and does not provide a clear explanation of her previous argument. 
One possible explanation might be that the motive of the violence (in terms of 
rage) lies in a past action, from which current actors cannot be held responsible. 
For this reason, justifying violence with reference to the past, for her, cannot be 
possible or is it relevant.
73
  
 Upon presenting her sympathetic criticism of violence with a focus on 
rage, Arendt moves to a politico-critical analysis of the phenomenon by noting 
its strategic usage within politics. Accordingly, violence might be an instrument 
which is used in challenging or damaging the system and it might even reach its 
objectives by forcing the existing regime (or the authority it is directed against) 
to respond to its cries. “violence does not promote causes, neither history nor 
revolution, neither progress nor reaction… but it can serve to dramatize 
grievances and bring them to public attention” (Arendt, 1969:176). She raises 
an interesting point by arguing, “to ask the impossible in order to obtain the 
                                               
72 In fact, Arendt’s many remarks on Africans and on black movement in the U.S. are 
controversial to the extent that they are called as ethnocentric (Dossa, 1980) or antiprimitivist 
(Klausen, 2010) by some scholars. The most controversial text in this sense is the Reflections on 
Little Rock (1959); her arguments presented in On Violence that views the Black Power 
movement’s struggle as apolitical are also strange. Dossa, furthermore, in her reading of Origins 
of Totalitarianism names Arendt’s engagement as “ethnocentric” See Shiraz Dossa. 1980. 
“Human Status and Politics: Hannah Arendt on the Holocaust,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 13.2: 309-23; Jimmy Casas Klausen labels this 
as antprimitivism. See Jimmy Casas Klausen. 2010. “Hannah Arendt's Antiprimitivism,” 
Political Theory 38(3): 394-423. For further readings and debates on the issue see Anne Norton. 
1995. “Heart of Darkness: Africa and African Americans in the Writings of Hannah Arendt”. In 
Bonnie Honig ed. Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, Pennsylvania State University 
Press: University Park; Gündoğdu, Ayten. 2011. “Arendt on Culture and Imperialism: Response 
to Klausen,” Political Theory 39(5): 661-667 and Jimmy Casas Klausen. 2011. “Reply to 
Gündoğdu,” Political Theory 39 (5): 668-73.  
73 But we can challenge Arendt by arguing that if the source of an axis of structural inequality 
was seeded in the past, (let’s say at a constitutive moment of the foundation of the United 
States) and if its impact is still felt presently, meaning that they suffer from inequality or 
exclusion, then how do we judge the validity of their rage/violence? 
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possible is not always counterproductive. And indeed, violence, contrary to 
what its prophets try to tell us, is a much more effective weapon of reformers 
than of revolutionists” (Arendt, 1969: 176). It is due to the violence of student 
movements in Europe and the U.S., she thinks, some reforms in educational 
system were realized. “No doubt ‘violence pays’” she says and adds, “but the 
trouble is that it pays indiscriminately” (Arendt, 1969: 176-177). This means 
that it is not possible to be certain about the outcome of violence: students 
might end up with ‘real’ reforms, (the content) but also with ‘soul courses’ or 
instruction in Swahili (Arendt, 1969: 177). Violence is rational to the extent that 
it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it. Justification makes a 
certain act understandable and even excusable with references to the motives of 
an act and in terms of the established causality. One can explain one’s 
intentions in acting a certain way and make damage comprehensible, by saying 
for instance “I did not mean to hurt that particular person, it was an accident”. 
Alternatively, we can understand why someone hits another one when we see 
that s/he has been kicked or insulted in the first place. Here, violence denotes an 
‘immediate reaction’; it is reflexive. It operates as a force of self-defense, and 
therefore it is justified. For Arendt “no one questions the use of violence in self-
defense, because the danger is not only clear but also present, and the end 
justifying the means is immediate” (Arendt, 1969: 151). The justification of 
violence is only possible when the duration of the process of reaching of the end 
is short, even prompt. Violence loses its ground of justification when its 
intended end is postponed or argued to be reached at a farther time. In that 
sense, she makes a distinction between justification and legitimacy. 
Accordingly, legitimacy is derived from a compact, an agreement or a promise 
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with which participants or concerned agents might have some sort of an 
understanding of a coming action. Within the framework of legitimacy, citizens 
or participants of politics would act within a domain where some dynamics of 
this closed universe are somehow stabilized or trusted. Justification, however, 
when the duration of the act extends and when it continues to have references to 
the future for the fulfillment of an end it promises (such as the ‘end of terror’ or 
‘bringing democracy’, ‘freedom’) gives way to uncertainty, ambiguity and 
manipulation; thence loses its persuasive force.  
I will present Arendt’s discussion of the difference between power and 
violence much more in detail in the following section, but here we should note 
that for her, distinct from power, force, or strength violence always needs 
implements. “The very substance of violent action is ruled by the question of 
means and ends” (Arendt, 1969: 106) and for this reason when applied to 
human affairs, the end is always exposed to the danger of “being overwhelmed 
by the means, which it both justifies and needs” (Arendt, 1969: 106). There is 
always the danger where violence becomes a constitutive element of a vicious 
circle. The implementation of violent means, Arendt argues, would probably 
lead to more violence (Arendt, 1969: 80). Whenever the end disappears 
altogether and whenever violence becomes an end in itself, violence turns into 
terror, the aimless and dysfunctional destruction and fright. Arendt notes that 
“terror is not the same as violence; it is rather the form of government that 
comes into being when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate 
but, on the contrary, remains in full control” (Arendt: 1969: 154). Thence, 
violence that has lost its objective and that has become an end in itself turns out 
to be terror. She presents an extended debate on the issue of terror and how it 
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played a constitutive role in totalitarian regimes in Origins of Totalitarianism 
but her main argument with regards to totalitarian terror, as different from terror 
of tyranny and other forms of dictatorships is that after certain point it targets 
not only its ‘enemies’ but also its friends and supporter by being afraid of all 
power, even the power of its friends. “The climax of terror is reached when the 
police state begins to devour its own children, when yesterday’s executioner 
becomes today’s victim” (Arendt, 1969: 154) 
 Secondly, since violence is a phenomenon of the human realm, and 
because it is within the terrain of action phenomenologically, (and although it is 
desired to be that way by thinkers like Plato) in contrast with the products of 
fabrication, the outcomes of it can “never be reliably predicted, the means used 
to achieve political goals are more often than not of greater relevance to the 
future world than the intended goals” (Arendt, 1969: 106). Therefore, violence 
suffers from unpredictability also arbitrariness. We have seen this 
unpredictability is a feature of action as well but the problem with violence is 
that while Arendt attributes action an inherent value, violence can be justified 
only by its attainment of ‘just’ ends, by its effectiveness and immediate results. 
Hence, unpredictability stands as an important limit on its justiﬁability (Finlay, 
2009: 29). 
 
5.2. Arendt’s phenomenological distinction between violence and power 
 
In presenting Arendt’s views on the reasons of the persistence of violence, 
we have seen her pointing out the problematic nature of the notion of 
sovereignty. Such a conception has its roots in the notion of free will and 
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understands power as the will and capability to dominate or to rule over others. 
Freedom, on the other hand, is equated with liberty, being free from external 
constraints. Violence, within this equation becomes an effective instrument of 
either applying power or acquiring it. In a stark contrast, she places freedom as 
a capability (i) to act and speak in public, (ii) with others (iii) to display one’s 
uniqueness for the sake of (iv) plurality. Action as the performance and 
experience of freedom, as presented has some drawbacks; the most important of 
them is its uncontrollability in term of the results it might produce. The 
philosophers’ will to master the world and human relations, for Arendt is due to 
the desire to prevent the handicaps of action. Despite its calamities, however, 
Arendt defends action for its capacity of introducing something new into human 
life. The interruption of the regular life, introduction of a new perspective, a 
new word or a question that raises confusions or conflicts and opening up a 
space of possibilities are what she praises as valuable and political aspects of 
the action. In Human Condition she writes (1998: 177) “to act means to take an 
initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, “to begin,” “to lead,” and 
eventually “to rule,” indicates), to set something into motion (which is the 
original meaning of the Latin agere)”. In providing this definition, she suggests 
a distinction between two notions with reference to St. Augustine: principium 
and initium (Arendt, 1968: 167). A principium, she writes, designates a new 
beginning as an archė, starting a chain of causes and effects. However, the 
initium, in Augustine’s somewhat enigmatic definition, is related to “the 
character of human existence in the world.” Such a beginning mainly refers to 
God’s creation of the world and time (“both of which existed before man”), 
hence designates a creation ex nihilo. Initium, on the other hand, connotes the 
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beginning of souls or human beings. It differs from principium in being not 
absolute, not the beginning of something rather of somebody, who is a beginner 
himself (Arendt, 1998: 177). Initium means “the freedom to call something into 
being which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of 
cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be 
known” (Arendt, 1998: 177). It denotes the unexpected nature of action, the 
emergence of something new, and the breaking of the chain of regular 
functioning of things. This is something humans can do. For her “with the 
creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself, which, of 
course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was created 
when man was created but not before” (Arendt, 1998: 177). As a result, because 
they are initium, meaning that they are “newcomers and beginners by virtue of 
birth” human beings are initiators; they take initiative and are existentially 
prompted into action (Arendt, 1998: 177). Through action, individuals can make 
a difference in the world.  
 As stated in the introduction for Arendt an approach to violence is 
closely related with the understanding of power. Traditionally, power is 
understood as an instrument of rule where rule is assumed to exist due to an 
instinct to dominate, violence, despite the attempt of overcoming it, is presumed 
to be a derivative of power. In contrast to this, Arendt presents an alternative 
conception of power and attempts to reject violence, in her view, with political 
reasons.  
 Power can be defined simply as gathering and more importantly “acting 
in concert” (Arendt, 1969: 142). It is “what keeps the public realm, the potential 
space of appearance, between acting and speaking men in existence” (1998: 
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200). The public realm, the space of appearance emerges wherever men come 
together in the manner of speech and action, and “therefore predates and 
precedes all formal constitution of the public realm” (Arendt, 1998: 199). Like 
Schmitt’s attribution of the political a specific character, Arendt defines power 
as the essence of all government and argues that a government is an organized 
and institutionalized power (Arendt, 1998: 199; 1968)
74
. One of the defining 
features of power in Arendt is its potentiality; potentiality of being and acting 
together. She (Arendt, 1998: 200) writes 
The word [power] itself, its Greek equivalent dynamis, like the 
Latin potential with its various modern derivatives or the German 
Macht (which derives from mögen and möglich, not from machen), 
indicates its “potential” character. Power is always, as we would say 
a power potential and not an unchangeable, measurable, and reliable 
entity like force or strength. While strength is the natural quality of 
an individual seen in isolation, power springs up between men when 
they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse.” 
 
 Temporality is the second feature of Arendtian power. By arguing this 
she refutes the traditional understanding that views power as something to be 
possessed or to be applied. Power is the potentiality that depends on the 
“unreliable and only temporary agreement of many wills and intentions” 
(Arendt, 1998: 201). It cannot be stored up or kept in reserve for emergencies, 
which for her differentiates it from the instruments of violence, and more 
importantly, it exists only in its actualization that is in the formation of a 
collectivity with the will to act upon something. In the case of a failure of an 
actualization, for instance whenever a disagreement prevents the realization of a 
collective action power passes away. The third feature of power is its 
                                               
74 In On Revolution she writes, “all political institutions are manifestations and materializations 
of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold 
them. This is what Madison meant when he said ‘all governments rest on opinion’, a statement 
that is no less true for the various forms of monarchies than it is for democracies.  
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dependence on multiplicity and plurality. In order to be realized power needs 
great numbers. It is not possible for one person to exercise power; “When we 
say that someone is ‘in power’ we actually mean that that person has been 
empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name” (Arendt, 1968: 
145). Within this context, her defense for the divisibility of power might be 
helpful. For Arendt, power can be divided without decreasing it (Arendt, 1998: 
200). It can be delegated, federalized or localized without losing its character; 
the interplay of powers, furthermore, “with their checks and balances is even 
liable to generate more power, so long, at least, as the interplay is alive and has 
not resulted in a stalemate” (Arendt, 1998: 201).  
A legally unrestricted majority rule, that is, a democracy without a 
constitution, can be very formidable indeed in the suppression of 
the rights of minorities and very effective in the suffocation of 
dissent without any use of violence. Undivided and unchecked 
power can bring about a “consensus” that is hardly less coercive 
than suppression by means of violence. But that does not mean that 
violence and power are the same (Arendt ??). 
 
 There are some other prerequisites for the actualization of power as well. 
In a somehow romantic style, Arendt (1998: 200) writes  
Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted 
company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where 
words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and 
deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations 
and create new realities”  
 
 Although it is difficult to disclose the meaning of this paragraph fully, 
one can say it comes very close to Habermas’s discourse ethics and his theory 
of communicative action. Arendt seems to require the members of a political 
community to be consistent, to eschew discursive arts such as rhetoric, to use a 
language that has the purpose of communication and revelation. The used 
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language is required to be non-violent at the symbolic level as well. It should 
not be exclusionary rather must use a democratic and inclusive tone. She writes 
“words used for the purpose of fighting lose their quality of speech; they 
become clichés” (Arendt, 1994b: 38). Yet still, she has significant differences 
from Habermas in terms of her emphasis on action, the absence of an object of 
reaching consent in politics, which derives from her argument about the 
uncontrollability of action. Like action, power is boundless it cannot be 
controlled.  
 In order to delineate the contours of the phenomenon of power and its 
difference from violence Arendt introduced a fivefold distinction between 
power, strength, force, authority and violence. Accordingly, strength denotes 
the “natural quality of an individual in isolation” (Arendt, 1998: 200; 1969: 
143). It mainly implies endurance, “the possibility of standing alone, something 
that is not simply a question of being in the command of a given quantity of 
force” (Dodd, 2009: 50). For Dodd (2009: 50) Arendt’s claim becomes cogent 
if one recognizes the “connection between silence and strength, and the problem 
silence poses for the space of appearance. Standing alone, one becomes an 
unknown quantity for the common narrative, falling outside of the logic that 
belongs to a common space of action.”75 In this sense, strength and power stand 
as opposites in terms of their relation with collectivity; equating power with 
strength furthermore is problematic. This is particularly so since the latter 
implies omnipotence and “conversely, aspiration toward omnipotence always 
                                               
75 For Dodd (2009) with this intervention Arendt gets rid of the opposition between the vital 
force of the strong and the resentment of the weak, exemplified in the work of Nietzsche for 
instance.  
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implies—apart from its Utopian hubris—the destruction of plurality” (Arendt, 
1998: 201-202).  
 Force, another notion used interchangeably with power, is defined as an 
“energy released by physical or social movement” (Arendt, 1998: 144). Its 
meaning is revealed in uses where one speaks of “forces of nature” or “force of 
circumstance” (Arendt, 1998: 144); hence force refers to uncontrollable (not in 
terms of the uncontrollability of an ‘action’ but more like the irresistibility of a 
’movement’) events of nature such as a tornado or an earthquake or to dramatic 
eruptions like lynching. For Arendt, the alternative to power is not strength 
(independent and strong vs. in company and powerful) but force for it has the 
capacity of defying political action. It is not possible to stand against a group of 
vigilantes who are agitated (looking for revenge or punishment) but not 
motivated for ‘genuine’ political action.  
 Authority, on the other hand, designates an unquestioning recognition 
vested in an office or position. The unquestioning nature of the recognition of 
authority, for Arendt, does not mean that it requires a blind obedience. She 
presumes the existence of a prior respect to the position or status; a type of 
recognition that does not need further persuasion or coercion. The authority of a 
father over a child exemplifies this: whenever he beats his child or treats him as 
if he is an equal the father would lose the ground of his authority. The 
relationship between two is based on authority for her (Arendt, 1969: 144). 
 Finally, violence is defined and distinguished from power by its 
instrumental character. Phenomenologically it is closer to strength and relies on 
implements for the purpose of further multiplication of strength (Arendt, 1969: 
145). One other resemblance to strength lies in its ‘muteness’. Although earlier 
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she had suggested violence to be possibly an articulation of some anger or rage, 
hence to be delivering a message, in her phenomenological analysis Arendt 
emphasizes the muteness and more importantly the muting characteristic of 
violence. A fist ends a discussion. Arms and bombs shock and silence people; a 
group of thousand people united in their acts and deeds can do nothing in the 
face of guns. For that matter, violence brings in isolation and it is characterized 
by isolation (Peeters, 2008: 183). Its extreme form is witnessed in ‘one against 
All,’ as it is in tyranny. This is, on the one hand, writes Peeters (2008: 183) 
“understandable insofar as violence has its origin in work, and on the other, in 
terms of its speechlessness: without speech there can no longer be any 
uncovering (or revealing) of the who” (emphasis original). Therefore while 
“violence can destroy power” by dispersing the collectivity and eliminating the 
power potentiality” of persons, it cannot destroy strength easily (Arendt, 1998: 
202). The two becomes somehow equivalent in terms of their logic of isolation. 
Strength, the capability of enduring, can cope with violence more successfully 
than it does with power. People might stoically accept the suffering, isolate 
themselves from the outer world and focus on self-sufficiency. Or they may 
heroically consent to fight violence and die in the arms of it; in either case, 
Arendt writes “the integrity of the individual and his strength remain intact” 
(Arendt, 1998: 202).  
Although Arendt contends that in certain contexts and in history 
violence may have an expressive character, phenomenologically, it is silent 
(Arendt, 1969; 1998) and is a silencing force (Arendt, 1969; 1998) for her. It 
damages the corporeal and emotional integrity of a person and cuts one’s ties 
with the world by destroying one’s trust to the world and by isolating one from 
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the others within the borders of the private and of the self.
76
 Pain confines one 
to the body that suffers from pain and distress (Arendt, 1998). For Hannah 
Arendt (1998), pain is such an experience that cannot be shared with others—it 
creates solitude and a radical subjectivity.
77
 The “unsharability” of physical pain 
is engendered “through its resistance to language” and even through an active 
destruction of language by “bringing about an immediate reversion to a state 
anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before 
language is learned” (Scarry, 1985: 4). 
 So, Arendt argues that the relationship between power and violence is an 
antagonistic one: “it is not enough to say that power and violence are not the 
same. Power and violence are opposites”. This is despite the fact that power and 
violence are generally found in combination. Even a totalitarian rule needs a 
power basis, she writes; it relies on secret police and a network of informants. 
Yet she points out the antagonism between violence and power with the 
argument that the absolute rule of one denotes the absence of the other; the two 
in their absolute forms cannot co-exist. In totalitarian camps, for instance one 
cannot observe the formation of power. In a context where power is established 
in its ideal form, violence becomes redundant. “This implies that it is not correct 
                                               
76 A philosopher and a rape survivor Susan Brison writes about her tearing off from the world 
she knows, about her detachment from herself and her past by the experience of violence and 
about  her recovery in her book. See, Susan Brison. 2002. Aftermath: Violence and the 
Remaking of a Self, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
77 In Human Condition, she writes:  
Indeed, the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of blotting out all other 
experiences, namely, the experience of great bodily pain, is at the same time the most 
private and least communicable of all. Not only is it perhaps the only experience which we 
are unable to transform into a shape fit for public appearance, it actually deprives us of our 
feeling for reality to such an extent that we can forget it more quickly and easily than 
anything else. There seems to be no bridge from the most radical subjectivity, in which I 
am no longer “recognizable,” to the outer world of life. Pain, in other words, truly a 
borderline experience between life as “being among men” (inter homines esse) and death, 
is so subjective and removed from the world of things and men that it cannot assume an 
appearance at all (Arendt, 1998:  50–1). 
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to say that the opposite of violence is nonviolence: to speak of nonviolent power 
is actually redundant.” Violence emerges when power is in jeopardy, however. 
A government losing its authority, the recognition vested in its status, may 
employ violent means that in turn contributes to the loss of its power base. One 
crucial point about violence, for Arendt is that it can destroy power; it can 
eliminate power but it “is utterly incapable of creating it.” 
 I have already argued that considering its unpredictability, it potential of 
breaking the chain of events and the dramatic results it causes, in Arendt’s 
theory, violence comes very close to action. Yet, we have seen with regards to 
the type of interruption it causes, its principle of operation and the effects it 
produces violence fails to meet the criteria of being so; an uncontrollable, 
spontaneous and creative act that initiates further events. Violence is strategic, 
planned and its end results are aimed to be produced with the implementation of 
instruments. Therefore, it comes close to ‘work’ as a type of human activity. By 
being instrumental, standing in need of guidance and an objective, violence 
always needs justification. It is argued to be finite; wars are assumed to end at 
one point. They are claimed to be fought for the reaching of peace one day. The 
goal-orientated nature of the use of violent instrument, therefore, seeks 
validation by referring to the end that lies in the future. Yet, we know that in an 
age where wars are not fought on a field rather carried out in every possible 
domain they may last for decades and continuously defer their ends. The 
justification, therefore, is in jeopardy due the unpredictability and arbitrariness 
of violence. A bomb might explode in a wrong place; a rocket might hit 
civilians and cause unwanted casualties. For this reason, violence cannot be 
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political: “What needs justification through something else cannot be the 
essence of anything.” 
 Legitimacy, on the other hand, is something that utterly belongs to 
power and it is derived “from the initial getting together rather than from any 
action that then may follow”. When a challenge is raised to the legitimacy of 
power, an appeal to the past is made. Power is, for Arendt, the essence of all 
government. Whenever it disintegrates one can assess the emergence of a crisis 
which might lead to revolutions possibly but not necessarily but also to the 
substitution of power with violence. No government can be solely based upon 
the means of violence. For this reason, eventually, even a totalitarian ruler needs 
a power basis, even though it is composed of the secret police and it’s net of 
informers (Arendt, 1969).  
 
Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter, I have presented Arendt’s understanding of the 
phenomenon of violence based on her assessment of the increased employment 
of techniques and the rise of a discourse of violence and in politics. We have 
seen she has particular criticisms directed at the traditional understanding of 
politics as a relationship of rule and domination. Freedom is understood as 
liberty, and in that sense it denotes the condition of being free from any type of 
rule and politics. Power, on the other hand, is equated with the effective 
capability of domination and of control of the other. Within this conceptual 
framework, Arendt argues, violence cannot be judged for its emergence in 
politics because it becomes nothing but other than an extreme form of power. 
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Equation of power with violence is a severe confusion she wants to correct. In 
this critique, we have seen Arendt attacks the notion of sovereignty as well 
since it represents the embodiment of all misconceptions within political realm: 
a political subjectivity, free from all constraints and successfully ruling over 
others.  
She has pointed out possible causes for the emergence of violence in 
human relations or in history. Perception of injustice is one of the reasons of 
such emergencies. Circumstances that offend people’s notions of justice or 
conditions that prevents argumentation or speech may lead to violent outbursts 
and these outbursts may have a therapeutic and restorative function. The 
strategic usage of violence within politics is again an understandable 
phenomenon for Arendt because in many instances violence can be an effective 
means in reaching the ends. It is swift, dramatic and effective. In terms of its 
impacts, violence has some resemblances with action as well: It operates as an 
unpredictable, at times expressive and disruptive force in human realm. Yet 
still, violence needs implements, functions within the framework instrumental 
rationality, destructive and is generally a silencing force. The circle of violence 
is a difficult to break and as long as the use of violence prolonged its 
justification becomes impossible. Arendt’s distinction between justification and 
legitimacy becomes an important criterion. Accordingly, justification implies 
understanding of the causal dynamics and the emergence of a certain event. 
Legitimacy, however, is a binding and bonding phenomenon and is related to 
power, people’s will of getting and acting together.  
In the last section of this chapter, Arendt’s discussion of violence in 
contrast to power in phenomenological terms was presented. The analysis 
168 
 
revealed that albeit accepting the role violence played in history Arendt wants 
to commit herself to a position of non-violence. According to one scholar, her 
theory can be understood primarily as an advocacy “of pragmatic nonviolence 
(of a non-absolute kind)” (Jakopovich, 2009: 2) for the obvious reasons that she 
recognizes violence, even supported it as it was the case in the death penalty for 
Eichmann and her politics lacks “the ‘Gandhian’ quality of compassion 
Arendt”(Jakopovich, 2009: 2).  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
FOUCAULT ON POWER AND VIOLENCE 
 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, I have reviewed Arendt’s critique of political 
tradition with a focus on the relationship between violence and politics. The 
critique targeted the increasing dominance of the practice and discourse of 
violence and aimed at the correction of political notions. I have presented her 
attempt of understanding the role violence plays in politics as well and finally, 
outlined the contours of her rejection of violence as a politically at a 
phenomenological level.  
When we come to Foucault, we see that he does not share Arendt’s 
concern for the persistence or rise of violence in politics. Firstly, he does not 
make an assessment on the prevalence of violence. Secondly, he does not have a 
notion of an ideal form for politics, freedom, power or action. Nor does he 
present a critique that passes a normative judgment on a certain practice, 
discourse or form of relationship. Upon reading his historical works on prisons, 
madness, and sexuality, many other issues and domains we did not consider to 
be related with political rationality, we cannot tell whether it is good to live in a 
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modern society or that life would be better in a premodern context. On these 
accounts Foucault receives many criticisms, one of the most famous is directed 
by Jürgen Habermas in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.
78
 Habermas 
(1987) charges Foucault with presentism, relativism, and with 
cryptonormativity and argues that his genealogical historiography jeopardizes 
its critical value.  
 Yet still, like Arendt he pays a special emphasis on the notion of 
sovereignty and points out the interlinked nature of sovereign power, law and 
violence. He furthermore, agrees with Arendt’s argument that there is 
discrepancy between the understanding and the practice of politics. In Arendt’s 
opinion, the tools that are used in the understanding of politics fall short of their 
ideal forms; from a Foucauldian perspective, the mismatch is a problem because 
it prevents the understanding of historical realities. He assesses two dominating 
frameworks used in the understanding of power relations, the ‘liberal-juridical’ 
and the ‘Marxist model’.  
 The juridical or liberal conception having its roots in the philosophies of 
the eighteenth century formulates political power on the basis of the market, the 
“process of exchange, the economic circulation of commodities” (Foucault, 
1980a: 89). The second one, on the left, is the Marxist approach and it raises a 
radical critique to the liberal-juridical conception of politics with the argument 
that “the historical raison d’être of political power and the principle of its 
concrete forms and actual functioning” to be located in the economy (Foucault, 
1980a: 89).  
                                               
78 For the Foucault Habermas debate See 1994), Critique and Power: Recasting 
the Foucault/Habermas Debate 
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 The liberal approach deals with the question of power only in juridical 
terms; that is in terms of constitution, sovereignty, rights and laws. Within this 
framework, power is considered to be a right, “which can be possessed like a 
commodity” and can be hold by every individual. “It can be transferred partially 
or totally to another party via contract”, the establishment of political power or 
sovereignty is therefore possible “with the transfer or sharing the power 
individuals possess again by a contract” (Foucault, 1980a: 88). For Foucault, 
oppression (read as violence) is the limit or the transgression of this limit of this 
form of power. 
 The Marxist approach, on the other hand, addresses power mainly in 
terms of the State apparatus. Power is analyzed by focusing on its role in the 
maintenance of the relations of production and of class domination (Foucault, 
1980a: 88). Therefore, while the liberal approach evaluates power as a 
commodity, the Marxist approach focuses on its functionality and despite their 
difference both approaches share a common point: they are both deduced from 
economy and present ‘economism’, the approach that views power as a product 
of economic relations and as secondary to economy, in the theory of power 
(Foucault, 1980a: 88). 
 Foucault rejects this economism and asks for the possibility of a non-
economic analysis of power. Reminding us Arendt’s ideas on the conception of 
action and power he argues that on the one hand there is the assertion that 
“power is not something that is given, exchanged, or taken back, that it is 
something that is exercised and that it exists only in action” (Foucault, 1980a: 
89). On the other hand, he argues there is the assertion that argues power “is 
primarily, in itself, a relationship of force” (Foucault, 1980a: 90). The assertion 
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that power is something exercised or considered to be a relation of force, he 
argues, would receive an immediate interrogation of the nature of such exercise 
and response that suggest it to be repressive. Starting from Hegel running 
through Freud and later Reich, power is also defined as a repressive force 
(Foucault, 1980a: 90; 1980c: 118-119).  
Reading politics with reference to sovereignty and power within the 
parameters of economism causes one to overlook modern forms of ‘domination’ 
different from earlier ones in terms of their operations and end results. As 
articulated in Discipline and Punish and the History of Sexuality Foucault 
argues that the functioning of mechanisms of political power has been 
transformed and has a different nature and these developments have an impact 
on the relationship between violence and power and politics as well. 
My presentation will start with the discussion of the sovereign power 
and its intimate connection with violence. Then I will move to the review of the 
Foucauldian analytical concepts, ‘disciplinary power’ and ‘bio-politics’ that 
denote the changing nature of power relations in modern societies and that 
operate in different terms than the sovereign power. Like Arendt, Foucault 
looks for an alternate understanding of power, which might be used in making 
sense of the present dynamics and formulate strategies to transform them. 
Albeit being fragmentary in nature I will present these alternative sketches of 
power. As we will see Foucault’s notion of modern power excludes violence as 
well. This does not mean that he rejects violence normatively; rather that in his 
view modern forms of power do not operate within the framework of 
prohibition, exclusion and violence 
. 
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6.1. From Sovereignty to Modern Forms of Power 
 
6.1.1. The Sovereign Political Power and its Relation with Violence 
  
 Like Arendt before him, Foucault problematizes the central place 
sovereignty has in politics and presents a historical analysis with a proto-
normative critique. In his analysis he specially points out the dominance of 
juridical discourse as system of representation, of formulation, and of analysis 
of power in the western societies (2003) and argues that this as an outdated 
approach. Within the discourse and techniques of right sovereignty has been 
used as a reference point. The juridical discourse developed on the basis of the 
monarchical model engaged with the demands of the royal personage, and for 
the benefit of royal power firstly in Middle Ages (Foucault, 2003: 25-26; 34) 
then in later centuries with the issue of domination that is the problem of 
legitimate rights of sovereignty, and the legal obligation to obey it (Foucault, 
2003: 26; Foucault, 1980a: 95).  
 The theory of sovereignty played four major roles in its emergence. First 
of all, it denoted a material power mechanism of feudal monarchy. Secondly, 
the juridical-political discourse was used in the establishment and justification 
of a large-scale monarchical administration. Thirdly, from the sixteenth century 
and particularly after the seventeenth century onward (at the time of wars of 
religion he writes) the discourse of sovereignty was used both to limit and to 
strengthen royal power and this utilization was not limited with the ruling class. 
Catholic monarchists or Protestant antimonarchists utilized it to defend their 
cases. Fourthly and finally, in the eighteenth century with a return to the 
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doctrine of Roman law the notion and theory of sovereignty was invoked by 
thinkers like Rousseau in the formulation of an alternative model as opposed to 
the authoritarian and absolutist monarchies (Foucault, 2003: 34-35; 1980: 103). 
According to Foucault, the theory or the discourse of sovereignty (whether it 
was used in the justification of the establishment of administrative units of in 
the attempt of the replacement of a monarch) “coextensive” (Foucault, 2003: 
35) with the existing mechanisms of power; that is the distribution, interaction 
and the reproduction of power relations within a feudal society. Starting from 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, a new mechanism of power 
with its specific procedures and techniques emerged in western societies. The 
operation of this new mechanism of power is significantly different from 
functioning of the sovereign form of power; and as I will present more in detail 
in the coming sections, it is incompatible with relations of sovereignty 
(Foucault, 2003: 35). Yet, as Arendt has pointed out before, the theoretical, 
conceptual framework that corresponds to the dynamics of the feudal society is 
sustained (it was even kept by Rousseau and by the revolutionaries of the 
French Revolution) and used to understand modern societies and modern 
politics.  
 One characteristic of the sovereign power is that it is exercised over a 
territory and mainly as a means of deduction (prelevement), a subtraction 
mechanism. It denotes the right to “appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of 
products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied on the subjects. This 
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makes it possible to transcribe, into juridical terms, discontinuous obligations 
and tax records” (Foucault, 2003: 136).79  
 Another characteristic feature (and in fact one privilege) of sovereign 
power is “the right to decide life and death”, that is having the last word over 
someone’s life. This right has its roots in the Roman conception of patria 
potestas, which denotes the legitimate right of the father of the family “to 
‘dispose’ of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given them 
life” (Foucault, 1978: 135). The theory of sovereignty, then initially referred to 
an absolute and unconditional power over the subjects and a territory. In time, 
however, this unlimited power of the sovereign was restricted and the use of the 
right over life was reserved for exceptional situations. Only when the 
sovereign’s very existence is in danger, the right to call for death might 
legitimately be invoked. In the presence of an external threat, for instance, the 
                                               
79
 Here I would like to note that Foucault’s depiction of the characteristics of juridical-sovereign 
power is like a snapshot of Carl Schmitt’s theory of the political. In the previous chapters, I 
have shown the German jurist’s affirmation of the sovereign as the decisive entity within 
politics and his emphasis on borders (in terms of the binary opposition between us and them) as 
a constitutive element of politics. The relation between law, territory and the logic of deduction 
is particularly dealt in his The Nomos of the Earth. In that book, Schmitt rejects the equation of 
Nomos, the Greek word for law with Gesetz, which originally connotes a norm, a word mostly 
used in the liberal-democratic discourse at that time. He further rejects the equation of Nomos as 
Lebensgesetz (law of life) due to its implied biological relation between law and life. (On the 
issue of nomos Arendt comes close to Schmitt as well but then she shifts her focus to the Roman 
conception of lex as a suggestive framework for law. This I will discuss in the next chapter) 
Schmitt firstly emphasizes the land-bound character of law and argues that the Greek noun 
Nomos that derives from the Greek verb nemein implies three meanings related with the 
management of a given territory. Firstly, nemein means to take or appropriate (nehmen in 
German), hence the first meaning of nomos is appropriation. Secondly, nemein means to divide 
or distribute (teilen in German). The second meaning of nomos then becomes the action and the 
process of division and distribution. Schmitt here notes a further link with Ur-teil, the 
combination of Ur the origin and the teil, the part that means judgment that is the outcome of a 
division. For Schmitt, nomos as an appropriation was forgotten in jurisprudence but its meaning 
as a process of division and distribution have been kept intact within the domain of jurisdiction. 
Law in relation with the second meaning of nomos denotes part or share (anteil). Concretely 
speaking, it refers to the piece of land every citizen-farmer cultivates as his property. The third 
meaning of nemein (weiden) connotes productive work, which I supposed to take place with 
ownership. In relation with this the third meaning of nomos obtains its content from the type and 
means of the production and manufacture of goods.  See, Schmitt, Carl. 2006. The Nomos of the 
Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum. Telos Press Publishing.  
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sovereign could “legitimately wage war, and require his subjects to take part in 
the defense of the state; without ‘directly proposing their death,’ he was 
empowered to ‘expose their life’: in this sense, he wielded an ‘indirect’ power 
over them of life and death” (Foucault, 1978: 135). An emergence of an internal 
threat, however, referring to the case when “someone dare[s] to rise up against 
him and transgress his laws”, the sovereign may legitimately revive his ancient 
power (unlike the case of war) to exercise a direct power over the offender’s 
life: as punishment, the latter would be put to death. Since the invocation of the 
right over life and death is usually in the form of putting someone to death, 
Foucault names it as the right “to take life or let live”.  
 The symbol of the sovereignty thence becomes the sword (Foucault, 
2003: 136). It is not a swashbuckling sword, however. It is bound and 
represented by law. As presented in the previous paragraphs, the theory of 
sovereignty initially viewed the law as an expression of sovereign’s will and 
then soon turned into an enterprise of determining the borders between the 
sovereign and the subjects (and among the sovereigns at the international 
domain) with reference to the rights of respective parties. Law, then, becomes 
the expression of that border and a means used in the protection of the border. 
The “law cannot help but be armed” writes Foucault (2003:244), “and its arm, 
par excellence, is death; to those who transgress it, it replies, at least as a last 
resort, with that absolute menace. The law always refers to the sword” 
(Foucault, 2003:244) as the sword always refers to the law. Thence, in 
Foucault’s depiction of sovereignty a link between law and violence is 
established.  
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 The emphasis on the corporeality is another characteristic of sovereign 
power. The monarch symbolizes ‘the living body of sovereignty’ with his 
glamour and mightiness sitting in his throne (2003: 26; 1997b: 23). I have 
already argued that the theory of sovereignty is developed on the historical facts 
and necessities of the model of monarchy. Yet, in time, the idea of sovereignty 
gained an aspect that transcends the bodily existence or the mortal life of a king 
and denotes an eternal rule of the King. The sovereign power relies on an 
absolute expenditure of power that makes its impacts visible and felt by the 
subjects and enemies. When touched, the sovereign leaves its marks on 
subjects. Therefore, not only the body of the sovereign but also the body of the 
subject becomes an important aspect of sovereign power. The sovereign power 
supposed to make the subjects feel the presence, tremble and even fall apart in 
front it. In order to create this impact the sovereign power engages with an 
absolute expenditure of power. It has no concern of employing techniques that 
can reach the maximum effect of power with minimum expenditure (Foucault, 
2003: 136). This, as I will show is a crucial features of the disciplinary power 
for Foucault.  
 This intricate relationship between violence, law and sovereign power 
embodied by the monarch is best epitomized by the issue of punishment. 
Foucault begins his Discipline and Punish (1979) with a scene, the 1757-dated 
depiction of the torturous and violent execution of Robert Damiens, a regicide. 
The criminal  
was condemned “to make the amende honorable before the main 
door of the Church of Paris”, where he was to be “taken and 
conveyed in a cart, wearing nothing but a shirt, holding a torch of 
burning wax weighing two pounds”; then, “in the said cart, to the 
Place de Grève, where, on a scaffold that will be erected there, the 
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flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and claves with red-
hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he 
committed the said parricide, burnt with sulphur, and, on those 
places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, 
boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur melted together and then 
his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body 
consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the 
winds” (Pièces originales..., 372-4 in Foucault, 1979:3). 
 
 The detailed illustration of the execution process is followed by a penal 
record, written only eighty years later. The record shows a time-table of daily 
activities (including exercise, education, and working) of the prisoners of the 
House of Young Prisoners in Paris.
80
 Rather than being exposed to tortures or 
other types of corporeal punishments, prisoners are treated as if they are 
soldiers. Having laid down two contrasting scenes with an eighty year-time 
difference, Foucault makes two arguments. The first one, apparently, points out 
the striking contrast between two settings; hence, the transformation that took 
place in the mechanisms and rationalities of power. The second one aims at 
revealing the juridico-political function of punishment in general and the public 
                                               
80Some of the articles of the list of the penal activities are as follows:  
Art. 17. The prisoners’ day will begin at six in the morning in winter and at five in summer. 
They will work for nine hours a day throughout the year. Two hours a day will be devoted to 
instruction. Work and the day will end at nine o’clock in winter and at eight in summer.  
Art. 18. Rising. At the first drum-roll, the prisoners must rise and dress in silence, as the 
supervisor opens the cell doors. At the second drum-roll, they must be dressed and make their 
beds. At the third, they must line up and proceed to the chapel for morning prayer. There is a 
five-minute interval between each drum-roll.  
Art. 19. The prayers are conducted by the chaplain and followed by a moral or religious reading. 
This exercise must not last more than half an hour.  
Art. 20. Work. At a quarter to six in the summer, a quarter to seven in winter, the prisoners go 
down into the courtyard where they must wash their hands and faces, and receive their first 
ration of bread. Immediately afterwards, they form into work-teams and go off to work, which 
must begin at six in summer and seven in winter.  
Art. 21. Meal. At ten o’clock the prisoners leave their work and go to the refectory; they wash 
their hands in their courtyards and assemble in divisions. After the dinner, there is recreation 
until twenty minutes to eleven.  
Art. 22. School. At twenty minutes to eleven, at the drum-roll, the prisoners form into ranks, 
and proceed in divisions to the school. The class lasts two hours and consists alternately of 
reading, writing, drawing and arithmetic.  
(Faucher, 274-82 in Foucualt, 1979: 6).  
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persecution in particular. The ways public executions serve to the functioning of 
the sovereign power, the reasons and the meaning of the disappearance of them, 
are contrasted with the power relations, institutions and mechanisms of the 
modern societies. Unlike some theorists like John Locke (1980), who asserts the 
foundation of a state is necessary for the regulation and for the ensuring of the 
just functioning of the penal-retributive system Foucault argues that punishment 
does not function as retribution or for restoring the harm that was done. The 
punishment can be retribution only with reference to the damaga done to the 
sovereign power. The ceremony of penalty therefore aims at the reconstition of 
the momentarily injured sovereignty. In this sense, Foucualt affirms Benjamin’s 
earlier argument on the intricacy of the law and violence in the mission of the 
preservation and foundation of Law by suggesting that punishment is an 
extension of the sovereign power and is an instrument of self-affirmation. An 
offence committed by a subject against another, is a crime not because of the 
damage it produces or its offense of a specific rule but because of the fact that it 
primarily attacks the sovereign. Also, confirming Arendt’s observation on the 
identification of the notion of will, the sovereign and the law, he writes, any 
offence attacks the sovereign personally, “since the law represents the will of 
the sovereign; it attacks him physically, since the force of the law is the force of 
the prince” (Foucault, 1979: 47). The intervention of the sovereign, in such a 
case, aims at a direct reply to the person who has offended him and must be at 
its extreme point to reveal the asymmetry of the relationship between the 
subject dared-to-offend and the all-mighty sovereign (Foucault, 1979: 48-49).  
Although redress of the private injury occasioned by the offence 
must be proportionate, although the sentence must be equitable, the 
punishment is carried out in such a way as to give a spectacle not of 
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a measure, but of imbalance and excess; in this liturgy of 
punishment, there must be an emphatic affirmation of power and of 
its intrinsic superiority (Foucault, 1979: 49). 
 
 Foucault notes that this superiority is not a comparison made in terms of 
right but in terms of physical strength. The body of the offender must be bent, 
marked and even crushed by the awe of the sovereign power. “The ceremony of 
punishment, then, is an exercise of ‘terror’” he (1979: 49) writes. The publicity 
of the execution, the requirement of being visible to all and being spectacular 
are other features of sovereign power. The spectacle functions as a simulation of 
a struggle of the sovereign with an enemy that ends with the triumph of the 
former.  
 As a result, the sovereign power, the juridico-political rationality that 
orchestrates the social, economic and political relations of the western societies 
until the nineteenth century, in its monarchical form appears to be closely linked 
with violence.  
 Starting from the end of the eighteenth century the direct relation 
between the body of the ruler and of the subject was loosened and even cut and 
the relations of political power has transformed and gained different 
characteristics.  
 
6.1.2. Disciplinary Power: Rendering Violence Useless as a Political 
Instrument 
 
 The Foucaldian analysis does not suggest a simple replacement of the 
sovereign power with novel forms of power mechanisms. Rather, he argues the 
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emergences of new forms of power relations in Europe took shape within the 
framework of the already established state apparatuses such as the army, police 
and the fiscal administration bodies of the state of the classical age. The most 
significant aspect of the transformation is the infusion of a new perspective or 
the economic rationality into the political ruling mentality, thanks to the 
development of capitalism. The procedures and techniques of new power 
mechanisms aim at increasing the effects of power throughout the entire social 
body. As opposed to the sovereign form of power, they aim efficiency, low-cost 
and low-risk, effective and thrifty. These techniques significantly differ from 
the ones employed by the sovereign form of power, which, “mixture of more or 
less forced tolerances (from recognized privileges to endemic criminality) and 
costly ostentation (spectacular and discontinuous interventions of power, the 
most violent form of which was the ‘exemplary’, because exceptional, 
punishment” (Foucault, 1980c: 119). While the sovereign form of power was 
operating as a total, direct and discontinuous way, the new forms of power 
circulates within the social body in a continuous, uninterrupted, indirect, 
adapted and individualized manner.  
One of the important aspects of these new mechanisms of power is the 
increased dependence on bodies for the functioning of power. This is despite the 
fact that for Foucault body is always present within the network of power 
dynamics. As indicated in the discussion of punishment in the previous section, 
sovereign form of power is in a direct contact with the body of the subject. 
Whenever it needs reaffirmation of its strength, it leaves marks on the body of 
the subject. It marks, tortures, tears the body apart to make the spectators feel 
awe of its presence. The sovereign power treats the body as an object of 
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deduction: like wealth, commodities, land and things, the parts and even the life 
of the body is extracted by the power mechanisms (Foucault, 1980c: 104).  
 The new power mechanisms, on the other hand, politicized the body by 
making it as an object and subject of production at the same time. Rather than 
deducing its sources, the new forces of power invest in the body for more 
productivity and efficiency. In schools for instance, pupils are taught, then 
examined and corrected for the achievement of specific objects such as 
graduation. Similarly, in hospitals patients are examined, their ‘values’ are 
analyzed with reference to normal measures, their problems are diagnosed and 
they are treated with care, with regular monitoring they are aimed to get back to 
a normal or healthy status. Five specific techniques are assessed there. Firstly, 
specific individual actions are defined with reference to a previously determined 
field, a discipline. The students for instance are expected to form of a line every 
morning in front of their schools to sing their anthems; they are required to wear 
uniforms, sit in the places determined by the teacher, and should succeed in 
exams to pass a class. Determination of a guidelines and the establishment of 
rules to be followed are part of this first technique. With the determination of 
rule differentiation is made possible. The target, which going to be reached, the 
distance from it and the level of differentiation from every other member of the 
group are assessed. Based on the gathered data categorization of individuals, 
ranking subjects in terms of their differing capabilities, strengths or weaknesses 
that is a hierarchical measuring is realized. By the introduction of ‘value-
giving’ measure the constraint of conformity, in other words the average values 
are established. Finally, the limit values that define the borders of normality are 
set (Foucault, 1979: 182-3). With these limit values it becomes possible to 
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regard some persons as mad, abnormal, challenged, genius etc. Foucault writes 
“the perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in 
the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, 
excludes. In short, it normalizes” (Foucault, 1979: 183). For this reason, they 
are called as ‘disciplinary’ forms of power, which are directed towards the 
organization of actions and in a sense towards the producing of behaviors 
within structured social systems. 
In the previous section, it was shown that the Leviathan raises its head 
when it is disturbed; when a subject transgresses the boundary and becomes a 
threat to the king’s persona the sovereign power intervenes the regular 
functioning of the system. As Schmitt suggested, the sovereign’s emergence or 
interference is an exceptional situation. It is the exceptional, extraordinary and 
spectacular nature of sovereign’s appearance that affirms the power. While this 
is the case, as long as there is no threat directed at the sovereign’s rule it is 
possible for the subjects to be free from the effects of its repressive and violent 
power. The disciplinary power, on the other hand, is broader in terms of its 
scope and extent, and it is more diffused within the social body. It establishes 
norms, which are not only created and monitored by various institutions (such 
as military, health or education) but also reproduced by the social or political 
groups and more importantly by the individuals. Individuals are required to 
monitor, control or discipline themselves and usually they do it most willingly, 
therefore become active agents of the functioning and reproduction of 
disciplinary power. While the sovereign power must be visible and present in its 
implementation to be effective, for the operation of disciplinary power neither 
visibility nor presence is required. By being dispersed within the social 
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structure, produced by diverse institutions and disciplines (medicine, psychiatry, 
economics) at times in conflicting forms and reproduced by the subjects 
disciplinary forms of power cannot be assessed as embodied by a specific body 
or an institution.  
 The violent execution of Damiens epitomized the operation mechanisms 
of sovereign power. A timetable that displays the daily activities of the inmates 
of a prison in Paris, only after eighty years after the execution constituted a 
striking contrast to the previous picture. This contrast, for Foucault, is a good 
example that reflects the transformation of the political power mechanisms in 
the western context. At a closer look, he suggests, Panopticon, an architectural 
design formulated by the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham as the symbol 
of disciplinary power. Bentham offered the Panopticon initially as a prison 
model but he immediately argued that it is applicable to many public 
institutions. 
The Panopticon (having its roots in Greek panoptēs, which means 
seeing everything) is the design of a circular building at the center of which 
rises a tower with a room for an observer. The inner walls of the circle facing 
the tower are open so that the cells that constitute the circular building can be 
observed from the tower any time. The tower is equipped with a mechanism of 
illumination and it enables the watchman to chose a cell any time and to 
observe the inmate whenever he wants. The cells are separated from each other 
with thick walls so that none of the inmates can communicate with the other nor 
be aware of the presence of the other. The room where the observer is 
positioned must be dark to make the watchman invisible and the inmate be 
unsure about the observer’s presence there and about the answer to the question 
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whether he is currently watching him or not. “Hence the major effect of the 
Panopticon” writes Foucault: 
to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility 
that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange 
things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is 
discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend 
to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural 
apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power 
relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the 
inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are 
themselves the bearers.  
 
According to Foucault, with this design Bentham laid down the logic of 
the disciplinary power. Disciplinary power should be visible and unverifiable 
(Foucault, 1979: 201). It must be visible: the inmate must see the tower before 
his eyes all the time so that he acquires the knowledge of being observed. It 
must be unverifiable: the inmate must never be certain of the presence of the 
observer or of his current attention “but he must be sure that he may always be 
so.” The (assumed) presence of a gaze engenders the internalization of the 
control and increases the effectiveness and the efficiency of the disciplinary 
power. The structure of Panopticon symbolizing the logic and the functioning 
of the disciplinary power also reveals how the “see/being seen dyad of the 
sovereign power” is transformed and even reversed in modern societies. The 
sovereign power must be visible for the re-affirmation of its presence. This 
visibility is emphasized by the use of symbols, glamorous garments, arms, 
rituals. Whereas, the disciplinary power, exemplified by the Panopticon makes 
the periphery totally visible and blind whereas the central tower is granted the 
privilege of seeing everything without ever being seen (Foucault, 1979: 202). 
The Panopticon further signifies the dissociation of power from individual 
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might. “Power is no longer substantially identified with an individual who 
possesses or exercises it by right of birth; it becomes machinery that no one 
owns. (Foucault, 1980b: 156) The techniques of surveillance operate on the 
body and the mind of the subjects in accordance with laws and rules of optics or 
physics, and many other rational criteria. With the emphasis on efficiency, the 
problem of the economic and political cost of power is raised. Excessive use of 
power or force, hence violence is rendered useless. The sovereign power 
becomes too costly albeit being spectacular. In the case of punishment, for 
instance, “a great expenditure of violence is made which ultimately only had the 
force of an example” (Foucault, 1979: 155). This singularity of the violent 
intervention makes it necessary to multiply the event to increase the scope of 
violence and to increase its impact. It aims at preventing possible future crimes 
or repressing revolts. However, this time it may face the political cost of the 
employment of violence: “If you are too violent, you risk provoking revolts. 
Again, if you intervene in too discontinuous a manner, you risk allowing 
politically costly phenomena of resistance and disobedience to develop in the 
interstices” (Foucault, 1979: 155).  
The system of surveillance, on the other hand, does not need large 
amounts of arms or any other repressive instrument. An inspecting gaze, even 
better the creation of an illusionary presence is enough to control each 
individual. This control might even extend to making one to oversee oneself. 
Each individual thus starts exercising surveillance over, and against the self 
(Foucault, 1979: 155). In this sense, the disciplinary and sovereign forms of 
power significantly diverge and even come to be antithetical and incompatible 
with each other (Foucault, 1979: 104). While the sovereign power punishes, 
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violates and exterminates the disciplinary power normalizes, it treats, and 
corrects.
81
 
 
6.1.3. Bio-politics of the Population: From Right of Death to the Power 
Over Life 
 
 While the disciplinary power with its minute, continuous, indirect and 
non-violent operation of over every individual body gains preeminence in 
socio-political institutions, Foucault points out that another form of power too 
enters into the picture in seventeenth century in the western context (Foucault, 
1978: 138). This new form of power focuses on the body as well but its 
attention is biological rather than anatomical. The dynamics of human life as the 
life of the species and biological processes such as reproduction, births and 
mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity have gained 
attention with the rise of this new form power and with the development of 
                                               
81 This does not mean, however, that the disciplinary power does not include a notion of 
punishment since it does but only as part of a double system: “gratification-punishment” 
(Foucault, 1979: 180). Particularly found in the processes of training and correction, the 
gratification-punishment system requires the employment of the first element as much as 
possible and the use of punishment only as a last resort. Rewards and encouragements are 
mostly used to achieve desired results. This mechanism also engenders a number of operations 
within the general framework of disciplinary power by defining a certain behavior or an act in 
terms of good and evil rather than a simple prohibition or ban; a range of measures can be taken 
between good and evil. By assigning quantitative values to acts, such as enabling students 
receive bonuses for their ‘good’ behaviors and penalties or disincentives for their ‘evil’ 
behaviors and by keeping a record of such performances it would be possible to rank subjects, 
categorize them and reward or punish them. In his analysis of the system Foucault writes, 
 
Through this micro-economy of a perpetual penalty operates a differentiation that 
is not one of act, but of individuals themselves, of their nature, their potentialities, 
their level or their value. By assessing acts with precision, discipline judge 
individuals line ‘in truth’; the penality that it implements is integrated into the 
cycle of knowledge of individuals (Foucault, 1979: 181). 
 
Thence, rather than an exclusionary or eliminatory approach, political regulation has become 
through the “normalizing judgment” and the construction of norms as a field of possible 
knowledge. 
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related knowledge mechanisms. Statistics of birth, mortality, rates of fertility, 
population control or growth plans and many other political instruments are 
examples of the techniques and mechanisms of the newly emerging form of 
power: bio-politics of the population (Foucault, 1978: 139). 
 In the previous section, I have shown that a shift from sovereign power 
to disciplinary power unfolds its impact on the penal system (or we can say that 
Foucault assesses a shift in the mentality of government in his analysis of the 
penal system) that leads to the exclusion of violence as an instrument of rule. 
According to Foucault, a similar impact can be assessed with the emergence of 
bio-politics due to the shift in the governing mentality of the socio-political 
order. While the defining characteristics of the sovereign power is the ‘right of 
death’ that is the “ancient right to take life or let live” (Foucault, 1978: 138; 
emphasis original) with the rise of bio-politics this right or privilege turned into 
the “power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault, 1978: 
138; emphasis original). The power over life denotes the responsibility of the 
administration of bodies and calculated management of life and the culmination 
of life as life (Foucault, 1978: 140)  This transformation is significant for 
Foucault (1978: 143) since he argues, “for the first time in history, no doubt, 
biological existence was reflected in political existence.” Life is not considered 
as an unknown phenomenon or a chanceful fact, being “amid the randomness of 
death and its fatality” anymore. In fact, a growing part of life has been included 
within knowledge’s field with the rise of scientific disciplines like medicine, 
biology, genetics, and chemistry. Life has become the site of control as well 
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(Foucault, 1978: 143)
82
: policy plans and programs are developed to increase 
population growth, to promote health, to extend life and to monitor many 
activities people conduct to sustain their lives. New technological developments 
such as assistance procedures for reproduction, or practices like surrogacy, 
adoption, abortion have become issues of policy debates and regulations. 
According to Foucault modern society turned into society of “‘sex’ or rather 
society ‘with a sexuality’. He writes, “through the themes of health, progeny, 
race, the future of the species, the vitality of the social body, power spoke of 
sexuality and to sexuality; the latter was not a mark or a symbol, it was an 
object and a target” (Foucault, 1978: 147). Similarly, sexual or reproductive 
rights constitute the agenda of many social movements. There has been an 
increased emphasis on the need for a rise of consciousness on issues of sexual 
and reproductive health and on the requirements of a body/health conscious 
subject. Various programs for weight control, smoking cessation, sexual health 
or pleasure etc. make individuals have a continuous control over their bodies 
and optimize their physical and psychological statuses. “Power would no longer 
be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was 
death, but with living beings” (Foucault, 1978: 143).83 Thence, modernity not 
                                               
82 A growing debate has been focusing on this extended control of political power on ‘private 
sphere’, which also finds its equivalent in the domain of political activism reflected in, for 
instance, LGBT rights movements. For this reason, some suggests that the notion of citizenship 
should be broadened to include the bio-political dimensions of the (tensional) relation between 
the ‘state’ and the ‘subjects’. For such works See, Judith Butler. 1993. Bodies that Matter: On 
the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’. Routledge: London; Ken Plummer; Evans, D. 1993. Sexual 
Citizenship. The Material Construction of Sexualities. Routledge; London; Kaplan, M. B. 1997. 
Sexual Justice. Democratic Citizenship and the Politics of Desire. Routledge: New York. Ken 
Plummer. 2003. Intimate Citizenship. Private Decisions and Public Dialogues. University of 
Washington Press: Seattle. 
83 This historical assessment, however, is suggested to be limited with the western context and 
particularly with ‘modernity’ by Foucault. Famine, different types of illnesses, pauperization, 
wars, killings and tortures, the techniques of the sovereign form of power still exist outside the 
borders of Western world. Death and violence seems to be disciplined only in modern societies. 
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only avoids direct forms of violence but also aims at erasing indirect forms of 
violence such as natural disasters, sicknesses or casualties. Correspondingly, he 
(1978: 143) writes 
what might be called a society’s “threshold of modernity” has been 
reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political 
strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a 
living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; 
modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a 
living being in question. 
 
 It is against this background, Foucault points out the changed meaning 
and function of death from the perspective of the governing mentality society. 
For the sovereign power, death was the way in which power was manifesting 
itself. For bio-power, on the other hand, death is the absolute limit. The bio-
power does not celebrate death; it aims to exclude it. Death represents an 
impasse and paradox for modern forms of political power. Therefore, suicide 
has become an important topic for psychological and sociological studies. In the 
classical age, within the framework of theological rationality it was simply 
called as sin:, in modern societies, however, it becomes an indicative of 
abnormality. Bio-politics pays a special emphasis on life, birth, and population 
(Foucault, 1978: 137-144). Thus, it cannot commit violence or any activity that 
poses a threat to life, body or health of the individuals. Paradoxically, however, 
bio-politics may commit violence and even kill individuals for the promotion of 
life, for the well-being of the population. Those who do not fit into the scheme 
can be eliminated for the survival and the progress of the race.  For this reason 
he (1978:137) writes “genocide is indeed the dream of modern power, this is 
not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is 
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situated at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large scale phenomena 
of population.” 
 The transition from ‘right of death’ to the ‘power over life’ is important 
in the understanding of the contrast between two instruments of form of power: 
the law of the sovereign power and of the norm of bio-politics. The instrument 
of sovereign power is the ‘law’ symbolized by blood death, transgression, 
sword and violence. Sexuality, on the other hand, connotes the ‘norm’, 
knowledge, life, meaning, normalizing techniques of disciplines, and 
regulations (Foucault, 1978: 148).  
 The ‘norm’alization of ‘life’, according to Foucault has had a 
transforming impact on the sovereign power. The transformation unfolds in the 
functioning of law. Law, has come to operate more and more as a norm in 
modern societies and the judicial institution has increasingly incorporated into a 
range of apparatuses (from medical to administrative) “whose functions are for 
the most part regulatory” rather than being constitutive or prohibitive (Foucault, 
1978: 144). I think this argument comes close to Schmitt’s critique of liberal 
democracies for stripping the political of its essential, conflict-based nature and 
for introducing an ethical (moral) perspective into politics.
84
 It also makes a 
correction to the Benjaminian thesis of law-preserving violence: law in 
contemporary world turns into a ‘life-preserving’ force or power.  
 Another theoretical effort, which attempts to “re-inscribe the thematic of 
sexuality in the system of law”, has come to the scene since the end of the 
                                               
84 I have already underlined one of the implications of the insertion of morality into politics to 
be in the presentation of the enemy. The political enemy (hostis) who who poses threat for the 
equivalent features cannot be judged morally or aesthetically. Within liberal discourse, 
however, the enemy turns into an inimicus, someone who is hated, degraded, viewed as an 
abnormal and inhuman creature. The discourse of terrorism and terrorist in our world 
exemplifies this ‘norm’alized politics and the moralized discourse. 
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nineteenth century, Foucault argues. The Freudian endeavor has aimed “to 
ground sexuality in the law-the law of alliance, tabooed consanguinity, and the 
Sovereign-Father, in short, to surround desire with all the trappings of the old 
order of power” (Foucault, 1978: 150).  
 Hence, we have a complex network of power mechanisms that interact, 
conflict, merge or combine with the elements of each other. In modern societies, 
power is exercised simultaneously through the discourse of right, sovereignty 
and its techniques and also through the disciplines that not only diffuse into 
different spheres of socio-political order for regulatory purposes but also 
“invade the area of right so that the procedures of normalization come to be 
ever more constantly engaged in the colonization of those of law” (Foucault, 
1978: 108). Within this complex network, then, violence does not seem to have 
a place. Violence, as a costly, manifest and blatant technique of sovereign 
power lost its relevance and effectiveness in normalized societies. Violence is 
also a force that threatens the life. It is not reproductive rather destructive. It 
also has proximity to death, which makes it dangerous for bi-politics. For this 
reason, Foucault suggests, rather than turning towards the ancient right of 
sovereignty, one should invoke alternative conceptions of power and of a new 
form of right, “one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same 
time liberated from the principle of sovereignty” (Foucault, 1980a: 108).  
   
6.2. Foucault’s Search for an Alternative Conceptualization of Power  
   
 As I have shown, in his criticism of the socio-political and economic 
structuring of western societies, Foucault points out the gap between the 
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existing theoretical conceptions of power (liberal vs. Marxist) and the material 
historical practices that defy conventional understanding of political power. 
Conceptualizing power within the scheme of repression or the model of contract 
and even within the framework of war, for him, is limited and reductionist. 
Having assessed two dominant paradigms in the analysis of power and after 
critizing them for being limited and reductionist, the French philosopher starts 
looking for alternative conceptualizations of power. As it will be clear in 
coming paragraphs, his enterprise reveal shifts and ambiguities and does not 
present a clear and complete model. He changed his opinion about one 
suggested way and tried something else.  
 Foucault, firstly, suggests to understand power in terms of a struggle, a 
conflict or war; a war conducted with means other than of violence (Foucault, 
1980a: 90). The reversal of Clausewitz’s famous formula (“politics is the 
continuation of war with other means”), he argues, has triple significance. 
Firstly, the present relations of power (which he argues to be effective in the 
western context) “rest upon a relation of forces that were established at a certain 
time as a result of a confrontation” (Foucault, 1980a: 90). The end of war by the 
political power, exemplified in the liberal thought with the notions of state of 
nature etc., “does not mean that it neutralizes the effects of war.” On the 
contrary, he argues, “the political power re-inscribes this relation through ‘an 
unspoken warfare’ in social institutions, economic relations, language and 
bodies” (Foucault, 1980a: 90). A struggle for the transformation or reversal of 
the present power relations takes place in the background continuously, the 
terms of which cannot be negotiated by different parties, nor rationale can be 
reduced to forces of production. Thence, “none of the political struggles, the 
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conflicts waged over power, with power, for power the alterations in the 
relations of forces etc. come about within civil peace” (Foucault, 1980a: 91). 
Notions like consent, legitimacy or agreement are ruled out from politics as 
possible formations of power. Here, we see Foucault’s divergence from Arendt, 
for whom power means acting in concert and founding something on the basis 
of a collective agreement. For Foucault, alterations within the system “should 
be understood as episodes, factions and displacements (Foucault, 1980a: 91). 
Finally, echoing Schmitt Foucault argues that the end-result of war-like 
relations of power is ultimately determined by a real war, that war as a 
possibility lies at the door of politics all the time.  
 In his mid-1970 works, Foucault suggests a non-economic analysis of 
power that followed the route of the repressive scheme, which understands 
power to be carrying the “force of prohibition.” This formulation is wholly 
negative and limited for him since it cannot recognize and analyze the 
productive power relations that operate beyond the reach of law that says ‘no’ 
all the time to the subjects and rather empower subjects to challenge and 
transform the power relations. This conception can be found in “para-Marxists” 
like Marcuse who give the notion of repression an exaggerated role and read 
power as if it works only through the mode of censorship, exclusion, blockage 
and repression, in the manner of a great Superego, exercising itself only in a 
negative way (Foucault, 1980d: 59).  
 Foucault’s suggestion of conceiving power in terms of war-like relations 
can be found in his works such as Discipline and Punish, Two Lectures and 
Society Must Be Defended, (the collection of his Lectures delivered at the 
Collège de France) dating the years of 1975 and 1976. However, he did not 
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insist on this alternative conception and even started to modify his attitude later 
in 1977. In the first Volume of the History of Sexuality, he implies a difference 
between politics and war, and their corresponding logics. This time he writes:  
Should one then turn around the formula and say that politics is war 
pursued by other means? Perhaps if one wishes always to maintain 
a difference between war and politics, one should suggest rather that 
this multiplicity of force-relations can be coded—in part and never 
totally—either in the form of “war “or in the form of “politics”; 
there would be here two different strategies (but ready to tip over 
into one another for integrating these unbalanced, heterogeneous, 
unstable, tense force-relation. The strategic model of intelligibility, 
with a vocabulary one of whose primary sources is the schema of 
war, applies to the forces of discourse as well as to nondiscursive 
force-relations subtly but significantly (Foucault, 1978: 93). 
  
 Later, in the Security, Territory, Population, however, Foucault replaces 
the war-like model with a new formulation, “governmentality” which denotes a 
web of rationalities working simultaneously on the constitution of the subject 
and the formation of the state and that links the technologies of the self and 
technologies of domination. According to Thomas Lemke (2000), the shift from 
a Nietszchean warlike model to the notion of governmentality was a result of 
his recognition of the impasse of the prior framework. For Lemke, after 
criticizing the juridical model and presenting the warlike model Foucault ended 
up with a simple reversal. “Instead of cutting off the king’s head, he just turned 
the conception that he criticized upside down by replacing law and contract by 
war and conquest” (Lemke, 2000: 3). His critique of sovereignty, firstly, 
suggests its vanishing power in socio-political relations and then criticizes the 
persistence of the conceptual model of sovereignty in politics and political 
theory. His famous statement, “one should cut off the head of the sovereign” in 
that sense aims at focusing on multiple and dynamic forms of relations in 
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modern societies. While this is the case, and although it is a powerful critique of 
the present, Lemke argues, Foucault faced the problem of addressing the 
question, (raised by Mitchell Dean as) “how is it possible that his headless body 
often behaves as if it indeed had a head?” (Dean 1994: 156 quoted in Lemke, 
2003: 3). With the cutting of the head of the King, one faces the danger of 
missing the intelligibility of force/power relations or of defending that they are 
arbitrary chanceful happenings. Governmentality in that sense enabled him to 
conceptualize complex, multilayered forms of power that are effective in 
modern societies.  
  In his later years, in works like Two Lectures, Foucault asserts “power 
is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and… it 
only exists in action” (Foucault, 1980a: 89). Like Arendt, he stresses that 
“power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength 
we are endowed with” but unlike her he emphasizes “it is the name that one 
attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 
1978: 93; emphasis mine). The strategic nature of power does not imply that it 
is determined by a central authority or a group dominating the others but that it 
is rational, calculative and accumulative in terms of the knowledges on which it 
rises and in terms of the results it gets. The discipline of psychiatry for instance, 
once establishes itself as a discipline, engages with the collection of data and 
production specific knowledge, accumulated in time, materialized in 
mechanisms and techniques and used for the reproduction of the scientific 
discourse and for the preservation of the discipline. Hence, it is strategic.  
 Foucault also opposes the idea of evaluating power as a superstructure. 
Although power is in some sense part of the development of forces of 
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production (Foucault, 1980b: 159), for him, it “is not primarily the maintenance 
and reproduction of economic relations” (Foucault, 1980a: 89). In fact, relations 
of power are interwoven with many other forms of relations. They are 
interlinked with kinship, family, sexuality, for which they play at once a 
conditioning and a conditioned role. More importantly, above all power denotes 
a relation of force. This is an argument again that stands against Arendt who 
defines power as acting in concert. For Foucault, consent is an aspect of power 
relations as alliances are but struggles and confrontations determine the 
essential aspect of power relations. For him, the relation of power is always a 
relation of inequality or of a relation of asymmetry. Yet this inequality excludes 
oppression, repression, coercion or violence, includes, and even necessitates the 
possibility of resistance. Violence or pure force is the limit case; forcing 
someone to do something or making her not to do something else denotes the 
zero-degree of power. It is the moment when “power ceases to be power and 
becomes mere physical force”. On the contrary, making someone act in a way 
by using a certain type of knowledge or authority as an ‘influence’, as an 
‘indirect effect’, that is making him or her choose to act that particular way is 
the exercise of power. Power “acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, 
on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future…it 
incites, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains 
or forbids absolutely” (1982a: 220). In this sense, although power signifies a 
relationship of asymmetry it is required to take place between free subjects. 
Hence, freedom is a prerequisite of power.  
 Power can take a certain number of forms but more importantly, it 
should be open to transformations. One particular group or an individual might 
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have power over the other at a certain point of time, and then the other has the 
hand and changes the balance of the relationship. Resistance is intrinsic to any 
type of power relation and like “power, resistance is multiple and can be 
integrated in global strategies” (Foucault, 1980d: 141-142). Foucault recognizes 
the fact that there are instances where relations of power are frozen; a state of 
asymmetry is fixed “so that a certain number of persons get an advantage, 
socially, economically, politically, institutionally” (Foucault: 1980d) but he 
asserts that an exhaustive and coercive determination is not possible.  
 In fact it is not possible to answer the question “what is power?” rather 
one should search the answer to the question “how it is exercised?” The search, 
in this sense, should not “concern itself with the regulated and legitimate forms 
of power in their central locations” such as the state or the sovereign rather 
should focus on “power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those 
points where it becomes capillary” and somehow “less legal in character”, in 
more regional and local forms and institutions” such as hospitals, prisons, 
barracks or schools (Foucault, 1980a: 96-97). Power mechanisms must be 
contextual and specific both in terms of their aspirations and in terms of their 
interpretations. Foucault, for this reason makes an emphasis on the relevance of 
his findings for the western context and eschews any kind of generalizations. 
His enquiry is limited with particular historical and institutional analyses. 
Additionally, an analysis of power should not consider power from its internal 
point to assess a rationality as if there is someone “who has power and what has 
he in mind’” (Foucault, 1980a: 97). The rejection of conceiving power as a 
commodity is also followed by the idea of refuting the notion of the 
consolidated and homogeneous domination of one individual’s or that of one 
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group or class over others. Power, he argues, must be analyzed as something 
that circulates and that never is localized. “It is employed and exercised through 
a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its 
threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and 
exercising this power” (Foucault, 1980a: 97). Therefore, individuals are not 
mere objects or targets of power but are almost always the elements of its 
articulation. They produce, exercise power and are affected by the impacts of it 
(Foucault, 1980a: 98). Since it is not possible to locate a central place for power 
a deductive analysis, moving from top the lower layers is not a relevant form of 
analysis;  
One must rather conduct an ascending analysis of power, starting, 
that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their 
own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, 
and then see how these mechanisms of power have been - and 
continue to be- invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, 
displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by 
forms of global domination. (Foucault, 1980a: 98) 
  
 Finally, then Foucault refutes the assumption that presents a direct link 
between ideological constructions and the formulation and functioning of power 
relations. The complex picture he draws leaves many causalities and 
explanations out and forces one to look for possible resistance mechanisms and 
ways of transformations.  
 
Conclusion:  
 
 In the previous chapter, I presented Arendt’s critique of traditional 
conceptions of politics and power. I have shown that she assessed an increased 
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employment and a rising discourse of violence within politics. Based on this 
assessment she aims at presenting a historical and a phenomenological analysis 
of power and violence. She found several reasons for the persistence of violence 
within politics. Conceptualizing politics on the basis of sovereignty is an 
important aspect of it. An attribution of centrality to sovereignty, law or of 
liberty for Arendt means a reduction of politics into a relationship of 
domination and violence. In this sense, the Schmittian and Benjaminian politics, 
which views violence as a constitutive and substantive force of politics, 
becomes a logical result of the sovereignty approach.  
 Foucault problematizes the notion of sovereignty as well. For him an 
emphasis on sovereignty causes one to overlook modern forms of ‘domination’ 
(that is the subjugation techniques) which are different from and at times in 
conflict with earlier ones in terms of their operations and end results. Like 
Arendt, he associates sovereignty with will and law, and argues that the 
sovereign law must be armed and violent due its functioning principles. He also 
argues that the relationship between violence and politics underwent a historical 
transformation and in modern societies, the sovereign form of power has been 
kept in the background, if not replaced, by the newly emerging modern forms of 
power, namely disciplinary power and biopower. These new forms of power 
operate on and through the bodies of individual for Foucault, in a direct, 
productive, and non-violent manner. Like Arendt, he notes the rising discourse 
of a social and an infusion of an organic mentality into politics. While Arendt 
problematizes this development as the ‘privatization of public life’, aims at 
putting the organic approach where it belong, i.e. the private sphere and 
reviving the political as a distinctive space, Foucault suggests the 
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transformation to be the ‘politicization of private life’. His conceptualization, 
then, requires an organization of resistance within private sphere a further 
‘privatization of public life’ to intervene the functioning of power mechanisms. 
Since he is a skeptic, he rejects the idea of progress and is against any 
collectivity with an attribution of universality or totality, the form of political 
action we derive from his political theory is engagement with local resistance 
mechanisms, resisting the system and achieving partial, incremental changes.  
 For both Foucault and Arendt power is a non-restrictive phenomenon. It 
is rather productive further relational; produces subjects and is exercised by 
subjects. It emerges and circulates within collectivities but while for Arendt the 
emergence and circulation of power is a positive notion for Foucault, it is 
dangerous for it is regulatory and normalizing.  
The coming two chapters will look into the issue of revolution and its 
relation with violence in Arendt and Foucault. Referring to a founding moment, 
an extra-legal, pre-juridical time, revolution I think presents itself to be a 
challenging topic for theorist. While there are diverging and opposing views on 
the relation between violence and politics, there is a common view that presents 
revolution and violence as essentially linked phenomena. Connoting a historical 
rupture, a sudden change in the form of the regime, norms, values and 
institutions with a great impact, revolution has almost always implied violence. 
It has been equated with outrage, outburst, revenge, and blood and considered 
as a politics of violence and chaos. Therefore, for some, revolution is an 
undesirable event. It is against this background I would like to explore Arendt 
and Foucault’s conceptualization of revolution and its relation to violence.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
ARENDT ON REVOLUTION AND VIOLENCE 
 
 
 
One can argue that the idea of revolution acquired its contemporary 
connotations mainly with the experience of the French Revolution. The July 
Revolution of 1789 is considered to different from previous forms of revolts, 
civil wars and strives that had never intended to bring major changes at political 
and societal levels. As exemplified in the British Glorious Revolution of 1688 
such uprisings were ‘traditionalist’ and ‘restorative’ in character (Arendt, 1963: 
35). They aimed at modifications (such as the introduction of a Parliament or a 
Constitution) in monarchical form of rule. For Machiavelli, Hobbes and for 
Locke, therefore, revolution meant a ‘restoration’ in politics. Restoration of the 
sovereignty, authority and legitimacy of the ruler were the primary aims of the 
rebellions. The French Revolution, on the other hand, had nothing to do with 
tradition or restoration. It represented a total break with the past; meant change, 
novelty and destruction. It was miraculous, redemptive and singular in one 
sense. Yet it was also an intentional, rational and somehow an expected 
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development. Therefore, it was received with great enthusiasm and hope
85
 by 
spectators and particularly by the Enlightenment philosophers. The French 
Revolution became such an important event it came to constitute the core of the 
idealistic systems on society and state formulated by philosophers like Kant, 
Hegel or Marx even after many years of its occurrence (Marcuse). The event is 
considered as a sign of human progress. It is a cornerstone, a step taken in the 
establishment of a utopian—peaceful, equal, rational, moral or free—world.86  
At the same time, however, the Revolution came to signify fear and 
violence. There are the mass peasant revolts, fires, pillages and even murders. 
Then there is the famous storming of the Bastille. The guillotine to which 
thousands lost their heads became the symbol of the revolution. The word 
‘terror’ was introduced into the political discourse due to the ‘Reign of Terror’ 
that denotes the bloody period between 1793 and 1794. This period was marked 
with the conflict between Girondins and the Jacobins for the control over the 
state and the mass executions of the so called “enemies of the revolution” by the 
Revolutionary Tribunals. In the two centuries since the French Revolution, as 
one scholar (Dunn, 1989: 214) writes, “the fundamental problem it has posed is 
the morality of political violence”. 
                                               
85 In his Philosophy of History Hegel writes: “Never since the sun had stood in its firmament 
and the planets revolved around him had it been perceived that man’s existence centers in his 
head, i.e., in thought…Anaxagoras had been the first to say that nous governs the world; but not 
until now had man advanced to the recognition of the principle that thought ought to govern 
spiritual reality. This was accordingly a glorious mental dawn. All thinking beings shared in the 
jubilation of this epoch. Emotions of a lofty character stirred men's minds at that time;a spiritual 
enthusiasm thrilled through the world, as if the reconciliation between the divine and the secular 
was now first accomplished.”447 
86 According to Tocqueville, it has been argued, the French Revolution, albeit being political in 
origin, resembled and operated like a religious movement; as Dunn writes (1989: 214) going far 
beyond its territory, with a missionary zeal it called the rest of the world to convert to a new 
religion. 
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For these reasons, to many thinkers who like Burke, de Maistre, and 
Herder revolution, equal to turbulence, ambiguity, chaos and violence is a 
trouble and it was caused by the Enlightenment thinking in terms of its 
radicalism, absolutism (for its insistence on rationality, universality and 
foundationality) and atheism. Even Hegel’s honoring of the French Revolution 
with a toast on the anniversary of the Bastille for Habermas (1974: 121), must 
be seen as a ritual of exorcism. If Hegel had celebrated the revolution, he must 
have done that out of fear.
87
 For Habermas, even though the primary principle 
of Hegel’s philosophy was revolution, it was a philosophy to overcome 
revolution. It was a critique of revolution (Habermas, 1974:121).  
Albeit being known as a great supporter of the French Revolution, 
Kant’s treatment of the event seems to be paradoxical too. In The Contest of 
Faculties (1798) he wrote that the French “[R]evolution has aroused in the 
hearts and desires of all spectators who are not themselves caught up in it a 
sympathy which borders almost on enthusiasm, although the very utterance of 
this sympathy was fraught with danger” (Kant, 1798: 182). This was because 
the revolution was “filled with misery and atrocities to the point that a sensible 
man, were he boldly to hope to execute it successfully the second time, would 
never resolve to make the experiment at such cost” (Kant, 1798: 182). After 
witnessing the Reign of Terror, Kant (1793) renounced his support to the 
                                               
87 For a study, which reads Hegel’s philosophical response to the French Revolution from the 
perspective of psychoanalysis by referring to concepts like trauma, mourning, melancholia and 
within the historical-political context of Germany, See Comay, Rebecca. 2010. Mourning 
Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution, Stanford University.  
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Revolution (received praises for this)
88
 and then even denied the right to rebel in 
his works.  
Hence, the dual meaning of the revolution, derived from the experience 
of the French Revolution, as a progressive and a destructive force has implied a 
set of dichotomies for many Enlightenment philosophers. This duality gave way 
to a series of attempts to understand and at times overcome the relation between 
violence and politics and Arendt is one of the names who undertook such a task.  
The next section will locate Arendt within a historical context to better 
understand her reflections on the topic of revolution and violence. This section 
will reveal her critique of revolutionary discourse targets Marxist tradition, 
which has its roots in the French Revolution. Then I will present a précis of her 
critique of the July Revolution of 1789. The critique will run along two axes: 
contours and dangers of conceptualizing revolution (and politics) within an 
organist framework and secondly, viewing the enterprise of revolution (and 
politics) within mechanistic and technical terms. These two forms of critique, 
we will see are in line with Arendt’s general theoretical approach presented in 
the Human Condition. I will present how Arendt views the organist conception 
                                               
88 A scholar (Beck, 1971: 411) notes that when in 1793 he sent his essay On the Saying: That 
May Be True In Theory But It Does Not Hold In Practice to the Berlinische Monatsschrift, the 
editor wrote him back expressing his relief to see Kant’s refuting the rumor that he had favored 
the “increasingly repulsive French revolution in which the actual freedom of reason and 
morality and all wisdom in statecraft and legislation are being most shamefully trampled 
underfoot”. Biester to Kant, Oct. 5, 1793; Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Prussian Academy 
edition , XI, 456; Kant’s Philosophical Correspondence, trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago, 1966), 
208-09 in Lewis W. Beck, 1971. Kant and the Right of Revolution, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1971): 411-422. Within this framework, in his The 
Metaphysics of Morals, Perpetual Peace, and in The Contest of the Faculties Kant argues, if the 
opposition fails or gets caught by the government the rebels may be sentenced to death and they 
must obey. In order to prevent a counter-revolution, he writes, if the rebellions succeed, the 
failed rulers cannot invoke a right to return to the prior state and are required to obey the new 
rule. In Perpetual Peace, Kant writes, If a violent revolution, engendered by a bad constitution, 
introduces by illegal means a more legal constitution, to lead the people back to the earlier 
constitution would not be permitted; but, while the revolution lasted, each person who openly or 
covertly shared in it would have justly incurred the punishment due to those who rebel 
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of politics as the overgrowth of the private domain and the infiltration the 
rationality of ‘laboring’ (that is the substance of production and consumption) 
into the public sphere. The mechanistic conception, on the other hand, connotes 
the instrumental view of the activity of producing things and building 
structures. For Arendt, we will see, neither of the two activities is truly political 
and both of them result in violence in politics albeit in different ways. I will 
provide Arendt’s analysis of the French Revolution in these terms and review 
her views on the American Revolution for a contrary argument. I will end up 
my discussion with the argument that for Arendt violence is somehow linked to 
the political yet it cannot be political. Violence, as an instrument in reaching 
political objectives may be justified but it cannot be legitimized. A true 
revolution, in that sense, cannot be equated with its capacity of violence rather 
must be judged in terms of its capability of envisioning and establishing an 
order of political freedom.  
 
7.1. Arendt on French Revolution: Crisis in the Old World 
 
As it is evident in her analysis in the Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt 
considers both Soviet and Nazi regime as examples of totalitarian form of rule. 
They represent the most evil form of political regime 
89
 and were made possible 
                                               
89 In fact Arendt received a criticism for reducing the Nazi and Soviet regimes into the same 
category for erroneous reasons (Kohn, 2002; Whitfield, 1980; Benhabib, 2003). While amply 
elaborating on the political and economic historical background of Europe in the first two 
chapters the book misses a similar analysis of the Russian context. In her remarks on the 
operation of camps and the peculiarities of totalitarian regimes in the third section, however, 
Arendt puts the Soviet and Nazi regime together into the same potFor Stephen Whitfield (1980), 
for instance, Arendt failed to take into account the class bases of Nazism and Stalinism and 
ignored the differences between two regimes. Similarly, it is not possible to argue that anti-
Semitism was a preeminent factor in Russia or an imperialist experience preceded the Soviet 
Revolution (Benhabib, 2003). 
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by the historical transformations European economic, political structure and 
tradition underwent.
90
 Neither the defeat of the Nazi regime at the end of the 
World War II nor the noted period of ‘detotalitarianization’ following Stalin’s 
death in 1953 convinced her that the threat of totalitarianism was eliminated. In 
fact, after some time other observers, too, decided that the transformation would 
not meet their expectations for a more pluralist and free political structure. The 
harsh crush of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 by the U.S.S.R troops, 
particularly, disappointed many European leftists and intellectuals including 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus.
91
 Many thinkers started to question the 
meaning of revolution, counter-revolution, the subject of revolution and the role 
violence plays in it. While Camus, for instance, rejects violence as a political 
means in these years, his attitude concerning revolution becomes ambiguous as 
well. Sartre, on the other hand, thinks domination must be fought with all 
                                               
90 Arendt’s encounter with the Nazi regime in its early period and finding out about the 
concentration camps in the U.S. at the end of the World War II had a great impact on her views 
on philosophy and politics. It was an event that blew out the old categories in her mind and that 
induce her to think about in novel terms. Violence is an indicator of the bankruptcy of the 
nation-state, of the idea of the rights of men, and the result of the reduction of human beings 
into mere producing and consuming individuals (animal laborans). In the Origins of 
Totalitarianism (1973), in that sense, she points out the realization of a dystopia in the modern 
world. The concentration camps were not only the places where violence rules absolutely; there 
the meaning of life and of death, human dignity, solidarity, culture and memory were also lost 
and the impact of those camps was already extended their physical borders. For Arendt the 
scary part of the story is that totalitarianism is not an issue of the past but is a tendency that 
might come up anytime in modern societies. In her works, therefore, she depicts the paths, 
crossroads and turning points that might lead to dead ends or precipices but also tries to provide 
the readers with a porch in order to enable them the right path by providing normative 
definitions of terms such as authority and clarifying political phenomenon like revolution. She 
tells stories from a distant past, mostly from Ancient Greece and Roman times to inspire human 
beings to revive a forgotten spirit and to remember the lost meaning of terms. She wants to 
encourage people to pursue an active and political life, to think with courage and perform heroic 
deeds. It is for this reason, one scholar argues, Arendt turned to the revolutionary tradition as a 
possible source of revitalized political action and public happiness (Grumley, 2008: 53). I also 
think that in Arendt’s decision on reflecting on the topic of revolution the historical context, 
which is the end of 1950s-mid 1960s, plays an important role too.  
91 Sartre criticized the Stalinist regime in his article Le Fantôme de Staline. See Jean-Paul 
Sartre. 1968. The Ghost of Stalin, translated by Martha H. Fletcher, John R. Kleinschmidt, New 
York: George Braziller. Albert Camus, on the other hand, on the anniversary of the event in 
1957-dated gave a speech, “The Blood of the Hungarians” and criticized the Western Europe as 
well for not taking any action at the time.  
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means; hence, for him revolutionary violence is not a problem, rather it is a 
necessary even emancipatory force (Dunn, 1989). In the famous introduction to 
Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth (1961) Sartre writes 
In the first days of the revolt you must kill: to shoot down a 
European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor 
and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remain a dead man 
and a free man; the survivor, for the first time, feels a national soil 
under his foot. 
 
Watching the developments from the other side of the Atlantic, in New 
York, Arendt had the same questions in her mind. She penned her views firstly 
on the short-lived Hungarian Revolution in 1958, then in On Revolution in 
1961.  
Against this background, Arendt’s engagement with the topic of 
revolution becomes a critique of mainly the Marxist and to some extent the 
liberal thought in terms of their conspicuous inability to comprehend the 
meaning of the phenomenon. Associating the French Revolution with a 
particular form of political thought that runs from Plato through Rousseau to 
Hegel and to Marx, in her enterprise, she points out the flaws in the historical 
event and in the tradition of political thought in Europe. “Ever since the French 
Revolution, it has been common to interpret every violent upheaval, be it 
revolutionary or counterrevolutionary, in terms of a continuation of the 
movement originally started in 1789” (Arendt, 1963:43). Each time adherents 
and opponents of these revolutions, and even the historians, philosophers 
understood the events as immediate consequences of 1789. Remembering an 
attribution of a comment to Marx which says, “the French Revolution had been 
played in Roman clothes” Arendt (1963: 44) argues “that each of the following 
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revolutions, up to and including the October Revolution, was enacted according 
to the rules and events that led from the fourteenth of July to the month of 
Thermidor and the eighteenth of Brumaire”. Nevertheless, they looked up for 
the wrong model. In her opinion, the July Revolution of 1789 was full of 
mistakes. The first and most important of these mistakes is the association of 
the social question with politics.  
 
7.1.1. The Social Question and the Terror of Les Malheureux  
 
In her observations on the Hungarian revolution in 1958, Arendt wrote 
that despite being crushed by the Soviet army in twelve days, it “was a true 
event whose stature will not depend upon victory or defeat; its greatness is 
secure in the tragedy it enacted” (Arendt, 1958:4). In fact, every revolution has 
a tragic aspect for her: they are historically short-lived. Like fireworks, which 
light up the sky at nights with myriad effects and beautiful colors and then fade 
within a very short span of time, revolutions break the historical route, take the 
stage and give people hope for freedom. The revolt in Hungary, in that sense, 
was impressive as well. It was unexpected. It broke the repetitive course of 
events and the apathy that inflicted people living under the control of Soviet 
Russia for years. The revolt induced public spirit, joy of acting and acting 
together. Therefore, Arendt (1958: 5) argues that the short-lived Hungarian 
revolution acquired more meaning than the twelve years of the Red Army rule. 
She also praises “this sudden uprising” for not being led by any organization, 
vanguard party, leaders or whatsoever. It is something that resembles Rosa 
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Luxemburg’s “spontaneous revolution” (Arendt, 1958: 8) and includes a 
dimension of ‘nobility’.  
While praising the Hungarian Revolution for its ‘nobility’, Arendt seems 
to refer to the July Revolution. In Hungary (and also in Poland), she notes the 
“rebellion started with intellectuals and university students, and generally with 
the younger generation…Not the underprivileged, but the overprivileged of 
communist society took the initiative, and their motive was neither their own 
nor their fellow-citizens’ material misery, but exclusively Freedom and Truth” 
(Arendt, 1958: 23). It was the revolting of oppressed people for the sake of 
“freedom and hardly anything else” (Arendt, 1958: 8). In contrast, in the famous 
march to Versailles, mothers whose children were starving in squalid homes 
played great role “and they thereby afforded to motives which they neither 
shared nor understood the aid of a diamond point that nothing could withstand” 
(Arendt, 1963). Thence, unlike Saint-Just who upon seeing the march uttered 
the words “les malheureux sont la puissance de la terre”, which means “the 
wretched are the power of the earth”, for Arendt the wretched are the terror of 
the earth and they are certainly the “doom” of the Revolution (Arendt, 1963: 
55). This is because she thinks one of the reasons why the French Revolution 
ended with a tragedy was its carrying away by the ‘social question’.  
With the term ‘social question’, Arendt refers to the problem of poverty 
and the attempt to solve the economic misery of people through political means. 
For her, neither poverty was a new phenomenon nor did economic motivations 
come to play role in political strife first time in the history. Nonetheless, poverty 
as a state of impoverishment and a form of acute misery became widespread in 
the eighteenth century in Europe. Secondly, for the first time in history the 
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conviction that the difference between wealth and inequality inherent in the 
social system is natural, intact and unavoidable started to shatter. The 
overthrows and upheavals, prompted by economic interests, despite being 
violent until the establishment of a new political order have always depended on 
the “distinction between poor and rich which itself was deemed to be as natural 
and unavoidable in the body politic as life is in the human body” (Arendt, 
1963:14). In the modern age, however, men began to question the distinction 
between poor and the rich, and doubt that the idea that the difference between 
the laboring many and the few who liberated themselves from the bonds of 
labor is inevitable and eternal.
92
  
It is against this background, the social question emerged as a 
revolutionary force in the eighteenth century of France. Both the peasantry and 
the urban poor - workers, artisans and wage earners- who had been suffering 
from high taxes, rents and cost of living joined the ranks of the revolutionaries. 
Their principle was rage, and conscious aim was not freedom but life and 
happiness. For Arendt, this was somehow inevitable. The state of constant need 
means to be under the absolute dictate of biological necessities and not caring 
much about other concerns such as dignity, solidarity or freedom. She writes 
(1963: 54) 
Poverty is more than deprivation, it is a state of constant want and 
acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; 
poverty is abject because it puts men under the absolute dictate of 
                                               
92 According to Arendt, this doubt might be American in origin meaning that the discovery of 
the continent inspired men to envision alternative world orders (Arendt, 1963). The vast land, 
rich natural sources and resources found in the New World gave way to the idea that not 
scarcity but abundance is a fact of nature. For instance, Locke in his depiction of ‘state of 
nature’ as a state of abundance and peace further argues that, in fact, labor is the origin of 
private property on the condition that it contributes to the increase of the natural sources and 
therefore constitutes the ground to the rightful claim to benefit from the products of the invested 
labor. 
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their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictate of necessity as all 
man know from their most intimate experiences and outside all 
speculations. It was under the rule of this necessity that the 
multitude rushed to the assistance of the French Revolution, 
inspired it, drove it onward, and eventually sent it to its doom, for 
this was the multitude of the poor. 
 
 
Therefore, with the entrance of the multitude of the poor, the aim of 
revolution changed and the uprising turned it into a violent spectacle. The ‘men 
of revolution’ who for Arendt differed from the miserable people in their rise up 
against tyranny, oppression to achieve freedom (Arendt, 1963: 68) did not or 
could not resist the transformation, and they ended up with the aim of liberating 
people from the yoke of necessity (Arendt, 1963: 69). Thus, the role of 
revolution “became to liberate the life process of society from the fetters of 
scarcity so that it could swell into a stream of abundance.” (Arendt, 1963: 69) 
With this change of priorities, happiness and well-being of the people became 
the new idea of the political order, a predicament of the modern societies.
 
 
The term, the “rise of the social” foresees the dominance of the form of 
relations based on activities that serve for attending necessities of life over 
every sphere of life and the infiltration of that rationality to the domain of 
politics (Arendt, 1963: 59-114).
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For Arendt, the activities that attend or serve to the satisfaction of 
biological, intimate, reproductive necessities such as eating, resting or 
                                               
93 From such a perspective, we can assess, for instance, how the world has been built upon the 
rationality that targets the human being’s will to satisfy their basic needs The rationality of 
animal laborans operates with the initial creation of a perception of a lack or of a need and then 
with the promise of filling that lack or need by acquiring—that house, that type of clothing, that 
brand of car. By emphasizing consumption, the system reproduces itself and continues to 
function by appealing same desires and needs. This mentality of laboring can be translated into 
human relations as well. In such a world, people connect with each other for the satisfaction of 
their needs, which means short-term contacts and making humane actions such as caring, 
sharing, building enduring relations as archaic and irrelevant forms of relationships. 
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procreating correspond to ‘labor’. Shared by animals, repetitive and lacking a 
durable end-product, labor is located at the lowest level of the Aristotelian 
tripartite of human activities, (‘labor’, ‘work’ and ‘action’) Arendt elaborated in 
The Human Condition.
94
 The defining feature of labor is that it is ruled by 
necessity. The human beings in their mode of laboring, as animal laborans, are 
bound by their bodily needs and desires and are busy with the effort of 
satisfying those needs. Since necessity dictates, they cannot be free in the mode 
of laboring. Furthermore, one cannot free oneself from necessity or from the 
activity of laboring. One other feature of labor is that it belongs to the private 
domain. The private domain, is dark and hidden by its definition because the 
satisfaction of basic needs should be realized away from the eyes of the others.  
Although it is not possible to free one from the burden of the activity of 
labor, in contexts such as Ancient Greece, the institution of slavery enabled the 
transfer of the burden of labor from one class to another. Slaves were handling 
all the laboring activities for their masters and the masters after fulfilling their 
needs went and participated in the polis life. The running of the house, 
oikonomos in Ancient Greece, in this sense, denotes a rule of necessity. It also 
refers to the despotic authority of the male over his wife, servants, and slaves 
                                               
94 Dana Villa (2000: 96) has organized Arendt’s use of the terms related with the activity of 
labor. They are: 
the blessing of life as a whole, nature, animality, life processes, (human) 
biology, (human) body, (human) metabolism, fertility, birth, reproduction, 
childbirth, femaleness, cyclicality, circularity, seasons, necessity, basic life-
needs (food, clothing, shelter), certain kinds of toil, repetition, everyday 
functions (eating, cleaning, mending, washing, cooking, resting, etc.), 
housework, the domestic sphere, abundance, consumerism, privatization, 
purposeless regularity, the society of jobholders, automation, technological 
determinism, routinization, relentless repetition, automatism, regularization, 
non-utilitarian processes, dehumanizing processes, devouring processes, 
painful exhaustion, waste, recyclability, destruction (of nature, body, fertility), 
and deathlessness. 
See Dana Richard Villa.2000. The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt. 
Cambridge University Press. 
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determined by the dictates of the law of nature (physis). Therefore, force and 
violence were natural aspects of the private sphere. Apart from this historical 
argument, Arendt notes, by definition, violence is an aspect of the private 
sphere because by being ruled with the laws of necessity and the will to liberate 
from them the rationale of labor imposes violence. She (1998: 31; emphasis 
mine) writes  
necessity is primarily a prepolitical phenomenon, characteristic of 
private household organization, and that force and violence are 
justified in this sphere, because they are the only means to master 
necessity—for instance, by ruling over slaves—and to become free. 
Because all human beings are subject to necessity, they are entitled 
to violence toward others; violence is the prepolitical act of 
liberating oneself from the necessity of life for the freedom of the 
world”  
 
  Also in another passage she (1961: 117-8) argues  
The mastery of necessity then has as its goal the controlling of the 
necessities of life, which coerce men and hold them in their power. 
But such domination can be accomplished only by controlling and 
doing violence to others, who as slaves relieve free men from 
themselves being coerced by necessity. The free man, the citizen of 
polis, is neither coerced by the physical necessities of life nor 
subject to the man-made domination of others. He not only must not 
be a slave, he must own and rule over slaves. 
 
 
With the rise of capitalism and the emergence of social domain in 
modern times, however, the walls that separate the private sphere form the 
public was put down, economics (oikonomos) was elevated to a matter of public 
concern. The modern nation state emerged as the political form of this 
development and now we “see the body of peoples and political communities in 
the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a 
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gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping” (Arendt, 1958a: 28). In 
On Violence, she (1963) writes 
Nothing, in my opinion, could be theoretically more dangerous than 
the tradition of organic thought in political matters by which power 
and violence are interpreted in biological terms. (…) The organic 
metaphors with which our entire present discussion of these matters, 
especially of the riots, is permeated – the notion of “sick society”, 
of which riots are symptoms, as fever is a symptom of disease – can 
only promote violence in the end. 
 
 
In the process of the placement of “necessity” and “welfare” at the 
center of politics, Arendt also assesses the entrance of “compassion” as an 
emotional drive into the equation of revolution.  
A genuine compassion towards people and identification with their 
sufferings and desires became a common attitude adopted by the 
revolutionaries. Compassion was exalted as the kernel of revolutionary passion 
and an altruistic selflessness was regarded as a supreme political virtue. For 
Arendt, the very definition of the word, le people and their “connotations were 
determined by those who were exposed to common people’s sufferings, which 
they themselves did not share. Yet they willed to identify themselves with le 
people, the equivalent for misfortune, unhappiness and absolute innocence. 
Arendt implies that this was some sort of a re-formulation of the religious 
grammar; revolutionaries seemed to import moral, religious ideas to political 
domain by placing, for instance, Godly love within human beings. Compassion 
aims at transcending the virtuous affirmation of suffering from wrong rather 
than doing wrong, “by stating in complete and even nave sincerity that it is 
easier to suffer to see others suffer” (Arendt, 1963: 81). Furthermore, she said, 
the search for a sin was replaced with a search of goodness; again a reversal of 
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an old formula. Reminding the old myth (that she referred to four times in On 
Revolution and that I will quote at the end of this section) she asserts: 
 “Let us suppose that from now on the foundation stone of our 
political life will be that Abel slew Cain. Don’t you see that from 
this deed of violence the same chain of wrongdoing will follow, 
only that now mankind will not even have the consolation that the 
violence it must call crime is indeed characteristic of evil men 
only?” (Arendt, 1963: 83)  
 
 
According to Arendt, morality has no place within politics. Feelings like 
passion or compassion, “the capacity for suffering,” and “the capacity for 
suffering with others” (Arendt, 1963: 71) respectively, or sentiments such as 
pity, for her, belong to the private domain. They abolish the distance, the 
required “in-between which always exist in human intercourse” between 
persons (Arendt, 1963: 81; emphasis mine) therefore cannot be part of the 
domain of politics. In fact, unlike pain, the most intimate and inexpressible 
feelings of all, “passion and compassion are not speechless.” They have a 
language yet that language consists of gestures and expressions of countenance 
and cannot be articulated in words.
95
 In that sense, similar to necessities’ 
destructive impact over public domain, moralistic claims, and idealized 
sentiments such as goodness and innocence for being non-public and even non-
humane features act violently when they are brought in to public sphere.
 96
 As 
                                               
95 Arendt pays a special emphasis on inter-est, denoting a relation, some sort of engagement and 
care as a form of human existence. She writes, “predicative or argumentative speech, in which 
someone talks to somebody about something that is of interest to both because it inter-est, it is 
between them.” (Arendt, 1963: 81) 
96 Her (1963) reading of Melville’s Billy Budd (and her reference to Dostoevsky’s The Grand 
Inquisitor), in this sense, aims at demonstrating the irrelevance of the notions of ‘innocence’ 
and ‘goodness’ within public realm. For Arendt, although the absolute goodness of Billy Budd 
(who is somehow depicted as the reincarnation of Jesus of Nazareth) is for sure and his forceful 
and violent response (as if Billy Budd was God’s Angel) against wickedness (of Claggart who 
bore false witness against him) is morally just, Captain Vere’s verdict of death penalty was also 
politically just. From the perspective of politics and law, the violation of a rule and order even if 
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Shiraz Dossa (1982: 310) has argued, the paradoxical nature of morality is that 
when it “strays outside its legitimate sphere it inevitably becomes tyrannical and 
dangerous because its only concern is the integrity of its own self, not the 
shared community, not the common world.” 
Albeit being ambiguous at times, one can say that Arendt’s conception 
of politics is formal, spatial and implies artificiality. This is so because she 
understands the political as a shared common space. The membership of a 
political community is not defined with a previously established communal 
bond or general will or by a social consciousness “but the world they set up in 
common, the spaces they inhabit together, the institutions and practices they 
share together” (D’entréves, 1994: 145). 
For this reason, she argues that the Revolution had come to its turning 
point when the Jacobins seized power. The drastic nature of change did not 
derive from the priors’ radicalism. It was due to their difference from 
Girondins. Jacobins neglected Girondins’ concern for the form of government 
and “pinned their faith on the natural goodness of a class’ rather than on 
institutions and constitutions”. Arendt quotes Robespierre who asserted “under 
the new Constitution laws should be promulgated ‘in the name of the French 
people’ instead of the ‘French Republic’” (Arendt, 1963: 70).  
Based on the fear of homogeneity and of the terror of the idea of 
equality conceptualized as sameness Arendt renounces the concern for social 
inequalities and the argument that inequalities hinder human development and 
the realization of freedom; she does not think the elimination of poverty and 
                                                                                                                             
it is committed for the provision of natural justice, even if the committee is purely innocent it 
does not make a difference.  
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taking care of the well-being of citizens is the purpose of politics. This is a 
mistake committed by the French revolutionaries but more importantly shared 
and disseminated by the great philosophers of Enlightenment. 
 She particularly has Karl Marx as her target.
97
 As the greatest theorist of 
the revolutions, Arendt argues Marx was “more interested in history than in 
politics and therefore neglected almost entirely, the original intentions of the 
men of the revolutions, the foundation of freedom” (Arendt, 1963: 55). As 
opposed to her own view, Marx had contended, “the reason why the French 
Revolution had failed to found freedom was that it had failed to solve the social 
question” and argued essentially “freedom and poverty were incompatible” 
(Arendt, 1963: 56). The lesson he derived from the “French Revolution was that 
poverty can be a political force of the first order” (Arendt, 1963: 56). This 
transformation of the social question into a political force is contained in the 
term ‘exploitation’ (Arendt, 1963: 56). Based on the idea of a ‘slave economy’ 
where a ruling class dominates and victimizes another group by possessing the 
‘means of violence’ (Arendt, 1963 57) it suggests the economic order is based 
on political power hence can be “overthrown by political organization and 
revolutionary means” (Arendt, 1963: 57). Nonetheless, Arendt thinks the 
assessment that the capitalist relations are based on the threat and monopoly 
over violent means is relevant only for the early stages of capitalism. She argues 
that the Marxist theory “could not have survived more than a century of 
                                               
97In fact, Arendt’s engagement with Marx in her works is always controversial. As Hanna Pitkin 
notes, Arendt’s interpretation and detailed formulations of Marxist concepts are “almost always 
mistaken, sometimes blatantly so” (Pitkin, 1998: 115). The discussion of such mistakes is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation but it is possible to say that she located and analyzed 
Marx’s theory of labor within her theoretical framework and therefore failed to understand the 
prior’s own logic (Holman, 2011). Despite being so, in order to understand her disturbances 
about the ideas on revolution and violence, I present a brief review of Arendt’s views on Marx 
in On Revolution.  
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historical research if it had not been for its revolutionary (for introducing the 
idea that economic relations can be undone with the seizure of political power) 
rather than its scientific content” (Arendt, 1963: 56; emphasis mine).  
Arendt asserts “by reducing property relations to the old relationship 
which violence, rather than necessity establishes between 
men…[Marx]…summoned up a spirit of rebelliousness that can spring only 
from being violated, not from being under sway of necessity” (Arendt, 1963: 
57). With this, she means Marx treats exploitation, the equivalent of slavery, to 
be rising on the ground of violence. As noted earlier, Arendt defines slavery as 
a system built upon necessity. With the will to get rid of the burden of necessity 
made the one group of people compel another group to be their slaves to attend 
their basic needs. For this reason, for Arendt, it is the will to do away with 
necessity that violent and exploitative relations are established rather than the 
way Marx suggested (Arendt, 1968a).
98
  
Based on this argument she assesses several mistakes in Marx’s theory. 
Firstly, Marx assumes it is possible to free human beings from labor and from 
necessity by abolishing exploitative relations since he argues poverty is not a 
natural but a political phenomenon. Although Arendt accepts that some poverty 
is political and such poverty might be the result of violence and violation rather 
than scarcity, she also argues, “necessity, which we invariably carry with us in 
the very existence of our bodies and their needs, can never be simply reduced to 
                                               
98 Moreover, Arendt makes a critical intervention to Aristotle’s conception of slavery and 
reverses his construction to support her own case. As he writes in his Politics for the ancient 
philosopher, slavery is a natural institution. Since some human beings lack certain capabilities, 
that would make them complete human beings and citizens such as the ability to speech and 
reason, they need mastery and are only useful for attending the needs of some others.98 
According to Arendt, however, it is continuous engagement with the activity of laboring (that is 
the tending to necessity of oneself or of the others) that disposes one from her/his humane 
capabilities and makes one slavish. Misery, which by its definition denotes being bound to 
necessity, therefore, can never produce ‘free-minded people’ (Arendt, 1963: 57).  
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and completely absorbed by violence and violation” (Arendt, 1963: 59). 
Another point underlined by McGowan (1998: 51), is that in a second move 
Arendt presents the problem of poverty as an administrative matter. For her, it is 
not an issue of politics something that should be dealt by bureaucrats. 
Moreover, thanks to the technological advancements, modern societies offer all 
the means to achieve prosperity. We can minimize the time devoted to laboring 
activities with the use of technological machines and even of robots. 
Nonetheless, as it is the case with western societies in terms of a growing 
disinterestedness and even apathy towards politics, liberation from necessity 
does not guarantee search for freedom or for distinction in the public realm. 
Secondly, she attacks Marx for inverting the relation between violence and 
necessity and opposes his assertion “violence is the midwife of history”. She 
argues conceiving capitalist relations as rising on the ground of violence led 
twentieth-century-Marxist theorists to defend violence as a necessary act to 
undo them all. In the end, we have an emphasis on and even celebration of 
violence, which is required to abolish violence. Within this conceptual 
framework, Arendt argues that Marx, like Hegel before him, commits the 
mistake of assuming freedom to be the fruit of necessity.  
 
7.1.2. Another Distortion on Revolution: Poiesis and Violence 
 
Another distortion made in the meaning of the action is due to the 
substitution of it with the activity of work. Work (poiesis), defined in the 
Human Condition, simply “is the activity which corresponds to the 
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unnaturalness of human existence” (Arendt, 1998: 7).99 It is the activity through 
which human beings transform the world, build durable and permanent 
structures that outlast and transcend them all. Humanity when engaged with this 
form of activity is called as homo faber “who makes and literally ‘works upon’ 
as distinguished from the animal laborans which labors and ‘mixes with’—
fabricates the sheer unending variety of things whose sum total constitutes the 
human artifice” (Arendt, 1998: 136). Work, despite sharing some similarities 
with labor differs from the latter on significant accounts. Labor is cyclical, 
natural and repetitive. Work is linear, unnatural and does not have to be 
repetitive. As the fruits of labor are consumed, products of work are used and 
continue to exist even when they are not used; they do not rot or perish in a 
short period of time. While laboring requires reproduction “fabrication, the 
work of homo faber, consists in reification” (Arendt, 1998: 139). One other 
important aspect of work is that “the process of making is itself ent irely 
determined by the categories of means and end”. Work ends with the fabrication 
of the final product, which in turn is used as a means in the production of 
another artifact or employed in the process of laboring; hence, instrumentality 
and utility becomes an important aspect of fabrication. What guides the work of 
fabrication lies outside the fabricator and precedes the actual work process, 
which is somehow similar to laboring in the sense that the urgencies of the life 
                                               
99 Villa (2000:97), similar to labor presents a compilation of the terms that are associated with 
work in Arendt’s text. They are:  
the work of our hands, the man-made world, fabrication, (human) artiﬁce, 
(human) creativity, production, usage, durability, objectivity, building, 
constructing, manufacturing, making, violation, maleness, linearity, 
reiﬁcation, multiplication, tools and instruments, rules and measurement, ends 
and means, predictability, the exchange market, commercialism, capitalism, 
instrumental processes, utilitarian processes, objectifying processes, artificial 
processes, vulgar expediency, violence, predictability, deprivation of intrinsic 
worth, degradation, disposability, destruction (of nature, world), and 
lifelessness.  
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process precede the actual labor process. Nonetheless, the guidance of a model 
either in the form of an image viewed by the eye of the mind or a “blueprint in 
which the image has already found a tentative materialization” is required since 
creation is an essential part of the work (Arendt, 1998: 141).
100
 For this reason, 
Arendt argues, work has been seen “in the image of a Creator-God, so that 
where God creates ex nihilo, man creates out of given substance” (Arendt, 
1998: 139). While labor is associated with slavery to the necessities, in Arendt’s 
conceptualization of human existence, work is equated with mastery over things 
and the world. Consequently, unlike labor, which is painful and exhausting in 
its sheer experience but peaceful as an activity, destruction characterizes 
fabrication; it is a required process of transformation. “We must kill a tree in 
order to have lumber, and we must violate this material in order to build a table” 
(Arendt, 1998: 283). Like a Promethean revolt, Arendt writes, work attempts to 
build a man-made world only after destroying part of God-created nature. 
Violence, within this framework, is an “interruption of the cyclic movement of 
nature for a certain use and an irreversible destruction of it” (Yazıcıoğlu, 2009: 
112).  
We know that labor characterizes the private domain, which in contrast 
to the public realm is a domain of necessity, intimacy, inequality and isolation. 
Unlike labor, work requires a public realm; in fact, it also has the capability of 
creating that realm. Like the activity of labor, however, work is not political. 
The historically well-known realm of the activity of work is the exchange 
                                               
100 In cooking, for instance, we do have recipes or some sort of an idea before we cook, 
therefore we can argue that the line between labor and work might not be that certain; but for 
Arendt, probably, this form of envisioning is secondary in the activity of cooking since in eating 
the primary aim is to satisfy hunger at the end. For the activity of work, however, a model is 
essential; one cannot make a shoe by putting a piece of leather, some nails and strings together.  
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market where the end-products of the activity are displayed and esteems are 
received by the creators (Arendt, 1998: 160). Therefore, the realm of work 
differs from the political domain, which is the home of action (praxis), the 
highest form of human activity. Action derives from human condition of 
plurality. It simply means persons’ coming together, relating with each other 
without the intermediary of things, speaking, debating and acting together. 
(Arendt, 1998:7) Utility, instrumentality, necessities or desires are irrelevant 
concepts from the perspective of action. It does not produce any durable product 
nor satisfies a need. While all three human activities are somehow related to the 
political life, as labor enables politics by satisfying needs, work precedes action 
by building the political space, action requires and enables freedom, human 
togetherness, meaning, history that is remembrance.  
We have seen that for Arendt the diffusion of the rationality of labor into 
the political sphere brings about homogeneity in term of reducing human beings 
to the equal members of the same species. Given the fact that there is a will to 
liberate from ‘laboring’ activities and that in the presence of unfulfilled 
necessities men are bound with the drives of these basic necessities, a transfer 
of such wills and necessities to the realm of politics in the form of ‘politics of 
labor’ leads to violence that acts as a natural and destructive force.  
Concerning the role of the entrance of the rationality of work to the 
domain of politics, one can say emergence of violence is inevitable. In fact, 
while violence in the activity of labor is secondary in terms of its emergence, it 
is primary in work that is inevitably inherent in all activities of making, 
fabricating, and producing (Arendt, 1998; 1968a). The substitution of poiesis 
with praxis has several aspects and impacts on politics. Firstly, it conceives 
224 
 
politics as a process of making. The political order is envisioned as if it is an 
architectural design, something to be built from the ground and for the erection 
of which destruction of the nature is seen as required. Action is formulated, 
justified and judged within the framework of utility, efficiency and 
effectiveness rather than with reference to excellence, distinction and freedom. 
Secondly, it replaces the notion of ‘beginning’ one of the fundamental notions 
of politics with an origin true source (arche) that equates any type of beginning 
with violence and destruction, rather than hope.  
Conceiving praxis in terms of poiesis is a problem Arendt assesses back 
in Plato’s philosophy in Ancient Greece.101 The Platonic thinking was kept 
intact and even strengthened in Middle Ages until seventeenth century when 
modern science rose as a new paradigm, reached its climax in the revolutions of 
the eighteenth century and put the traditional philosophical approach into a 
crisis. For her, the introduction of scientific thinking into the realm of human 
affairs became path breaking since only by then the idea that had maintained 
since Plato that whatever is not given to senses, whatever is beyond mere 
appearances is more truthful, more real and more meaningful, could not be held 
true anymore.  
                                               
101 She traces the sustenance of this problematic conception through Middle Ages, discusses its 
transformation from the sixteenth century till modern times to point out the destructive impacts. 
According to her, with the death of Socrates, Plato blamed Athenian citizens for his teacher’s 
death, resented them, disgraced the life in polis for its hypocrisy and even doubted certain 
fundamentals of Socrates’ teachings for they did not save the philosopher’s life. As known 
Socrates, the great maieutics, the interrogator of beliefs and ideas was charged with impiety, 
undermining state religion and corrupting youth, found guilty of these crimes and sentenced to 
death. Rejecting escape plans offered by his student he declared the necessity of obeying the 
city’s verdict and took his own life. In response to this tragedy Plato turned to ideas rather than 
people, exalted vita contemplativa, which refers to the withdrawal from active city life and 
engagement with meditation in an attempt to find eternal truths. It is only with the development 
of absolute standards via inner vision, Plato thought, the philosopher-king can return to the city 
to build the perfect order and rule harmoniously. 
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With the intersection of the two paradigms, one viewing life/labor as the 
basis of human activity praising necessity and will as the transformative force in 
history (an organic view) the other that views life to be ordered with universal, 
objective laws (a mechanistic view) politics has turned into a process of 
production and reproduction. For Arendt, the French Revolution is the example 
of the failures of the adoption of the dual approach; while the revolutionaries 
were conceptualizing the aim of the political order as the provision of human 
necessities, they were also hoping to establish an order regulated by scientific 
laws.  
 
Law and Violence  
The problem of conceiving the establishment of a political order in the 
model of poiesis brings about the understanding of law-making as an activity 
transcending politics. Quoting Rousseau “the great problem in politics, which I 
compare to the problem of squaring the circle in geometry… [is]: How to find a 
form of government which puts the law above man” (Rousseau in Arendt, 1963: 
184), Arendt points the ambition and the perplexity of this enterprise. Law 
making is confused with laying down the fundamental law, which, from then 
on, is supposed to incarnate the ‘higher law’ from which all laws derive their 
authority” (Arendt, 1963: 184). This was a difficult task for the simple reason 
for those who came together with the will of constituting a new form of regime 
were themselves unconstitutional and in a secular world, they lacked any 
authority to do what they were intended to do.  
As stated earlier the new Republic and following political regimes were 
founded on the model of a sovereign; the King-God, both omnipotent and the 
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legislator of the universe. For Arendt this turn to the religious realm for 
inspiration or establishment of the laws by the image of God, was not those 
men’s conscious choice: they were enlightened and deist, not traditional or 
religious. Yet, the “enormous risks inherent in the secular realm of human 
affairs caused them to turn to the only element of traditional religion whose 
political usefulness as an instrument of rule was beyond any doubt” (Arendt, 
1963: 192). Even Machivalli, who in Arendt’s view is the spiritual father of the 
Revolution
102
 with his passionate yearning to revive the spirit and the institution 
of the Roman antiquity, which was adopted later by the eighteenth century 
revolutionaries as well, was puzzled with the task of foundation and had to 
recourse to God. His appeal to ‘high heaven’, Arendt argues, was certainly not 
inspired by any religious feelings but exclusively dictated by the wish to escape 
the difficulty of finding an irrefutable authority and establishing a stable 
political order.  
The problem of foundation, apart from the recourse to higher sources, 
unfolds in the argument of the necessity of violence. This necessity is expressed 
in the statements like “you cannot make a table without killing trees, you cannot 
make an omelet without breaking the eggs, you cannot make a republic without 
killing people” (Arendt, 1968a: 139). The association of violence with 
beginning is a historical fact and a tendency she assesses in the political 
                                               
102Arendt’s views of Machiavelli seem to differ in On Revolution and in What is Authority? and 
they somehow contradict. In On Revolution, she argues that Machiavelli is the father of 
revolution not by his insistence on violence nor for his conception of revolution as a history 
breaking event, which makes him different from the men of revolutions but due to his 
understanding of foundation—as a renovation (rinovazione) as the only beneficial alteration 
(alterazione a salute) (Arendt, 1963: 29) and for being the first to “think about the possibility of 
founding a permanent, lasting, enduring body politic” (Arendt, 1963: 29) . In What is 
Authority?, however, she asserts that the “double respect, because of his rediscovery of the 
foundation experience and his reinterpretation of it in terms of the justification of (violent) 
means for a supreme end Machiavelli may be regarded as the ancestor of modern revolution” 
(Arendt, 1968:140). 
227 
 
tradition. In their desire of founding a public-political realm both Machiavelli 
and Robespierre, “felt that for this supreme “end” all “means,” and chiefly the 
means of violence, were justified” (Arendt, 1963; 1968a:139). She writes 
They understood the act of founding entirely in the image of 
making; the question to them was literally how to “make” a unified 
Italy or a French republic, and their justification of violence was 
guided by and received its inherent plausibility from the underlying 
argument: You cannot make a table without killing trees, you 
cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs, you cannot make a 
republic without killing people. In this respect, which was to 
become so fateful for the history of revolutions, Machiavelli and 
Robespierre were not Romans, and the authority to which they 
could have appealed would have been rather Plato, who also 
recommended tyranny as the government where “change is likely to 
be easiest and most rapid (Arendt, 1968a:139). 
 
 
While Romans differed from Machiavelli and Robespierre in their 
capacity to locate the source of political authority within human realm, 
Machiavelli can be distinguished from the French revolutionaries in terms of the 
absence of a conception of revolution as a history breaking and new event in his 
theory (Arendt, 1963: 30). Revolution originally an astronomical term, in 
Copernicus’s De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, designated the “regular, 
lawfully revolving motion of the stars, which, since it was known to be beyond 
the influence of man and hence irresistible” (Arendt, 1963: 35). When translated 
to the political realm it connoted restoration, i.e. renovating government that is 
one among the few, which revolve among the mortals in eternal recurrence and 
with the same irresistible force, as exemplified in the Glorious Revolution in 
England in the seventeenth century. Only with the French revolution all 
revolutionary actors have been possessed and obsessed with the idea that they 
are the agents of an inevitable, historical process which is going to put an end to 
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the old order and bring about of a whole new world (Arendt, 1963: 35). While 
she agrees with the idea that novelty characterizes the modern revolutionary 
spirit, Arendt argues that invocation of an old and wrong myth dramatizes the 
idea of novelty and taints the revolutionary public spirit.  
The relevance of the problem of beginning to the phenomenon of 
revolution is obvious. That such a beginning must be intimately 
connected with violence seems to be vouched for by the legendary 
beginnings of our history as both biblical and classical antiquity 
report it: Cain slew Abel, and Romulus slew Remus; violence was 
the beginning and, by the same token, no beginning could be made 
without using violence, without violating. The first recorded deeds 
in our biblical and our secular tradition, whether known to be 
legendary or believed in as historical fact, have travelled through 
the centuries with the force which human thought achieves in the 
rare instances when it produces cogent metaphors or universally 
applicable tales. The tale spoke clearly: whatever brotherhood 
human beings may be capable of has grown out of fratricide, 
whatever political organization men may have achieved has its 
origin in crime (Arendt, 1963: 10).  
 
 
All in all, so far we have seen the faults Arendt has assessed within the 
revolutionary tradition. I have argued that she mainly criticizes the distortion 
made in the meaning of politics, revolution and political action through several 
mechanisms. The first of these is the conceptualization of politics within 
organist terms, a result of the infiltration of the rationality of laboring into the 
public sphere. The historical correspondence of this infiltration is the rise of the 
social domain and the emergence of the welfare state. For Arendt the social 
question is not the concern of the political. This is a mistake committed by the 
French revolutionaries and followed by political thinkers like Marx in the 
following years. Any issue bound with necessity for Arendt cannot aim nor 
reach freedom. The attempt of solving social problems in politics would lead to 
violence, which is tried to be justified with a discourse of necessity, the 
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employment of which we have seen in the first chapter in the discussion of the 
essentialist/instrumentalist approach.  
A second distortion made in the meaning of revolution is the 
formulation of politics within the framework of work, that is making or 
building. This conception, hardly modern, has gained increasing currency with 
the rise of modern science and technological developments and created the 
illusion that man is capable of producing a perfect order. Violence, since it is 
inherent in the rationality and activity of making for Arendt becomes a 
destructive force in politics in the first degree. In what follows, I will present 
Arendt’s intervention to the meaning of the revolution and her reception of 
violence as a force that can be used for political purposes.  
 
7.2 . Arendt on American Revolution  
 
7.2.1. The Difference between Liberation and Freedom  
 
As the biblical stories conveyed, beginnings might include a dimension 
of violence Arendt argues that crime or violence is only part of a story and that 
part does not constitute the true nature of any revolution.
103
 For that aim, as 
opposed to the story of Abel and Cain she refers to two other legends, one the 
biblical story of the exodus of Israeli tribes from Egypt and the story of the 
wanderings of the Virgil of Aeneas after he had escaped the burning city of 
                                               
103 In fact, it is possible to read Arendt’s views on revolution, an event that enables the political 
to emerge in comparison with Schmitt and as a critique of Schmitt. While both theorists 
disregard liberal conception of politics as a petty business and emphasize the autonomy of the 
political as a distinct domain and to be a part of collectivity, Arendt differentiates herself from 
Schmitt with her rejection of violence.  
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Troy. The significance of these two stories for her is that both are “legends of 
liberation, the one of liberation from slavery and the other of escape from 
annihilation, and both stories are centered about a future promise of freedom” 
(Arendt, 1963: 206).
104
 She argues, these stories contain an important lesson for 
the revolutionaries. They “indicated that freedom is no more automatic result of 
liberation than the new beginning is the automatic consequence of the end” 
(Arendt, 1963: 206).  
This distinction between ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom’ is an important point 
in Arendt in passing a judgment about the ‘true’ character of a ‘revolution’. It 
constitutes the criterion, based on which she asserts that the American 
Revolution is superior to the French Revolution. This criterion also enables one 
to decide whether coups d’état’or civil wars, phenomena that have 
commonalties in terms of attempting a change of governmental power and of 
their employment of violence are revolutions are not.  
When one talks about a revolution, she asserts, one should always keep 
in mind that as a distinctively modern matter, “the aim of revolution was, and 
has always been, freedom” (Arendt, 1963: 2). Freedom, she asserts, does not 
refer to individuals’ having ‘fundamental’ rights such as the right to life, liberty 
and property or civil rights, which are considered to be under the guarantee of 
constitutional governments. These are liberties, defined negatively as the 
freedom from unjustified restraint, violence or fear and are results of “liberation 
but they are by no means the actual content of freedom, which…is participation 
                                               
104 For a study that traces the theme of myth and mythology not much articulated by Arendt, See 
Barash, Jeffrey Andrew. 2009. Hannah Arendt and the Mythology of Violence, in: Yazıcıoğlu, 
Sanem (Ed.): Doğumunun 100. Yılında. Hannah Arendt. On her birth centenary, Cogito: 
Istanbul  
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in public affairs, or admission to the public realm (Arendt, 1963: 24). While 
liberties seem to define private and apolitical enjoyments, freedom is an issue of 
politics; it signifies the enjoyment of equality and plurality with the peers within 
public sphere and sharing the pleasure of togetherness and collective action.  
only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where 
violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of 
government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, 
where liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of 
freedom can we speak of revolution (Arendt, 1963: 2) 
 
 
Interestingly however, “the very word freedom disappeared from the 
revolutionary vocabulary” (Arendt, 1963: 2), and wars, which have a longer 
history than the revolutions, have adopted the discourse of freedom. This 
happened once aggression was defined as a crime after the First World War and 
once the scale and the destructiveness of modern warfare increased (Arendt, 
1963: 3). Although the conception of justification of war under certain 
conditions, which is exemplified in the notion of ‘just war’ goes back to the 
Roman times, freedom has appeared in the debate of modern warfare, “like a 
deus ex machina to justify what on rational grounds has become unjustifiable” 
(Arendt, 1963: 4).  
The entry of the idea of liberation into the equation of freedom and 
revolution is a novel development for Arendt. The line between liberty and 
freedom has been erased in the process and modern revolutionaries have come 
to equate the struggle for liberation with the desire for freedom. As stated, 
although liberty is a necessity for reaching political freedom it is not the 
sufficient condition. In fact, we know that she (Arendt, 1973; 1968a; 2000; 
2008) called for the establishment of a Jewish Army to fight the Nazis during 
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the World War II.
105
 Rather than being bystanders or victims of a tyrannical 
regime, people should rise up and fight for their existence, identity and for their 
freedom. In these cases, she argues that the use of violence may be ‘justified’. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that it can ever be ‘legitimate’ (1969: 151).106 
For Arendt, liberation could have been fulfilled under monarchical regimes. 
Freedom, however, requires the formation of a new republic. This is 
exemplified in the Hungarian Revolution, when a student demonstration turned 
into an uprising in less than twenty-four hours, with no vanguard party, no 
programs, points or manifestos or civil war. “What carried the revolution was 
the sheer momentum of acting-together of the whole people whose demands 
were so obvious that they hardly needed elaborate formulation: Russian troops 
should leave the territory and free elections should determine a new 
government” (Arendt, 1958: 26). The Hungarian army, Arendt writes 
disintegrated in hours, it did not resist the protestors. The dictatorship, on the 
other hand, was stripped of all of its power in a couple of days. Legitimacy, 
therefore, lies in a collective act: “No group, no class in the nation opposed the 
                                               
105 Albeit being against, what we today call as ‘identity politics’ that is the political struggle on 
the basis of identities such as womanhood, ethnicity or religion, Arendt argues “when one is 
attacked as a Jew one must respond as a Jew not as a German not as a world-citizen, not as an 
upholder of the Rights of Man”. For her, in the case of a direct attack defending oneself in 
abstract terms would have been “nothing but a grotesque and dangerous evasion of reality”. See: 
Hannah Arendt. 2000 [1941]. ‘The Jewish Army – the Beginning of a Jewish Politics?’ in The 
Portable Hannah Arendt, edited by Peter Baehr, London: Penguin, 46–8 and Power and 
Violence’, Lecture delivered at Bard College, New York. 
Available online: http://www.bard.edu/arendtcollection/digitalproject.htm. 
Yet still, as known, she opposed the foundation of a Israeli state and defended the formation of a 
dual-state with Arab-Jewish councils.  
106 On the issue of calling for a Jewish Army, one scholar (Birmingham, 2011) offers an 
alternating view. Upon juxtaposing Arendt and Benjamin, she argues that Arendt’s distinction 
between violence and power is very close to Benjamin’s distinction between mythical and 
divine violence in the sense that both reject instrumentality and offer something else. Instead of 
Benjamin’s Messianic violence that ends all forms of worldly violence, Birmingham argues, 
Arendt locates revolutionary power, which in my opinion means to close a very big gap 
between the two. She further argues that in her call for a Jewish army, Arendt is calling for a 
revolutionary act, a collective action and power. However, as I have tried to show, a fight 
conducted by a Jewish Army cannot be revolutionary but liberationist from an Arendtian 
perspective. 
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will of the people once it had become known and its voice had been heard in the 
market place” (Arendt, 1958: 27). 
As a result, violence of liberation movements, liberation wars, fall under 
the category of ‘prepolitical’ acts as Villa (1996:157) too has observed. 
“Domination, liberation, administration, representation—determined by the 
force of necessity and destructive of plurality they are all prepolitical in 
character” (Villa, 1996: 31). The use of force in these cases, or the employment 
of violence against tyranny and oppression may be ‘justified’, and even morally 
affirmed but Arendt reasons they can never be political nor can be ‘legitimized’.  
 
7.2.2. Founding Freedom: Law and Violence 
 
By now, we are familiar with Arendt’s views on the problem of 
conceiving revolution as an act of liberation from necessity, domination and 
oppression, the distorted view of conceptualizing action as making. We have 
also seen that there is a difference between liberation and freedom. We know 
that revolution does have the component of liberation, and although violence 
can be employed at this stage and even though it can be morally justified, acts 
of violence are prepolitical phenomenon. They are secondary in terms of their 
role in revolution and they can never be legitimate politically. Furthermore, the 
phenomenon of revolution cannot and should not be reduced to liberation. 
Hence, it cannot be reduced to violence either, establishment of a political order 
where members of the political community can enjoy action and public freedom 
is the second and the most important stage of a revolution. One of the reasons of 
this error is the historical fact that there had been not many revolutions that 
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could have successfully ended up with constitution making; either the 
revolution became permanent or the counter forces imposed new laws to seize 
them or when revolutions failed.  
Recognizing the difficulty of founding a new political order Arendt 
writes “psychologically speaking the experience of foundation combined with 
the conviction that a new story is about to unfold in history will make men 
‘conservative’ rather than ‘revolutionary’, eager to preserve what has been done 
and to assure its stability rather than open for new things, new developments, 
new ideas” (Arendt, 1963: 34).  
Ironically, she writes most of the time, men of revolutions lacked 
expectations and inclinations for novel things. They were not aware of the fact 
they were in the process of a revolution. What they aimed, on the contrary was 
restoration: revolving back to some ideal arrangement. Nevertheless, the 
process and the experiencing of political freedom during the process brought up 
the problem of foundation.
107
  
The perplexity in the face of the problem of foundation is particularly 
materialized in the task of laying down a constitution. Formulating a new 
constitution without referring to extrapolitical (transcendental, higher) sources 
of authority, establishing a stable political order and lasting institutions with the 
knowledge that all these structures can be undone with a counter-revolution, 
                                               
107Bonnie Honig (1991) argues that Arendt faults the American revolutionaries for being 
inadequately conscious of themselves as innovator but I have my doubts about this comment. 
Honig gives reference to a passage where Arendt (1963: 37) writes “…especially with respect to 
the American Revolution, which did not devour its own children and where therefore the men 
who had started the ‘restoration’ were the same men who began and finished the Revolution and 
even lived to rise to power and office in the new order of things. What they had thought was a 
restoration, the retrieving of their ancient liberties, turned into a revolution, and their thoughts 
and theories about the British constitution, the rights of Englishmen, and the forms of colonial 
government ended with a declaration of independence”. In fact as Honig herself later 
acknowledges the experience of public freedom, opened the way to carry on the revolutionary 
process and to establish a new political realm for the American revolutionaries. 
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were true challenges the American and French revolutionaries faced. In fact, 
Arendt does not deal with the topic of law as in her view legislation is a 
technical matter. Yet still, as I have already stated, she points out the flaw in 
French Revolution as the futile but tragic search for an absolute law, which is 
conceived as a sovereign will. For this reason, she makes a comparison between 
the Greeks and the Romans in an attempt to offer a true meaning for law. As a 
result of this comparison she offers a twofold meaning for law. Neither for 
Greeks nor for Romans law was something above politics, has she argued. In 
Greek city-states, in the founding of a city, a legislator came from outside of the 
city. That law-giver “could be a stranger and be called from abroad but this was 
because, as Arendt suggests, due to the fact that laying down the law was a pre-
political act. Just as the erection of walls around the city before establishing the 
city (Arendt, 1963: 187), laws were made before the foundation of politics. The 
similarity of the laws and walls are noted with the following paragraph: 
“The very word νόμος (nomos), which apart from its etymological 
significance, receives its full meaning as the opposite of φύσις 
(phusis; later became physis) or things that are natural, stresses the 
‘artificial’, conventional, man-made nature of the laws. Moreover, 
although the word νόμος came to assume different meanings as 
throughout the centuries of Greek civilization, it never lost its 
original ‘spatial significance’ altogether, namely, ‘the notion of a 
range of province, within which defined power may be legitimately 
exercised.’” (Arendt, 1963: 187)  
 
 
The Roman lex, on the other hand, “was not coeval with the foundation 
of the city”. Nor was the law a pre-political activity (Arendt, 1963: 188). Lex 
signified a relationship, an intimate connection, something that connects two 
things or two partners whom external circumstances have brought together. The 
function of law is exemplified in the case of wars in Roman history. Arendt 
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argues that laws were established at the end of wars not to re-establish peace but 
to constitute new alliance and a new unity (in the form of treaties and 
agreements) between altogether different entities, which were thrown together 
by war and now entered into a partnership (Arendt, 1963: 188). Having assessed 
the same conception in Montesquieu, whom she favors a lot, Arendt argues for 
the Romans, “a law is merely what relates two things and therefore is relative 
by definition” (Arendt, 1963: 189).  
According to one scholar (Birmingham, 2011) Arendt’s understanding 
of law has shifted from the Greek conception of ’wall’ or ‘border’ to the Roman 
notion of ‘alliance’ in time.108 The conceptualization of law as a border, 
presented in the Human Condition, enables her to make a neat distinction 
between the city and the nature, between politics and violence, a citizen and a 
                                               
108 My explanation of such a shift would be that upon realizing the problems of the existence of 
the ‘borders’ to be one of the defining features of the ‘nation state’—a problematic political 
structure (among many others particularly) for equating human rights with citizens’ right and 
therefore, for instance, stripping refugees of all rights—Arendt might came favor the relational 
formulation. We know that in her opinion federalism is superior to the unitary state structure. 
Her view on the issue has a specific reference to the Jewish Question not only in terms of the 
sufferings Jewish people underwent during the Nazi regime but also with regards to the 
establishment of the long-awaited Israeli state in Middle East in 1948. As known, Arendt 
opposed it with the argument that it should have been founded as a federated and pluralistic 
state, a homeland for the Jews and the Palestinians. In Origins, she (1973: ??) writes “after the 
war it turned out that the Jewish question, which was considered the only insoluble one, was 
indeed solved – namely, by means of a colonized and then conquered territory – but this solved 
neither the problem of the minorities nor the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually all other 
events of the 20th century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a new category 
of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of stateless and rightless by another 
700,000 to 800,000 people. And what happened in Palestine within the smallest territory and in 
terms of hundreds of thousands was then repeated in India on a large scale involving many 
millions of people” 
Arendt debates the problems of the nation-states in the Origins of Totalitarianism. One can also 
take a look at her essays on the matter. See Arendt, Hannah. 1949. ‘The Rights of Man’: What 
Are They? Modern Review 3 (1): 25-3 and Arendt, Hannah. 1978. We Refugees. In Ron H. 
Feldman, ed. The Jew as Pariah, NY: Grove Press, 1978: 55-66.For further discussions on the 
relation between human rights, citizenship and the nation-state from an Arendtian perspective 
and works that enter a dialogue with Arendt, for instance, See. Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. The 
Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press & Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and 
Citizens, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Isaac, Jeffrey C. 1996. A New 
Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Human Rights. American Political 
Science Review 90 (1): 61-73 and Rancière, Jacques. 2004. “Who is the Subject of the Rights of 
Man?” The South Atlantic Quarterly 103 (2/3): 297-310. 
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barbarian. So that she can argue although the city connotes a non-violent 
domain, outside the walls of the city violence is a natural aspect of human 
affairs. The conception of the treaty and alliance, on the other hand, is relational 
rather than spatial and it suggests that the law is constituted through political 
action. Within this framework, law becomes a productive and regenerative 
instrument; it establishes a relation between two distinct entities that inevitably 
creates a space for politics. Following Thomas Paine, then, Arendt argues: “a 
constitution is not the act of the government, but of a people constituting a 
government” (Arendt, 1963: 143).  
In the previous sections, I have pointed out the distinction Arendt makes 
between freedom and liberty. I have argued that she associates freedom with 
revolution and does not think that a movement, which aims at the provision or 
guarantee of liberties, is revolutionary. Although a constitutional government is 
considered as a form of government with limits on its absolute power; hence, 
limited, the liberties guaranteed by the laws of constitutional government are 
negative in character. Thence, the aim of revolution cannot be reduced to this 
problem since then they would not differ from restoration. The establishment of 
a new constitution, therefore, cannot revolve around the question of “how to 
limit power but how to establish it” and “how to limit a government but how to 
found a new one” (Arendt, 1963: 146). Among the modern attempts,109 she 
assesses and praises the revival of ‘council’ model. These councils, referring to 
a direct regeneration of democracy through the proliferation of local sites 
                                               
109 Arendt finds 1871 Paris Commune, the first weeks of the first Russian revolution of 1905, 
the October revolution in Russia, the November revolutions in Germany and Austria after the 
First World War, the workers’ councils of the 1956 uprising in Hungary, and the American 
Revolution inspirational examples of revolutions. Yet all except the American revolution failed 
for her.  
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(Arendt, 1963: 263) acted as truly revolutionary forces, “born exclusively out of 
the actions and spontaneous demands of the people, and they were not deduced 
from an ideology nor foreseen, let alone preconceived, by any theory about the 
best form of government” (Arendt, 1958: 28). Yet among many trials only the 
American Revolution survived and for this reason can be evaluated as 
successful. 
Restriction of violence is an important aspect and the success of 
American Revolution. This was made possible, firstly, due to the geographical 
distance between the New World and Europe, inflicted by mass misery and 
unhappiness. By not being crippled with the problems of necessity, the 
American Revolution could successfully deal with political problems, the form 
of government and the formation of freedoms (Arendt, 1963: 63). This does not 
mean, however, that inequality was totally absent in the American context and 
that the founders of the Republic were not preoccupied with distinctions present 
within society. Yet, Arendt argues these men were convinced that these 
distinctions were eternal as old as the creation, and as extensive as the globe.
110
 
Slavery, she confesses, carries an obscurity darker than the obscurity of 
European poverty in the American context. “The slave, not the poor man, was 
‘wholly overlooked’” by the newly established Republic just like it was in the 
Athenian democracy. Without problematizing the meaning of the exclusion of 
this problem from the sphere of politics, she declares her relief with the 
                                               
110From this, we can only conclude that the institution of slavery carries an obscurity even 
blacker than the obscurity of poverty; the slave, not the poor man, was ‘wholly overlooked’. For 
if Jefferson, and others to a lesser degree, were aware of the primordial crime upon which the 
fabric of American society rested, if they ‘trembled when [they] thought that God is just' 
(Jefferson), they did so because they were convinced of the incompatibility of the institution of 
slavery with the -foundation of freedom, not because they were moved by pity or by a feeling of 
solidarity with their fellow men. 
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statement that the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution, in fact, 
recognized the incompatibility of the fact of slavery with the foundation 
principles of freedom. In a strange way, she implies a comparison with the 
French Revolution and again declares the superiority of the American 
Revolution: They judged it so, “not because they were moved by pity or by a 
feeling of solidarity with their fellow men” (Arendt, 1963: 66).  
The separation of powers, the application and elaboration of 
Montesquieu’s theory of the three branches of government (the legislative, 
executive and the judiciary) are also important features that made the American 
Revolution successful in the eyes of Arendt. The separation of powers should 
also be celebrated for its abolition of the notion of sovereignty, which within the 
realm of human affairs is the same with tyranny (Arendt, 1963: 152). The 
‘Founding Fathers’, managed to create a new realm where, public happiness and 
personal desire to excel in public affairs can be pursued (Arendt, 1963:131). In 
French Revolution, she argued, the emphasis shifted from public freedom to 
civil liberty, exemplified in the Declaration of Human Rights, which for her is 
the equation of the rights of ‘man’ and the rights of the citoyen with the rights 
of the ‘bourgeois’. The disappearance of the ‘taste’ for ‘political freedom’, the 
withdrawal from public affairs into an ‘inward domain of consciousnesses’ and 
the pursuit of private happiness” (Arendt, 1963: 131) determined the 
physiognomy of the nineteenth century as it partly does even that of the 
twentieth century in Europe.  
As a result, the foundation of a political domain for the enjoyment of 
public freedom, laying down laws that relate people to each other, formulating 
power not in absolute terms rather generating them through local mechanisms 
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and endorsing a spirit which inspires individuals to participate in public affairs, 
emerge as major issues a revolution has to address.  
 
Conclusion:  
 
The endeavor of understanding the relationship between violence and 
politics in the works of Arendt and Foucault in comparison with the traditional 
approaches has been running along two axes of power and revolution. I have 
presented and discussed how Arendt and Foucault conceive power and its 
relation to violence. As seen, the Arendtian analysis of violence has been more 
complex and nuanced than Foucault and it has two dimensions. Both in the 
discussion of power and revolution, firstly, she engages with a historical 
critique, analyzes the present and looks for possible explanations. Then, she 
builds up her argument by refuting the mistakes she assessed and replacing 
them with the true meanings of the concepts. Redefinition of the meaning of 
revolution and separating its link with violence was the attempt I have tried 
discussing in this chapter.  
She pointed out the dangers made in the formulation of political action; 
showed how the domination of the rationality of laboring turns societies into 
conformist, apolitical and homogenous masses that pursue the mere satisfaction 
of their biological needs. Viewing politics in the image of making, on the other 
hand, she argued results in destruction, domination and exclusion. Both of these 
problems, she argued are present in the European tradition and was embodied 
by the French Revolution. 
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In her opinion, there are two stages to a successful revolution: liberation 
and freedom. There is the will to liberate from any form of domination and 
there is the volition to found a novel form of regime, which engenders the 
experience of political freedom. The true meaning of revolution, as a political 
act par excellence lies in its unfolding of the establishment of a political order. 
For Arendt it is possible to succeed at the initial project of liberation and to fail 
at the subsequent project of the foundation. From an Arendtian perspective, one 
can argue, the French Revolution succeeded the process of liberation yet failed 
in the successful foundation of the political order, hence freedom. The 
American Revolution was successful in both terms and this, for Arendt was 
apparent in the marginality of violence within the event. The next chapter will 
discuss how Foucault understands the problem of revolution and its relation to 
violence. As we will see, his review of the Iranian Revolution will be a 
challenge to Arendt’s definition of revolution as a freedom founding act.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
FOUCAULT ON REVOLUTION AND VIOLENCE 
 
 
 
 I have argued that the experience of the Nazi regime had a traumatic 
impact on Arendt and throughout her career, she writes on and against violence 
in her works. The Human Condition, was a reaction to the totalitarian 
nightmare; On Violence and On Revolution were penned as fearful responses to 
the political events of the 1960s.  
 Foucault’s reflections, on the other hand, do not reflect a worry or fear.  
Although he provides numerous works that can be considered to be touching 
upon the topic of violence in terms of its transformation at polity and societal 
levels, none of these works makes an explicit statement about the necessity of 
avoidance of violence. Nor he defended a non-violent form of politics in his 
historiographies. Within this context, revolution was a theme Foucault did not 
grow any interest in until the late 1970s. 
Starting from the early 1970s, however, he became an increasingly 
politicized figure. A particular interest and engagement with the prison system 
support to prisoners with Gilles Deleuze characterized this period. During this 
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time, he got also busy with thinking about an alternative concept of power, the 
contours and oscillations we have seen in the previous chapter. For Foucault the 
importance of the 1968 events derive from their embodiment of a critique of 
traditional frameworks of politics and political action, therefore might be 
illuminating for him to develop his notion of resistance. The critique of 1968 
particularly targets Marxism
111
 and blames it for failing to understand complex 
dynamics of capitalist societies and a whole series of questions, such as 
questions about women, relations between sexes, medicine, mental illness, 
environment or identities (Kritzman in Foucault, 1988). The movements of 
1968 brought these issues forward and they demanded solutions; they asked for 
state’s withdrawal from one domain, or called for its intervention on 
environmental issues or some other domains, which were not considered as 
political issues. In an interview where he explicates the meaning of his work on 
the relationship between body and power, Foucault notes the importance of 
1968 events with the question  
One can say that what has happened since 1968, and arguably what 
made 1968 possible, is something profoundly anti-Marxist. How 
can European revolutionary movements free themselves from the 
‘Marx effect’, the institutions typical of nineteenth- and twentieth-
century Marxism! This was the direction of the questions posed by 
‘68. In this calling in question of the equation: Marxism = the 
revolutionary process, an equation that constituted a kind of dogma, 
the importance given to the body is one of the important, if not 
essential elements (Foucault, 1980: 57). 
 
 
The 1968 events were also important for the reawakening of a sense of 
revolution yet the desire for an overthrow of the existing regime for the 
establishment of a novel one seemed to be dim in western contexts. In the U.S. 
                                               
111 This however does not mean that Foucault disregards Marx as an important figure. In fact, 
his critical analyses have affinities with the Marxist analysis. Yet, he has a particular distance 
with the “Marxism” which attempts at defining itself as a science.  
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and in Europe, there were antiwar demonstrations, rise of student movements, 
civil society movements with various agendas such as feminism, antiracism, 
gay and civil rights, environmental concerns. These new forms of political 
movements (also known as new social movements) led people go to streets and 
cause them to demand more rights, democracy and equality. Yet they did not 
ask for another world, a regime or a form of government. They did not demand 
nor could transform existing economic (capitalist), political and social relations. 
In non-European contexts, on the other hand, the revolutionary spirit was more 
radical. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 was followed by a series of revolts, 
uprisings, anti-colonial struggles. The Vietnamese opposition to U.S.’s 
occupation, and many wars of independence in Africa and Asia took place in 
this period.  
 
8.1. Iranian Revolution: An Alternative to Western Modernity? 
 
It is against this background when in 1978, a protest against the Iranian 
Shah Reza Pahlavi turned into a massive revolt
112
 Foucault expressed his 
enthusiasm, went to Iran two times for one-week-long visits (in September and 
November 1978), and penned his observations. These observations were 
published in the form of newspaper reports, interviews, opinion pieces and 
letters to the editors between September 1978 and May 1979 in Italian 
                                               
112 Shah’s secular regime had long suffered from a legitimacy crisis. By the mid-1970s, 
however, protests became widespread; they met with increased political repressions and at times 
with some attempts reforms. In the early phases demonstrations leftist urban intellectuals are 
noted to be active but when the protest organized by seminary students against the publishing of 
an article, which criticizes Ayatollah Khomeini in a newspaper in January 1978 was suppressed 
with several killings, Iranian clergy came to the scene and overtake the role of organizing mass 
protests. On September 8, a massive demonstration in Tehran was crushed by the regime forces 
and received the name of Black Friday. This event accelerated and intensified the uprisings and 
ended up with Shah’s departure on January 16, 1979.  
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newspaper Corriere della sera, French newspapers and journals, such as the 
daily Le Monde and Le Nouvel Observateur (Afary and Anderson, 2005). The 
French theorist’s sudden interest in the event aroused surprise and curiosity but 
as soon as his writings came out, they received harsh criticisms from different 
groups including feminists, leftists, Middle Eastern scholars and scholars of 
Middle East. The critics blamed the thinker for his unconditional sympathy and 
even fascination with the spectacle, for his ignorance of the history of the 
country (Keating, 1997) and the scope of violence and repression the new 
regime brought. Foucault’s neglect of women, homosexuals who have been 
marginalized, excluded and oppressed by the religious Khomeini regime was 
also attacked particularly by the feminists (Afary and Anderson, 2005; de 
Beauvoir in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 246-247). Some of these texts and their 
critics appeared in a volume, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and 
the Seductions of Islamism (Afary and Anderson, 2005) and fuelled debates that 
aim to understand Foucault’s position in the issue (Afary and Anderson, 2005; 
Honig, 2008; Bernauer, 2006).
113
  
For some, Foucault made a mistake by celebrating the Iranian Revolution 
too early (Bernauer, 2006). He just could not realize the radical, anti-modernist 
and oppressive nature of the religious movement. For others this was not an 
isolated incident; rather Foucault’s comments are a symptom of the problems of 
a political/theoretical stand he too belongs to, that is as one scholar labels, “the 
                                               
113 For one scholar one can assess a revived interest in Foucault’s Iran writings particularly after 
9/11. He asserts that most works on Foucault in the English language published after 2002 
dedicate a separate section or chapter on Foucault and Iran. According to him, “what clearly 
was a source of discomfort and possibly embarrassment in the scholarship for two decades… 
has evidently become a central theme” in contemporary Foucault readings. See: Beukes, 
Johann. 2009. Foucault and Iran 1978-1979 (2: Scholarship and Significance) Hamartia, Vol. 65 
No: 1: 116-126.  
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kind of left-wing thinking that mixes postmodernism, simplistic thirdworldism, 
and illiberal inclination” (Cohen, 2002: 17-18). Walzer (1983), on the other 
hand, calls Foucault’s political position in response the events of May 68,  
prison revolts in seventies and Iranian Revolution as “infantile leftism”, which 
however, should be separated from his political theory.
114
 Within French leftist 
circles, there were others who supported the Iranian Revolution with the 
argument that the movement is anti-imperialistic in nature and includes some 
socialist elements. The latter assessment was partly correct due the support the 
Iranian left gave to the mass protests during the revolutionary period.
115
 Many 
newspapers with Islamic-leftist tendencies published the pictures of young 
martyrs who had died in the prisons by Shah’s regime (Afary and Anderson, 
2005) and contributed to the expansion of the support to the demonstrations and 
the fall of the Shah regime.  
Foucault explicitly stated that he would not answer his summoning for the 
acknowledgement of his errors (Foucault, 1978: 114) nor respond to critics that 
look for polemics on the issue.
116
 In an interview where the reception of the 
                                               
114 Foucault on the other hand, labeled Walzer as a polemicist and denied his right to respond to 
the critique of “infantile leftism”. He argues, “[I]f I open a book and see that the author is 
accusing an adversary of “infantile leftism” I shut it again right away. That’s not my way of 
doing things; I don’t belong to the world of people who do things that way.” See: Foucault, 
Michel. 1997. Polemics, Politics and Problematizations translated by Lydia Davis, in Essential 
Works of Foucault Volume 1 Ethics, The New Press. 
115 Leftist reviewers still argue the mobilization of the working class and the poor was effective 
in the Iranian Revolution and they were the ones who pushed the system into crisis. See, Saman 
Sepehri. 2000. Internationalist Socialist Review, Issue 9 August-September. Available online:  
http://www.isreview.org/issues/09/iranian_revolution.shtml  
116 An interview conducted by Paul Rabinow in May 1984 Foucault expressed that not engaging 
in polemics is his general attitude. His views on the nature of the polemic and the polemicist 
and the way he differentiates the prior from interviews where one asks and the other responds 
are interesting because they seem to contradict his thoughts on relations of power. By arguing, 
“in the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of 
each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue 
situation…The polemicist… on the other hand…possesses rights authorizing him to wage war 
and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search 
for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose very existence 
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Iranian revolution by the French left was interrogated, however he said, apart 
from the sympathy that can be felt towards the Revolution due to its service to 
the socialist ideals and the total rejection of it on the basis of its anti-modernism 
there is a possible third reaction, which, exemplified in his case, is 
“astonishment” (Foucault 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 251). Foucault 
contends the event in Iran does not resemble a revolution in the known sense; it 
is a previously unknown form of politicization and will have impacts, which 
cannot be foreseen in the near future. His thoughts in different articles not only 
confirm that feeling of “astonishment”. But they also suggest ‘confusion’ and 
‘indecisiveness’. Foucault could not immediately decide whether he was 
witnessing a revolution or not. In the essay entitled, The Mythical Leader of the 
Iranian Revolt he says 
… I wanted to say that it is not a revolution, not in the literal sense 
of the term, not a way of standing up and straightening things out. It 
is the insurrection of men with bare hands who want to lift the 
fearful weight, the weight of the entire world order that bears down 
on each of us, but more specifically on them, these oil workers and 
peasants at the frontiers of empires. (Foucault 1978, in Afary and 
Anderson, 2005: 222). 
 
 
Then in another essay, in Iran: The Spirit of a World without Spirit he writes 
 
We recognize a revolution when we can observe two dynamics: one 
is that of the contradictions in that society, that of the class struggle 
or of social confrontations. Then there is a political dynamic, that is 
to say, the presence of a vanguard, class, party, or political 
ideology, in short, a spearhead that carries the whole nation with it. 
Now it seems to me that, in what is happening in Iran, one can 
recognize neither of those two dynamics that are for us distinctive 
signs and explicit marks of a revolutionary phenomenon (Foucault 
1978, in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 251).  
 
                                                                                                                             
constitutes a threat” sounds more like Habermas than the familiar Foucault. See, Foucault, 
Michel. 1997. Polemics, Politics and Problematizations translated by Lydia Davis, in Essential 
Works of Foucault Volume 1 Ethics, The New Press. 
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Iran did not undergo a colonial experience even though it was divided into 
two zones, which were controlled, by the British and the Russian governments 
in the nineteenth century. Starting from the mid-nineteenth century the Unites 
States gained greater influence on the state and this influence increased its 
scope during the rule of Shah Pahlavi. The substantial inflow of oil revenues 
transferred to a group of privileged and used for the strengthening of the army 
but neither transformed the country’s social structures nor create new social 
forces (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 221). In the absence of an 
antinomy of a colonizer and occupier, hence an organized struggle for 
independence/decolonization and under the shadow of a strong army and police 
forces backed up by the Shah regime, Foucault reasons, political-military 
organizations could not emerge. For this reason, he argues, “the rejection of the 
regime is a massive social phenomenon” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and 
Anderson, 2005: 220; emphasis mine) and operates as a negation of politics in 
Iran.
117
  
A distinction between the ‘social’ and the ‘political’ domain is not 
meaningful for Foucault. I have already shown it is Arendt who argues the 
‘social’ signifies a hybrid domain of private and public characterized by a set of 
relations of necessity, homogenizing norms and values and individualism. For 
her the rise of the social, its expansion into the political has a degrading impact 
on political, the sphere of excellence, distinction, freedom and plurality. 
                                               
117 This is a point underlined by Asaf Bayat as well. In his comparison of social movements in 
Middle East Bayat argues that the Iranian revolutionary movement in 1978 aimed to solely 
negate the existing order without considering and not knowing whether they may or may not 
able to build alternative structures. For him movements in other Middle Eastern countries such 
as Egypt or in Europe such as European Socialist Movements, Poland’s Solidarity are more 
organized and had attempts of establishing alternative structures and value systems before a 
total change. See: Asef Bayat. 1998. Revolution without Movement, Movement without 
Revolution: Comparing Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 40,(1) :136-169.  
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Foucault, like Arendt he points out an increasing concern for the welfare of the 
population, the increase of its wealth, health, cycles of reproduction and other 
indicators such as rates of birth, death etc. in the western societies since the 
eighteenth century. Arendt’s argument that asserts the nation-state corresponds 
to a form of politics that conceives ruling of body of peoples and political 
communities in the image of a family –a form of housekeeping, echoes in 
Foucault’s essay on governmentality (Foucault, 2001). Referring to Rousseau’s 
entry on ‘Political Economy’ in his Encyclopedia, however, he points out the 
meaning of economy as the ‘management of a household by the father’ but also 
reminds Rousseau’s warning that this model cannot be accepted; the political 
economy is not the economy of the family anymore (Foucault, 2001: 218). As I 
have already presented, he offers a more complex analysis and argues that while 
the ‘politics of sovereignty’ looms in the background, a ‘politics of discipline’ 
and a ‘politics of government’ have emerged in the West, they have merged and 
become effective in the functioning of modern societies. The politics of 
sovereignty, briefly refers to the rule of the sovereign over a territory on the 
basis of his will; the politics of discipline connotes an emerging political 
interest in the individual as a subject to be regulated; finally the politics of 
government corresponds to the ruling of the society as a collectivity to be taken 
care of. Thence, while Foucault agrees with Arendt on the ‘rise of the social’, he 
would probably argue that it is not simply the infiltration of the social into the 
political but the diffusion of the political rationalities into the social. From a 
Foucauldian perspective, politics does not have a normative value. It connotes a 
domain composed of a set of power relations that produce, maintain and 
transform subjects, the epistemological, economic and socio-cultural framework 
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within which those relations operate in western societies. In the West, thence a 
distinction between the social and the political is not meaningful.  
In the Iranian context, however, Foucault makes such an ‘odd’ 
differentiation. With this, he might have attributed a relative autonomy to the 
social. He assumes that the economic-political rationality of the West was not 
present and it did not infiltrate into the social with its regulative mechanisms. 
He does not elaborate the meaning or the implication of the distinction. This 
however, he adds does not mean that the revolt, as a social phenomenon, is 
“confused, emotional, or barely self-conscious”, a rather rough implication of 
the adjective. As a total form of collective organization that negates politics (in 
its existing form), the revolution constitutes a perfectly unified collective will 
and spreads in an unprecedented and effective manner (Foucault, 1978 in Afary 
and Anderson, 2005: 221).  
In arguing that the revolt is not a proper revolution and that it operates as 
a negation of politics in Iran, Foucault seems to have a Marxist conception of 
revolution in his mind. Therefore, he writes it is a tidal wave without a military 
leadership, without a vanguard, without a party or political ideology (Foucault, 
1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 211; 221). The protestors have an 
immediate political goal, they want Shah leave. A whole nation opposes the 
Shah, his regime and his strong, well-armed military and police “with bare 
hands, without resorting to armed struggle, with a determination and a courage 
that are in the process of immobilizing the army, which, little by little, freezes 
and hesitates to fire on them” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 
211). Resisting a military force, which did not hesitate to employ violence 
against demonstrators and to kill several thousand people in earlier months, 
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with bare hands is the first feature Foucault notices and labels as a paradox of 
this movement. When two hundred thousand people come together he says, 
“recourse to violent repression seems less and less possible. The uprising a 
whole society has choked off the possibility of civil war” (Foucault, 1978 in 
Afary and Anderson, 2005: 211; 254). Foucault comes close to Walter 
Benjamin and Slavoj Žižek who argue for a divine violence to take place a total 
mobilization of people (workers) and an absolute negation of the existing 
political system would be enough.  
“Movement” is the word mostly used by Foucault while referring to the 
revolt.
118
 He does this to make the difficulty of putting the spectacle under the 
category of revolution and within the boundaries of known versions of 
collective action explicit.
119
  
                                               
118 The revolt was in the form of a continuous demonstration. He writes, “It’s the repetition of 
the demonstration…I believe the demonstration, in its very repetition, had an intense political 
meaning. The very word demonstration must be taken literally: a people were tirelessly 
demonstrating its will” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 254). 
119 It is interesting that in the Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt (1973) made the same 
observation concerning the functioning of Nazism and Stalinism and of the Mussolini regime. 
Accordingly, all of these totalitarian regimes established and presented themselves as 
movements, continuous and dynamic; they avoided any identification with a stable political 
structure such as the state. As movements international in their ambition and all-comprehensive 
in their ideological scope Bolshevik and Nazi movements, Arendt argued, faced the dilemma of 
either becoming “‘ossified’ by taking over the state machine and frozen into a form of absolute 
government” or being “limited by the borders of the territory” by transforming into national 
parties (Arendt, 1973: 389). In order to avoid stabilization and normalization, hence the gradual 
decline of the effectiveness of propaganda and mass organization, these regimes claimed to be 
initiators of a ‘permanent revolution’. The movement was defined as being above state and 
people ready to sacrifice both for the sake of its ideology. The discourse of ‘movement’ for 
Arendt is one of the important indicators of the shift in the understanding of politics. She writes, 
“one should not forget that a building can have a structure, but that a movement…can have only 
a direction, and that any form of a legal or governmental structure can be only a handicap to a 
movement which is being propelled with increasing speed in a certain direction” (Arendt, 1973: 
398). The ‘totalitarian state’ is a state in appearance only; it operates more like a shapeless, 
sinister and secret organization. Far from being monolithic structures, these organizations 
surprise their observers either by the lack of enduring source of authorities or by the co-
existence of dual authorities. Additionally, there was no established hierarchy; rather than 
operating as top-down management system a cell-like configuration was in control; no one 
except the leader had any information about the functioning of their units and its role within the 
whole system. “If there is a totalitarian personality or mentality”, Arendt (1973: 266) writes, 
“then it is possible to argue, that it is the trait of adaptability and absence of continuity”. For 
Arendt, like Foucault, a form of politicization, which presents itself as a movement and acts 
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Foucault underlines that the protest is determinate and had a very clear 
objective. It “is always based on the same thing, a sole and very precise 
thing…the departure of the shah.” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 
2005: 221) The “endlessly demonstrated rejection” of the Shah, for him not 
only is a collective action and is an expression of public right but also it is a 
performance of a religious ritual. Comparing the demonstrations to Greek 
tragedies, within which “collective ceremony and the reenactment of the 
principles of right go hand in hand” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 
2005: 254), “in the streets of Tehran”, he writes, “there was an act, a political 
and juridical act, carried out collectively within religious rituals—an act of 
deposing the sovereign” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 254).  
A second paradox Foucault assesses in the movement is the absence of 
internal conflict. He argues that no class struggle or clash of interests split the 
opposition, although this argument can be challenged with some socialist 
registers that note the formation of shuras (factory councils) from the beginning 
of 1979 as an indicator of a clash of interests between the clerical leaders and 
the workers’ movement.  
The lack of long-term objectives is the third paradox of the movement 
(Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 211). There was no specific 
political program; however, this is not an indication of weakness for Foucault. 
On the contrary, he thinks, an almost unanimous obstinate popular will could be 
formed because of the lack of a plan for government and due to the simplicity of 
the slogans (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 212). Confirming 
                                                                                                                             
accordingly, is anti-political in nature. However, from an Arendtian viewpoint this is a 
dangerous development. 
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Arendt’s observation on the movements’ dislike towards established structures 
and practices, he notes that the mullahs refused the idea of having a referendum, 
which could possibly transform the ‘collective will’ into a ‘political coalition’ 
(Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 213). In response to the demands 
when Khomeini finally proposed a referendum, he demanded it to be held only 
after Shah’s leave. The rejection of Shah was guaranteed to be total and 
immediate with the threat of a civil war if he would not leave and the threat of 
expelling from the movement any person who would possibly agree on the 
temporary preservation of the dynasty with limited powers. The proposed 
referendum, furthermore, was required to have the establishment of an ‘Islamic 
government’ as its main topic. For Foucault, this “is a way of reviving openly 
the slogan of a “strike against politics”” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and 
Anderson, 2005: 213).  
Confirming Bayat (1998)’s thesis that the Iranian Revolution lacked a 
previously constructed alternative form of institutions and relations, he contends 
that even though four out of five person declare the will for “an Islamic 
government” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 205), “nobody in 
Iran means a political regime in which the clerics would have a role of 
supervision or control” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 206). 
Arendt too takes a note of the existence of a political awareness on the issue of 
knowing what to do next in her observations on the Hungarian Revolution. The 
peculiar and important aspect of the Hungarian revolution is its ‘political’ity: 
the instant organization of councils and the already existing form and plan of an 
alternative politics. On the other hand, both of the revolutions owed their 
success (in terms of the organization of the revolutionary movement) to the 
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existing collective action mechanisms. In the Iranian case mullahs and religious 
collectivities, particularly those that worked in the task of the rebuilding Tabas 
that was hit by an earthquake; again, the workers’ unions gave the movement an 
impetus. In the Hungarian case, the councils, councils of the workers, students, 
artists etc. were the carriers of the revolt.  
Somehow romanticizing Islam and its meaning for the people in Iran, 
Foucault asserts that for these people the idea of the Islamic government is like 
a “utopia”, an “ideal”. It is “something very old and also very far into the future, 
a notion of coming back to what Islam was at the time of the Prophet, but also 
of advancing toward a luminous and distant point where it would be possible to 
renew fidelity rather than maintain obedience” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and 
Anderson, 2005: 206-207). The revival of Asr-ı Saadet (Golden Age or Era of 
Bliss), is the desire of the revolutionary people. 
Yet still, for Foucault this is not a regressive or reactionary movement. It 
is not a shrinking back in the face of modernization but a rejection of which, in 
his words, is itself an archaism (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 
195). After a visit paid to a local bazaar, Foucault takes notes of an observation 
that struck him and somehow clarified his ideas on the Iranian revolution. In the 
bazaar, 
Incredible sewing machines, high and misshapen, as can be seen in 
the advertisements of nineteenth-century newspapers, were lined up 
in the stalls. They were adorned with patterns of ivy, climbing 
plants, and budding flowers, roughly imitating old Persian 
miniatures. These unfit-for-use Western objects, under the sign of 
an obsolete Orient, all bore the inscription: “Made in South Korea” 
(Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 195). 
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It is the will for modernism, an already expired concept in Europe and has 
never been a property and the product of Europe seems to be surreal and archaic 
to Foucault. The shah unfortunately and obliviously adopted this archaic view; 
he aspired to realize an old-fashioned dream and tried to ward it by a corrupt 
and despotic system despite the dynamic and ‘modern’ forces of his own 
country. It is the “dead weight of modernity” the people in Iran is trying to lift. 
For this reason, he writes, “it is perhaps the first great insurrection against 
global systems, the form of revolt that is the most modern and the most insane” 
(Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 222).  
From Foucault’s perspective, the Iranian movement is like witnessing the 
coming back of spirit into a long-dead body and watching its resurrection. 
Hence, the title of one of the articles: Iran: The Spirit of a World without Spirit 
(Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 250-60). He reminds Marx’s 
famous statement “religion is the opium of the people” several times and argues 
that this assertion is not relevant for Islam, especially Shi’ism. For him Islam is 
not simply a religion, but an entire way of life, an adherence to a history and a 
civilization (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 241). The religion is 
a form of expression and a mode of social relations, “something that allows one 
to be listened to by others and to yearn for something with them at the same 
time as they yearn for it” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 202-
203). He presents how Shi’ism historically functioned in enabling national 
unity, maintaining political consciousness and more importantly in inciting a 
political awakening. The Shi’ite religion operated as a force that mobilizes 
common people and transforms the discontent, hatred, misery, and despair of 
thousands into a collective will. For this reason, for Foucault Islam is a form of 
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“political spirituality” that has been forgotten since the Renaissance and the 
great crisis of Christianity in the western contexts (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and 
Anderson, 2005: 209). The desire to make Islam as the foundation of social and 
political life, on the other hand, is an expression of a will to change oneself 
radically; it is a desire to renew an entire existence. This is what makes Islam 
and the revolt revolutionary (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 
255). 
In Foucault’s reading of the Iranian revolution, it is possible to assess 
enchantment felt by both the spectators and the participants. While he is 
depicting revolution, Foucault narrates the story as if a magic spell was cast and 
the Iranian people in their ecstatic moods are living a magical moment. When 
one reads Arendt’s depiction of the Hungarian revolt, for instance, one can 
sense that her language implies the breaking of a spell. She writes, “it was as 
though ideology, of whatever shade and brand, had simply been wiped out of 
existence and memory the moment the people, intellectuals and workers, 
communists and non-communists, found themselves together in the streets 
fighting for freedom” (Arendt, 1958: 27).  
For Afary and Anderson (2005), the Iranian Revolution is an event that 
constitutes a turning point for Foucault who in the late 1970s was shifting his 
emphasis from the analysis of power to the question of subject and the issue of 
ethics. Afary and Anderson (2005) argue that Foucault’s will to explore 
alternative forms of existence and relations in non-Christian eras and contexts 
led him to develop an interest in and sympathy for the Iranian Revolution. His 
“Nietzschean-Heidegerian” impulse that critiqued the mediocrity and 
spuriousness of modernity give way to an Orientalist and spiritualist reading of 
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the spectacle, the role of religion and the motives of the mullahs. The authors 
conclude that Foucault was particularly impressed with the fearless will to die 
in Shi’ite martyrdom and with the religious rituals of penitence120 (Afary and 
Anderson, 2005).  
Concerning the great role the Iranian Revolution played in Foucault’s 
theoretical-critical work some scholars challenge Afary and Anderson. A 
scholar (Keating, 1997: 194), for instance, argues that despite his lack of 
interest and knowledge in Iran before the Revolution, Foucault became 
interested because the Revolution seems to exemplify “a mode of resistance that 
had resonances throughout his work but which he had been developing as the 
necessary corollary of the conception of power that he had developed in the 
1970s”.  
Almond, again, reminds us that Foucault’s first and long encounter with 
the East did take place during his stay in Tunisia between 1966 and 1968. 
Having witnessed the Tunisian Marxist student uprising, Foucault stated that 
despite the lack of a Marxist theoretical approach he is impressed with the 
‘violence’, ‘radical intensity’ and ‘impressive momentum’ of the actions of the 
Tunisian students (Foucault, in Almond, 2007:). On this Almond (2007) writes, 
                                               
120 The religious rituals of penitence are the Shi’ite Ashura ceremonies that are held every year 
for ten days in the month of Muharram. During these ceremonies the Shiites mourn for the 
murdering of Husain in 680 AD in Kerbela and commemorate the ‘martyrs’ i.e. Husain, his 
family and his supporters by Yazid. Husain was the grandson of the prophet Muhammad and 
son of Ali the fourth Caliph (successor to the prophet) and also the prophet’s last direct male 
descendant. Ali’s immediate succession of the prophet upon his death was challenged and 
prevented by a sect of Islamic community. The controversy over the caliphate gave way to a 
clash that between Sunnis and Shiites and from the Shi’ite perspective to the illegitimate 
dominance of the Sunnis for centuries. The Husain’s death, in this sense, “sealed this 
illegitimate rule and decency. The Ashura ritual, then aims to simulate Husain’s and his 
supporters suffering and their death at Kerbela by suffering physical pain indicted by the 
participants themselves by rhythmically beating their breasts or foreheads. Bleeding because of 
the wounds, weeping and passing outs are also part of these rituals. While for the Shiites 
suffering and martyrdom are part of the belief, for the Sunnis inflicting pain and suffering to 
one’s body is not approved.  
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Whereas for their European counterparts, Marxism was simply ‘a 
better way of analyzing reality’, for the student movements 
Foucault witnessed in Tunisia it constituted ‘a kind of moral energy, 
wholly remarkable’. A Tunisian politics of the heart rather than the 
head seems to have impressed a Foucault weary of the endless 
armchair intellectualizing he had left behind in Paris (emphasis 
mine). 
 
Therefore, the ‘political spirituality’ Foucault praises in Iran, in fact, 
refers to a certain mood, a form of existence he already witnessed and admired 
in Middle East. In Iran, this mood unfolds itself in the politicization of people 
around Islam. In the Tunisian case, it was channeled through Marxism. In both 
cases, unification was impressive. As opposed to the individualist concerns of 
the West, the collectivities were formed easily. Acts were radical, intense and 
dramatic. In his search for a ‘heart’, which he assessed to be put under the 
command of the ‘head’ in the West Foucault might have attributed Islam and 
Shi’ism a primary role. His approach in some way might romanticize the 
dynamics he witnessed in Iran. Further, his knowledge about mullahs and 
Shi’ism is probably flawed. Yet still, isolating Iranian case from his general 
interest in religion or labeling him an Orientalist
121
 might obscure his general 
theoretical critique.  
Thence, while having some reservations about the argument that the 
Iranian Revolution plays a transformative role in the theorist’s intellectual route 
and that there is a “Nietzschean-Heidegerian Orientalist subtext” in his 
                                               
121 In his The New Orientalists, Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to 
Baudrillard, similar to Afary and Anderson (2005) Almond (2007) too argues that Foucault’s 
observations on Iranian Revolution are somehow shaped by Nietzsche and his sympathetic 
reading of Islam. Yet this reading, he notes, is part of Nietzsche’s critique of European 
modernity and employed for the development of a modern critique. Both Nietzsche’s and 
Foucault’s essentialization of the West, that is their Occidentalism plays effective role in their 
affective relationship with the East, and this is why theirs can be read as a peculiar form of 
Orientalism. See: Almond, Ian. 2007. The New Orientalists, Postmodern Representations of 
Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard. I. B. Tauris: London New York. 
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interpretation along with some other scholars (for instance Honig, 2008; 
Keating, 1997), I agree with the idea of reading Foucault’s views on Iran in line 
with his ethico-political concerns.  
In terms of their concentration, Foucault’s historiographies are divided in 
three periods: archaeology, genealogy and as Afary and Anderson (2005) note, 
ethics. Archeology is the term he used for his research he wants to differentiate 
from both social history, which analyzes society and from analysis of 
discourses, which like a philosophical hermeneutics attempts to interpret what 
has been said or decipher which wouldn't have been said. It deals with a set of 
discourses. Despite being in the terrain of knowledge, for Foucault discourses 
has to be analyzed as an event or as a set of events with a particular focus on 
their special effects that are not similar to, for instance, economic events, law or 
demographical change. Borrowed from Nietzsche, the genealogical approach, 
on the other hand refers to a methodology that refutes the idea of progressive 
and linear history. Genealogy conceptualizes history as a scene of power 
struggles; it looks for continuities and discontinuities in power relations, and 
traces the visible effects of such struggles. In his later works, Foucault 
announced that he had always been interested in the ‘subject’ and argued that 
knowledge, power and ethics are three axes that are being constitutive of the 
subject. Having studied the impact of knowledge and power, he shifts emphasis 
to ethics in 1980s, dealt within history of sexuality. The subject of ethics refers 
to the study of a mode of self-formation, the way we, as subjects, fashion our 
freedom and know our limits. In this endeavor, Foucault attempts to understand 
the practices one performs on oneself to produce, monitor, regulate and 
transform the self (Foucault, 1978). For him limits are inescapably part of the 
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idea and reality of freedom because the encounter with the limits creates the 
opportunity of trespassing, violating and transgressing them. The ‘limit 
experiences’, e.g. walking on the thin line between life and death, wandering 
into the domain of insanity, irrationality, pain or pleasure, in this sense, become 
important.  
In a short essay, Lives of Anonymous Men, written in 1977 as an 
introduction to a collection of stories from the early-18th-century records of 
internment of anonymous women and men, Foucault explains his attraction to 
these narratives for their vividness. “They constitute the instrument of a 
retaliation, the weapon of a hatred, an episode in a battle, the gesticulation of a 
despair or a jealousy, an entreaty of an order” (Foucault, 2000:160). In the 
misfortunes of these petty people, in their passions, loves and hatreds, he argues 
it is possible to see “something gay and ordinary in comparison with what is 
usually deemed worthy of being recounted” (Foucault, 2000:160). Their stories 
include “the most intense point of a life the point where its energy is 
concentrated…where it comes up against power, struggles with it…[and]… 
attempts to use its forces and to evade its traps.” (Foucault, 2000:162). Despite 
their mundanity “propelled by a violence, an energy, an excess expresses in 
malice, vileness, baseness, obstinacy, or ill-fortune” the lives of these people 
gave in their fellows a sort of appalling or pitiful grandeur. (Foucault, 
2000:161).  
Similarly, he was impressed with the story of Pierre Rivière, who after 
killing his mother, sister and brother in rural France in the 1830s left a memoir 
of more than a hundred pages. Foucault (1982) published a dossier on the case 
to show that when in 1830s Rivière’s case was handled by the judiciary and the 
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newly emerging discipline of psychiatry around the question of sanity. The 
memoirs revealed that there is rationality behind an insane crime. Furthermore, 
they also asserted that the frontier between rationality and madness could 
indeed be trespassed. Now, this is a challenge to the tradition of thought, which 
conceptualizes reason and violence in oppositional terms. As modern 
individuals, we should accept the fact that we find particular relief when we can 
classify a violent act, a murderous crime or a terrorist activity as an act of 
insanity, prompted by malevolency or some sort of abnormality. The difficulty 
emerges when we face the presence of a rational motive, when we are required 
to understand the rationality. We face this dilemma when we give up the 
modernist claim to or aspiration for normativity.  
When we go back to the limit experiences, we see that in his analysis of 
the Iranian case Foucault pays a particular emphasis on the protestors’ lack of 
fear in the face of violence and death as well. In an interview with Claire Brière 
and Pierre Blanchet, he expressed his surprise to find happy rather than 
terrorized people when he arrived in Iran immediately after the Black Friday, 
when a great number of people were killed by the Shah’s regime122 (Foucault, 
1979 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 257). It is also possible to sense the idea of 
‘enchantment’ in this paragraph, I have mentioned before.  
There was an absence of fear and an intensity of courage, or rather, 
the intensity that people were capable of when danger, though still 
not removed, had already been transcended. In their revolution, they 
had already transcended the danger posed by the machine-gun that 
constantly faced all of them. 
 
 
                                               
122 The Black Friday refers to the protests of September 8 in 1978. The number of killings, 
however, is not certain. For Foucault it was four thousand (Foucault, 1979 in Afary and 
Anderson, 2005: 257) but this might be an information he received from the clerics in Iran. 
Afary and Anderson (2005) notes the number of killing to be at least two hundred and fifty.  
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He was also surprised to see the long succession of festivities and 
mourning, thousands of men invoking god’s name in the streets, mullahs calling 
people to revolt and prayer and rituals of commemoration of martyrs. This was 
quite contrary to the case with Iranians he knew in Paris. He states that he was 
struck by their fear from agents of SAVAK, the secret police of Shah, for 
keeping company with left-wing people, for reading certain books, and many 
other things (Foucault, 1979 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 256-257). What did 
make the prior so brave and the latter so timid? The difference in their religious 
beliefs, degree of religiosity or their being in different geographical location, 
socio-political contexts? Although it is not possible to find an explanation on 
this, we can assume that the docility Foucault witnessed in western contexts was 
what caused his fascination with the Iranian protestors. Does this, however, 
mean that he exalts violence? Considering the impasse he attributes to Kantian 
philosophy, is it possible to reason that he prefers violence/destruction to 
order/reason?  
To these questions, many including Afary and Anderson (2005) respond 
positively. This is because, Honig (2008) argues they identify Foucault’s notion 
of political spirituality with premodernity, his disdain for judicial order, and 
praise for willingness to risk life would mean as part of his anti-westernism and 
his personal interests. In my opinion, however, reading Foucault’s interest in 
limit experiences as a glorification of violence, pain and death or arguing that 
he admires Shi’ites for their ‘sadomasochistic’ tendencies would be 
reductionist. Rather, one can claim that he celebrates the overcoming of the fear 
by the Iranian people, their courage to stand up against the pain, violence and 
death the Shah’s military and police forces inflict upon them. It is not the will to 
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violence but the will to resist violence, the rejection of docility and servitude he 
sees as a radical element.  
The impulse by which a single individual, a group, a minority, or an 
entire people says, `I will no longer obey’, and throws the risk of 
their life in the face of an authority they consider unjust seems to 
me to be some- thing irreducible … People do revolt; that is a fact, 
and that is how subjectivity (not that of great men, but that of 
anyone) is brought into history, breathing life into it (Foucault, 1979 
in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 263) . 
 
 
It is the stubborn rejection of the regime by a collective and their hope for 
the coming of a new order.
123
 It is like the waiting for the ‘divine violence’ both 
Benjamin and Žižek called for a revolution to take place in the third chapter. He 
writes, 
Around 90 percent of the Iranians are Shi’ites. They await the return 
of the Twelfth Imam, who will create the reign of the true order of 
Islam in earth. While this creed does not announce each day that the 
great event will occur tomorrow, neither does it accept indefinitely 
all the misery of the world. When I met Ayatollah Shariatmadari (he 
is undoubtedly the highest spiritual authority in Iran today), one of 
the first sentences he uttered to me was: ‘We are waiting for the 
Mahdi, but each day we fight for a good government.’ Shi’ism, in 
the face of the established powers, arms the faithful with an 
unremitting restlessness. It breathes into them an ardor wherein the 
political and the religious lie side by side (Foucault, 1978 in Afary 
and Anderson, 2005: 201). 
 
 
To the question that can be possibly directed to the mullahs which asks 
whether Islam by calling the faithful to battle against the Shah and the 
Americans and regularly commemorating the martyrs, is profoundly fascinated 
with death or not or, again, is it more focused on death than life, on martyrdom 
than on victory Foucault himself provides a response:  
 
                                               
123 This point was underlined by Foucault in his open letter published in April 1979 in Le 
Nouvel Observateur addressing Mehdi Bazargan, who was a leader of the National Front, a 
coalition of secular and religious factions and became the Prime Minister until 1979 February.  
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What preoccupies you, you Westerners, is death. You ask her to 
detach you from life, and she teaches you how to give up. As for us, 
we care about the dead, because they attach us to life. We hold out 
our hands to them in order for them to link us to the permanent 
obligation of justice. They speak to us of right and of the struggle 
that is necessary for right to triumph (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and 
Anderson, 2005: 201).  
 
 
  “Each one staked his life and his death!” (Foucault, 1979 in Afary and 
Anderson, 2005: 265), he writes. This, he repeats several times. Even in his 
writings when he was disappointed with the establishment of the government of 
mullahs especially the quick replacement of the violence of the Shah’s regime 
with the violence of Ayatollah, he reminds himself, the mullahs and the readers 
the revolutionary aspect of the event. Foucault was certainly disappointed with 
the ending of the Revolution. Upon witnessing the summary trials and the hasty 
executions of oppositions and penned a public letter addressing Mehdi 
Bazargan, who was a leader in the revolutionary movement and became Prime 
Minister for a couple of months after the foundation of the Islamic government. 
In the letter, he expressed his complaints about the violence of the newly 
founded Ayatollah regime. He wrote “a spiritual dimension, you said, pervaded 
the revolt of a people where each one risked everything for an entirely different 
world…It was not the desire to be ruled by a “government of mullahs” 
(Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 261). Nevertheless, as he had 
asserted before, nobody knew what he or she wanted except his or her strong 
will to Shah’s leave.  
Well then, we might ask, how is it possible to understand the revolution? 
Why there is a need to reflect on the meaning, role and the possibility of 
revolution? Is there a revolution anymore? What role could the intellectual play 
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in the face of revolution? How can s/he narrate about it? What should be the 
purpose of such praxis? What kind of a judgment can s/he pass? On what 
grounds one should praise and approve an upheaval? Is it possible to make a 
distinction, as Arendt did, between a good and bad revolution? What kind of a 
revolution do we want? Finally, as Foucault reminds, is it really so desirable, 
the revolution? These are questions, the answers of which are hard to find 
within this essay, some of them however seem to be on both Arendt’s and 
Foucault’s minds when they were witnessing and reflecting on political 
developments. The following then is an attempt to review their idea on the role 
of the intellectual as a participator and interpreter of political events.  
  
8.2. What is Revolution? Is it Useless to Revolt? Marking the Contours of 
the Position of Ambivalence 
 
The age of revolution has constituted a gigantic effort to acclimate 
uprisings within a rational and controllable history… By thus 
repatriating revolt into the discourse of revolution, it was said, the 
uprising would appear in all its truth and continue to its true 
conclusion. This was a marvelous promise. Some will say that the 
uprising thus found itself colonized by realpolitik. Others will say 
that the dimension of a rational history was opened to it. I prefer the 
question that Horkheimer used to ask, a naïve question, and a little 
feverish: “But is it really so desirable, this revolution?”(Foucault, 
1979 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 264). 
 
 
At the beginning of chapter eight I have asserted that the experience of 
the French Revolution has given a dual meaning to the concept of revolution; it 
is conceptualized both as a progressive and destructive force. It was violent, 
hence fearsome. It was emancipating, hence hopeful. Within this framework, 
however, I have argued that the fear of violence inflicted many of 
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Enlightenment thinkers’ views on revolution and even at their most radical 
moments, they do ponder on the possibility of overcoming revolution. The need 
for an order and the emphasis on reason outweighed the will to change and 
liberty from constraints. We have seen that this was a problematic Arendt 
addresses in her work too. She attempted to overcome the problem of violence 
and the fear by assessing the mistakes in revolutionary tradition and to find a 
‘best practice’, an example of ‘good’ revolution. Her enterprise is characterized 
with the effort of dissociating the link between revolution and violence by 
pointing out the distortions made in the conception of political action. We have 
seen the conceptualization of action within the framework of labor and work 
albeit in different ways end up with violence. A second point concerns the 
distinction she has drawn between liberation and freedom.  
When in 1980s Foucault gave seminars on Kant’s writings on 
Enlightenment, this aroused a shock on the side of many who viewed Foucault’s 
works to be contrary and hostile to Kantian philosophy. In these seminars, 
Foucault interrogated the meaning of Enlightenment, its relation with revolution 
and the role of the intellectual and even argued that his work can be located 
within the Kantian tradition. In these seminars, he noted the perplexity caused 
by the French Revolution and asserted the spectacle gave way to an impasse for 
the philosophers. The perplexity unfolds itself as the problem of Reason and 
Revolution with which the Kantian philosophy has to deal in the following 
centuries. He (Foucault, 2007: 94) writes, 
The question of the Aufklärung, or of reason, as a historical problem 
has in a more or less occult way traversed all philosophical thought 
from Kant until now. The flip side of the actuality that Kant 
encountered was the Revolution: the Revolution both as an event, as 
rupture and upheaval in history, as a failure, also as a value, as the 
267 
 
sign of a predisposition that operates in history and in the progress 
of the human species.  
 
 
Despite his sympathy towards the French Revolution, Kant faced the 
paradox of the will to establish and to destruct of an order. Arendt too addresses 
this paradox when she discusses the question of the foundation of an order. The 
authority and the legitimacy of a political order cannot be sustained with 
reference to transcendental sources anymore; but it should be formulated in 
such a way that can provide a ground for a valid and stable structure to prevent 
and sustain revolution. Having equated revolutionary spirit with the will for 
freedom Arendt like Kant faced the challenge of stabilizing that ‘spirit’ without 
domesticating or alienating it within a political order. This is an impasse, 
Foucault argues and it led Kant to limit his critical project with epistemological 
realm that is the search for the conditions of truth, thereby losing its political 
relevance. For Foucault (2007: 94), following this line a tradition of philosophy, 
the “analytic of truth” defined and developed from the nineteenth century on 
and has looked for the conditions and possibilities of reaching true knowledge.  
However, there is another kind of critical interrogation that can be traced 
from the Kantian thinking. This critical tradition, which Foucault names as the 
“ontology of the present” asks for the meaning of the present. It does not dwell 
into the problem of knowledge, but to that of the relations of power. It does not 
take the form of an investigation into legitimacy, but as something he calls an 
examination of “eventualization” (evenementialisation) (Foucault, 2007: 59). It 
tries to locate the subject in question within a historical context, aims to 
understand the conditions that produced that particular context and looks for the 
possibilities of transformation. What differentiates the ‘ontology of the present’ 
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from an ‘analytics of truth’ is the awareness of being constituted by the history 
and the attitude, which permanently questions one’s relationship with oneself, 
with others and with authority. It is this form of philosophy, which runs from 
Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber and so 
on Foucault puts himself within.  
Though being linked with Enlightenment and Revolution, he takes note 
that this certain mode of thinking; the critical attitude emerged in the fifteenth 
century in the form of suspicion. The suspicion did not mean a total negation of 
a domain of knowledge or denial of a normative universe, however. It was 
limited to specific practices where one can grasp the possibility and desirability 
of change. In his Governmentality lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault 
points out that a process that was concerned with “subjugating individuals in the 
very reality of a social practice by mechanisms of power that appeal to truth” 
expanded since the sixteenth century in Europe.  
Within this context, as I have already presented in chapter eight, 
Foucault argues that productive rather than restrictive forms of power have 
become the hallmark of Enlightenment. Traditional, visible and violent forms of 
power were abandoned and replaced by more subtle “technologies of 
subjection”, which are more effective increasingly meshed, minute, and 
disciplinary than brute punishment. Thence, one can say that the revolutionary 
violence, feared by the modern philosophers was eliminated with the 
establishment of the reign of reason. In Foucault’s view, the Enlightenment, 
albeit discovering the liberties and despite its emancipatory claims invented the 
disciplines (Foucault, 1977a, 222; Afary and Anderson, 2005: 15). Again, he 
contends, unlike the claims of modern philosophy, knowledge has been linked 
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to power by disciplines such as psychiatry or medicine and they operate on lives 
of individuals with reference to scientific truths. The modern individual is 
imagined, produced, disciplined and reproduced via a web of institutions of 
normalizations.
124
 The body has become the site of the functioning of these 
power and knowledge mechanisms.  
Complementing this analysis (and in line with the famous argument that 
can be simply put as the inevitability of resistance in the presence of power), 
Foucault points out that a movement of critique by “which the subject gives 
itself a right to question the truth concerning its power effects and to question 
power about its discourses of truth” emerged in western societies (Foucault, 
2007: 47). This form of critique historically became effective in three domains: 
a biblical critique conducted the search for the truth in scripture in the domain 
of religion. At the level of government, critique was carried out for the 
restriction upon the sovereign powers, and it led to the question of the limits of 
the right to govern. Within the domain of authority, finally, there appeared a 
resistance to the authority’s claim to truth (Foucault, 2007: 45-47). This attitude 
was occupied with the question ‘how not to be governed like that?’ It was in the 
form of a will not to be governed by those rules, by that particular ruler or 
government. Reformulating Kant’s term “voluntary servitude”125 used in the 
definition of Enlightenment, Foucault names his critique as an ‘art of voluntary 
inservitude’ (Foucault, 2007: 47). In this sense, this historico-political attitude 
                                               
124 “In Madness and Civilization, Foucault (1961) argued that in Western Europe at the time of 
the Renaissance, madness was a mundane fact of life and was even endowed with a certain 
respect” madness a gate to imagination and even truth as opposed to reason. “Beginning with 
the seventeenth century, the insane were incarcerated, tortured, and tormented. During and after 
the French Revolution, Foucault argued, the physical torment lessened but was replaced with a 
psychological one” (Afary and Anderson, 2005: 22). 
125 It has been also noted that the notion of “voluntary servitude” was used by Etienne de La 
Boétie’s political tract of 1550, Le Discours de la Servitude Volontaire will. 
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was not absolutist but particular, not emancipatory but transgressive; it was not 
even revolutionary but experimental. It attempted to challenge the borders, 
existing limits, norms and rules. It could work as a reformative or 
transformative force or might give way to the trespassing or destruction of the 
borders, that is with a revolution.  
For Foucault ‘revolution’ signifies an event, which can be called as 
Enstehung (emergence) within the framework of Foucault’s Nietzsche inspired 
historical analysis. In his essay (1977) Nietzsche, Genealogy, History while 
presenting the contours of his genealogy Foucault locates it as opposed to 
traditional historiography and challenges the latter’s reference to the concepts of 
rationality, causality and linearity. Accordingly, the traditional/modern history 
puts an emphasis on an arche (origin) and a telos (end and aim) in explaining 
events and “attempts to capture the exact essence of things, their purest 
possibilities, and their carefully protected identities… ‘that which was already 
there’” (Foucault & Rabinow, 1984: 78). The genealogical approach, on the 
other hand, is defined as the study of Herkunft (descent) and Enstehung 
(emergence).  
From a rather organist perspective of history in Arendt’s terms, the 
analysis of Herkunft involves a consideration of race or social type; but rather 
than looking for ‘essential’ features of a particular identity, Herkunft “seeks the 
subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in them 
to form a network that is difficult to unravel. Far from being a category of 
resemblance, this origin allows the sorting out of different traits” (Foucault, 
1977: 148). Hence, as opposed to the assumptions of continuity within history, 
to the presumption that it rises on solid grounds and progresses towards the 
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fulfillment of an end at the end, Foucault argues that genealogy aims to disturb 
“what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought 
unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself” 
(Foucault, 1977: 148). Within this scheme, Enstehung designates a place of 
confrontation, a non-common space where the endless play of dominations 
takes place (Foucault, 1977: 150). He writes, “the domination of certain men 
over others leads to the differentiation of values” for instance “class domination 
generates the idea of liberty; and the forceful appropriation of things necessary 
to survival and the imposition of a duration not intrinsic to them account for the 
origin of logic” (Foucault, 1977: 151). This relationship of domination is 
continuous, like an unending wrestling its rounds are won by a party, then by 
some else and the marks of the struggle can be traced in languages, things and 
even on bodies.  
Revolution, in this sense, is an event, which opens the possibility of 
challenging the domination of certain men over others. It designates the time 
when confrontation of forces become explicit, intense, and somehow equal. 
Revolution operates as the means whereby new forms of subjectivities are 
introduced into history. Resembling Walter Benjamin who argues that it is not 
possible to eschew from violence in revolutionary moments and in fact, 
violence is inscribed in any worldly law and political order, Foucault thinks that 
it is wrong to search for the possibility of non-violence. He writes (1977: 151) 
Following traditional beliefs, it would be false to think that total war 
exhausts itself in its own contradictions and ends by renouncing 
violence and submitting to civil laws. On the contrary, the law is a 
calculated and relentless pleasure, delight in the promised blood, 
which permits the perpetual instigation of new dominations and the 
staging of meticulously repeated scenes of violence. 
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In this sense, Foucault seems to be immune to the fear from violence, 
which inflicts the thoughts of Enlightenment philosophers like Kant and Hegel 
and their paradoxical views on revolution. He is not a fan or an ardent supporter 
of order per se. It is not possible to argue that for him freedom is experienced in 
a domain, secured by borders or walls or among peers who were linked to each 
other with the ropes of politics as it is the case for Arendt. Quite the contrary, 
for him ‘freedom’ is an experiment of challenging, pushing these limits, 
trespassing borders or teasing or seducing the border patrols. This will to resist, 
the attempt to push or pull, to bend or break the rules, boundaries and the claim 
to an absolute truth, a totality is what secures the continuity of human life.  
If societies persist and survive, that is to say if power in these 
societies is not “absolutely absolute,” it is because behind all the 
consent and the coercion, beyond the threats, the violence, and the 
persuasion, there is the possibility of this moment where life cannot 
be exchanged, where power becomes powerless, and where, in front 
of the gallows and the machine guns, men rise up (Foucault, 1978 in 
Afary and Anderson, 2005: 263-4). 
 
 
Furthermore, this moment of revolt, when a lone man, a group, a 
minority, or an entire people stand up and say, “‘I will no longer obey’ and are 
willing to risk their lives in the face of a power that they believe to be unjust” is 
‘irreducible’. “No power is capable of making it absolutely impossible. The 
moment of revolution, in that sense, is the intensification of power relations, a 
scratch Warsaw will always have its ghetto in revolt and its sewers populated 
with insurgents” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 263). 
For this reason, Foucault does not seem to be concerned with the 
enterprise of judging the revolution. He does not respond to the question of 
whether a certain revolt is progressive or whether as a form of resistance it is 
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emancipating or not. Also, rather than determining “what part of the Revolution 
should be retained and set up as a model”, he says the task of the 
philosopher/historian/intellectual  
is to know what is to be done with that will to revolution, that 
‘enthusiasm’ for the Revolution, which is quite different from the 
revolutionary enterprise itself. “What is the Aufklärung?” and 
“What to do with the will for revolution?” together define the field 
of philosophical questioning that is concerned with what we are in 
our present (Foucault, 2007: 94). 
 
 
When Kant addresses the questions “What is Enlightenment?” (1784) and 
“What is Revolution” (1798) his response exemplify the type of philosophy 
Foucault labels as ‘ontology of the present’ I have mentioned before. To the 
question, whether the French Revolution is a sign of progress or not Kant 
responded differently than expected. He says, “it matters little…if the 
revolution of a people full of spirit that we have seen occur in our 
day…succeeds or fails, it matters little if it accumulates misery and atrocity, if it 
accumulates them to the point where a sensible man who would do it over again 
with the hope of bringing it to fruition would never consider, though, trying it 
out at this price” (Kant, in Foucault, 2007: 90). Kant’s appreciation of the 
enthusiasm and of the reviving spirit, which emerged with Revolution, implies a 
subjective position. It denotes a preoccupation with the specificities of the 
present as opposed to ahistorical universals and as part of a larger community.  
In ‘What is Critique?’ Foucault (1978:387) says, “we must not forget that 
this is a newspaper article.” This is significant for it refers to a moment when 
Kant, the philosopher takes off his robe sewed for grand tasks, cares for a 
current phenomenon and speaks to the public via a newspaper in order to say 
something that is for him philosophically and politically interesting. The 
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question Kant asks himself - revolves around understanding his relationship 
with the present, and it is different from the question of how one belongs to a 
doctrine or tradition. This is not a search for universal categories but for an 
immediate environment, context and group, and an idea of us. Foucault argues 
that the philosopher thus confronts the question of how he belongs to this ‘us’. 
This point is important for Foucault in terms of his proposition on the role of 
intellectual.  
Secondly, ever since the French Revolution, he argues, “the intellectual 
has played the role of a prophet, a foreteller of the future society. In other 
words, the intellectual was one whose responsibility was to deal with general 
and universal principles for all of humanity” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and 
Anderson, 2005:184). However, during the French Revolution, at that particular 
instant Kant did not engage with such concerns. His main concern was to 
understand the present, to comprehend what was going on and to share the 
whole experience. For him, as an intellectual, it is not possible to write history 
or predict the future. He defines his ethics as “antistrategic” (Foucault, 1978 in 
Afary and Anderson, 2005: 267) which cannot be reduced to the question of 
political success. A strategist is one who takes into account the importance of a 
“particular death, a particular cry, a particular uprising…in relation to the great 
necessity of the whole”, and also calculates the importance of that particular 
event to herself/himself with reference to a general principle. This attitude, he 
argues, characterizes his position vis-à-vis that particular person rather than his 
identity as a politician, a historian, a revolutionary, or someone who supports 
the Shah or the Ayatollah. He asserts his “theoretical morality” lies in 
opposition and argues that his “is ‘antistrategic’... [it is]…respectful when 
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singularity rises up, and intransigent when power infringes on the universal”. As 
an intellectual, he says, “I would like to try to grasp what is happening right 
now, because these days nothing is finished, and the dice are still being rolled. It 
is perhaps this that is the work of a journalist, but it is true that I am nothing but 
a neophyte” (Foucault, 1978 in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 220).  
 A while ago, I have argued that ’68 events are significant for Foucault 
and other theorists for they made them to think about the relationship between 
theory and practice and the role of the intellectual. In an interview with Gilles 
Deleuze, Foucault argued  
political involvement of the intellectual was traditionally the 
product of two different aspects of his activity: his position as an 
intellectual in bourgeois society, in the system of capitalist 
production and within the ideology it produces or imposes (his 
exploitation, poverty, rejection, persecution, the accusations of 
subversive activity, immorality, etc); and his proper discourse to the 
extent that it revealed a particular truth, that it disclosed political 
relationships where they were unsuspected. These two forms of 
politicization did not exclude each other, but, being of a different 
order, neither did they coincide (Foucault & Deleuze, 1977a: 207). 
 
 
While these two positions were fused at certain historical instances such 
as “after 1848, after the Commune, after 1940” once the new system is 
established the intellectual was sent to exile, rejected by the system and stayed 
somehow outside of the conventional power relations again. In the 1968 
upheavals, Foucault argues, “the intellectual discovered that the masses no 
longer need him to gain knowledge.” The masses had their own notion of truth, 
their opinions and political judgments even “far better than” the intellectual and 
“they are certainly capable of expressing themselves” (Foucault & Deleuze, 
1977a: 207). This transformation of the role of the intellectual, her conception 
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at public level is also due to the transformations, as he presents in his works, in 
the establishment and the functioning of power relations within modern 
societies. As I have already shown, modern forms of power denote diffused, 
enmeshed and complex form of relations produced and implemented in every 
type of relations, which can be transferred to the political rationality as a 
governing mentality in case of a need. The economic rationality with concepts 
like efficiency, effectiveness has been adopted by the political discourse easily 
in the last thirty years. Within this context, every individual and the intellectual 
become one of the active agents of the system engendering its reproduction and 
transformation. For this reason, she cannot place herself/himself “somewhat 
ahead and to the side’ in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity” 
(Foucault & Deleuze, 1977a: 207). Her role becomes now “ to struggle against 
the forms of power that transform her/him into its object and instrument in the 
sphere of ‘knowledge’, ‘truth’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘discourse’” (Foucault & 
Deleuze, 1977a: 207). The struggle and the role of the intellectual, Foucault 
asserts, must be ‘local’, ‘regional and in the form of ‘resistance’ (not 
‘universal’, ‘total’ and ‘revolutionary’).  
Foucault’s rejection of the traditional role of the intellectual as an 
enlightening and guiding subject is something Arendt would reject too. As we 
have seen in the previous chapters, she has a dislike towards the Platonic 
philosophy and the idea of the philosopher-king that rules over the city with an 
absolutist and mechanistic view. This being so, she has also directed criticisms 
towards the modern conception of history, theory and politics, problems in her 
view are exemplified in the actors’ experience of the French Revolution and in 
the theorists’’ interpretation of the event. This perspective understands history 
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as a process that imitates the nature’s primarily cyclical, rotating, ever-recurring 
movement. The paradoxical development here is that the conviction that 
necessity is inherent in the history survived when a rectilinear understanding 
emerged. The rectilinear conception does not require an eventual revolving back 
to a previous point but always foresees a move and even progress towards an 
unknown future. According to Arendt, this idea of historical necessity perplexed 
the minds of theorists since the beginning of the nineteenth century but it was 
formulated with the French Revolution and consolidated with the October 
Revolution. Oddly, she argues, both theorists and revolutionaries have come to 
believe that the ‘History’ not their actions played role in the development and 
proceeding of the events. Such a conception has given way false attributions 
that might be evaluated as unearthly belief. ‘Irresistibility’, in this sense, is one 
of the attributions Arendt finds problematic in revolutionary discourse. She 
assesses “various metaphors in which the revolution is seen as not the work of 
men but as an irresistible process, the metaphors of stream and torrent and 
current” in the discussions of the actors (Arendt, 1963: 42). Such a conception, 
visibly displayed in the French revolution, in the absence of a factor that could 
stabilize the events presented the uprising as a natural destructive force whereas 
in reality it turned into a violent spectacle. She (1963: 42) writes, 
for the mighty current of revolution, in the words of Robespierre, 
was constantly accelerated by the ‘crimes of tyranny’, on the one 
side, by the ‘progress of liberty’, on the other, which inevitably 
provoked each other, so that movement and counter movement 
neither balanced nor checked nor arrested each other, but in a 
mysterious way seemed to add up to one stream of ‘progressing 
violence’, flowing in the same direction with an ever-increasing 
rapidity.” 
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‘Spectacle’, then, becomes an important term to describe the event and 
the phenomenon of revolution. It denotes the fact that the agents did not see 
themselves as actors, that they had no control over the course of natural events. 
It also points out the fallacy of the new type of philosophy that understands the 
human realm from standpoint of the ‘spectator’ who derived from the French 
Revolution the lesson more than the actor and believed that the things that took 
place are required by historical necessity or that Napoleon Bonaparte was 
“destiny” (Arendt, 1963: 43). Arendt seems to have the Hegelian-Marxist 
philosophical response in her mind while penning her ideas on the spectator, 
which epitomizes the problematic attitude that ontologizes the realm of human 
realms as History, attributing the philosopher the role of revealing the Truth of a 
certain event and neglecting the importance of actor and action within that 
event. For Hegel, she thinks, the task of the philosophy was to distinguish the 
contingent, which is meaningless from the necessary since the latter reveals the 
absolute and truth in history (Arendt, 1963; Villa, 1996: 67). The philosophical 
spectator, when looking at the events assumes that there is a rationally 
necessary progress towards freedom. This progress, like a flood, sweeps 
everything that stands on its way, and like the Titan Saturn, it devours its own 
children. The revolution is conceived as if an irresistible, irreversible and 
uncontrollable force, both the energy it reveals and the tragedy it brings are 
received with awe and amazement by the philosophers. Such a view minimizes 
both the role of actor and the spectator, and their capability and responsibility of 
taking one-step back from the current to reflect upon the courses of events.  
Nonetheless, we know that Kant too had a spectatorial account of the 
French Revolution when he expressed his enthusiastic response to the French 
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Revolution. We know that he argued that the event was as a clear sign of a 
moral disposition in humankind in the Contest of Faculties. He further argued 
that violence could be a vehicle for progress in the Idea for a Universal History 
even though such a statement conflicts with his philosophical perspective that 
forbids any kind of revolt. For Foucault, we have seen, such a conflict is not a 
problem. In fact, he feels and underlines an affinity with Kant who was 
perplexed in the face of the French Revolution, affirms his enthusiasm for there 
is an irreducible character of the will to provoke existing power mechanisms 
and for the magical impact of the events on the ones who are witnessing its 
taking place. Foucault chose to focus on the revolutionary moment rather than 
its ends or means.  
The feeling of enthusiasm and the appreciation of the revolutionary 
spirit is something present in Arendt as well. She considers revolutions as 
events when political action can be seen in its true form. In fact, she has a 
conception of a ‘spectator’ too; this she developed in her late life in the lectures 
on Kant’s political philosophy given at New School for Social Research in 1970 
and in the uncompleted section Judging in the Life of the Mind (Vita 
Contemplativa). 
The need to turn the shift to the process of thinking is due to assessment 
that one of the most tragic problems in modernity (among the rise of the social, 
the loss of the meaning of freedom, plurality and action, dominance of scientific 
thinking) is giving up the faculty of ‘thinking’ i.e. critical engagement with the 
given form of truths (norms, ideologies) and forming of opinions. She 
particularly underlines the importance of thinking in Eichmann in Jerusalem, 
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the book she wrote after following Eichmann trial in Israel in 1963.
126
 In the 
Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt had argued that the atrocities of the Nazi 
regime could only be understood with a notion of ‘radical evil’, which denotes 
the adoption of evil as a policy. Evil as a policy aimed at making human life 
superfluous in a systematic manner. Then in 1963, when she confronted 
Eichmann, who she envisaged to be a person with terrifying and demonic 
qualities yet turned out to be a quite ordinary man, she changed her mind. She 
wrote that “the deeds were monstrous, but the doer ... was quite ordinary, 
commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous” (Arendt, 1981: 4). She was 
also surprised when Eichmann stated that he had lived his life according to the 
Kantian moral imperative (Arendt, 1994a), which turned out to be reformulation 
of the categorical imperative as “act in such a way that the Führer, if he knew 
your action, would approve it” (Arendt, 1994a:136).127 Having studied 
Eichmann’s past as well as his behaviors and speeches during the trial she 
decided that the only specific characteristic one could detect in him is 
“something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but a curious, quite authentic 
inability to think”. In a letter, to her old-friend Gershom Scholem128 she 
(Arendt, 1978: 250) also writes,  
                                               
126 Adolf Eichmann was one of the officers under the command of Himmler who was 
responsible with and participated in the organization of the deportations and evacuations of 
Jews and bringing them to the extermination camps to send them to death. After being captured 
in Argentina, he was brought to Israel (which was a controversial issue in terms of international 
jurisdiction rules) and was tried with the accusation of crimes against the Jewish people, against 
humanity, and of war crimes. For more information, see Arendt, Hannah. 1994a. Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Penguen Classics.  
127 Facing Eichmann, Arendt is confronted with the specificity of the general claim she first 
made in Origins in Totalitarianism (1951):the terror of radical evil and total domination is 
possible through the perversion of the symbolic dimension of the Law, that is, a human being 
becomes its embodiment, its sovereign will: “In Kant's philosophy, that source [of the law] was 
practical reason; in Eichmann's household use of him, it was the will of the Fuhrer” (1963, 137) 
128Gershom Sholem charged Arendt for being a self-hating Jew and ended his friendship with 
her after the publication of Eichmann Book. According to him, Arendt’s depiction of the trial as 
an international show, her aestheticization of Nazi crimes with her notion of ‘banality of evil’ 
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“I changed my mind and no longer speak of ‘radical evil’.... It is 
indeed my opinion that evil is never ‘radical’, that it is only 
extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor demonic dimension. 
It can overgrow and lay waste to the whole world precisely because 
it spreads like a fungus on the surface. It is ‘thought-defying’, as I 
have said, because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the 
roots, and the moment it concerns itself with evil it is frustrated, 
because there is nothing. That is its ‘banality’. Only the good has 
depth and can be radical”129 
 
 
Therefore, watching the expansion of the epidemic of thoughtlessness, 
the inability to think
130
 and assessing its relation with evil-doing Arendt comes 
to the decision to revive the link between politics and philosophy and attempts 
to make philosophy a politically relevant activity. If it is possible to argue that 
Foucault’s motive was to strip the intellectual of the assumed ‘privileges’ and 
‘responsibilities’ as a servant of History, Arendt’s aim is to provide everyone 
with the necessary equipment so that they can act and judge responsibly and as 
the agents of history. We already know that her conception differs from the 
traditional understanding of history and in some senses overlaps with Foucault’s 
approach but her aspiration includes normative elements. 
                                                                                                                             
and her remarks that accused Jewish organizations and high-class Jews for collaborating with 
the Nazis on the provision of the names of lower-class Jews in order to escape the country.  
129 As one scholar (Assy, 1998) notes with ‘banality’ Arendt does not mean ‘commonalty’. The 
idea of banality does not imply that the evil itself is trivial or common to everybody. On this, at 
a conference as a response to a question from the audience Arendt says, “You say that I said 
there is an Eichmann in each one of us. Oh no! There is none in you and none in me! This 
doesn’t mean that there are not quite a number of Eichmanns. But they look really quite 
different. I always hated this notion of ‘Eichmann in each one of us’. This is simply not true. 
This would be as untrue as the opposite that Eichmann is in nobody”. Hannah Arendt. 1979. On 
Hannah Arendt. In Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World, edited by Melvy A. Hill: 
308. See, Assy, Bethania. 1998. Eichmann, the Banality of Evil, and Thinking in Arendt’s 
Thought, Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Boston: Massachusetts.  
130 For Arendt “Inability to think is not stupidity; it can be found in highly intelligent people, 
and wickedness is hardly its cause, if only because thoughtlessness as well as stupidity are much 
more frequent phenomena than wickedness. The trouble is precisely that no wicked heart, a 
relatively rare phenomenon, is necessary to cause great evil. Hence, in Kantian terms, one 
would need philosophy, the exercise of reason as the faculty of thought, to prevent evil” See 
Arendt, Hannah. 2005. Responsibility and Judgment. Random House, Inc.  
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In Human Condition, where Arendt depicts action as if it is a theatrical 
performance in terms of its heroicness, excellence, she asserts that the 
spectators too are substantive elements of any performance. It is not the actors, 
who are absorbed by their immediate environment and within the sequence of 
their actions, but the spectators, who with a broader perspective and vision can 
reflect in a disinterested manner. Actors, with their capacity for novelty, for new 
beginnings, also need spectators to make their actions communicable by talking 
about them, judging them in terms of their excellence and ultimately telling 
stories about them (Arendt, 1998; Kristeva, 2001). The spectators enable 
remembrance and meaning, which is a different phenomenon than truth or 
knowledge. Meaning requires a spatial and historical context and a subject who 
attributes certain qualities to the matter based on ‘her/his’ historical background 
and subjective judgement. 
The judgment of the spectator “does not tell one how to act” (Arendt, 
1992: 44). On this point, Arendt goes to Kant and reformulates his judgment of 
taste, debated in his Third Critique to suggest thinking as a historically situated 
and politically relevant praxis. Belonging to the domain of aesthetics, taste 
reveals one’s opinion with a statement like “this painting is beautiful” or “that 
sculpture is ugly” and denotes a subjective partiality that does not subsume the 
‘particular’ under the category of ‘universal’. Furthermore, taste can be shared 
with others. It is communicable and plural and thus enables to think with an 
‘enlarged mentality’ by which she means the ability to consider others’ 
perspectives and imagine their opinions; in her words “training one’s 
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imagination to go visiting” (Arendt, 1992: 43).131 If Eichmann had thought 
about his actions, the impact of such actions on other people’s lives, if he had 
conducted a dialogue with himself to think thoroughly about the things he had 
been doing, he would not commit those crimes or at least would be aware of the 
nature and scope of his actions. Conceptualizing thinking as a dialogue with 
oneself, Arendt (1990: 440; 1981) reminds Socrates’ answer. One does not need 
to ask others why one should not kill even under the condition where nobody 
could see you. For her, the other voice in you would tell you that it is because 
by committing murder you would deliver yourself to the company of a murderer 
as long as you live and no one wants the company of a murderer.
132
  
Based on this formulation, we can say that the stage that is the political 
domain, the actor and the spectator constitutes fundamental elements of politics. 
The spectator’s capacity to judge the events contribute to the revelation of 
meaning of an act or event to be shared and discussed with the others. The 
spectator also engenders remembrance that is history what makes human life 
humane. The critic, the narrator, or the spectator is not a different person than 
the actor. “It sits in every actor” (Arendt 1992, 63): spectatorship does not 
denote another person, but simply a different mode of relating to, or being in the 
world.  
 
 
                                               
131 With this reformulation one scholar argues, “communicability… becomes the true compact 
of mankind …not the social contract, which is an idea of reason that still requires external 
enforcement” (Necula, 2008: 30).  
132 This is a controversial argument. One can question the presence of a voice, which tells one 
“thou shall not kill” where murder is not defined as a crime by the society and not transmitted to 
the individual as an evil one should refrain from. The discussion of this statement is beyond of 
the scope of this essay, however.  
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Conclusion:  
 
 Up until now, I have debated the problem of revolution. In this 
enterprise, my primary aim was to understand its relation with violence in the 
works of Arendt and Foucault. I have tried to juxtapose both theorists’ views 
with the political tradition as well so that I can present their challenges, and 
differences. 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed Arendt’s engagement with the 
phenomenon of revolution to rescue it from its equation with violence. Upon 
presenting the distortions made in the meaning of action and political order she 
introduced a distinction between liberation, breaking free from the present 
domination and freedom, the establishment of a new political order that sustains 
plurality and free action. From an Arendtian perspective, the French Revolution 
succeeded the process of liberation yet failed in the successful foundation of a 
political order. The American Revolution was successful in both terms but that 
too lost its political character after the foundation of Republic.  
From an Arendtian perspective, one can argue the Iranian Revolution is 
a movement of liberation; it passed the criteria of a collective action, coming 
together for the purpose of overthrowing a dictatorship and acting on it. 
However, she would probably argue, the Revolution failed the test of 
establishing a political order on the basis of political freedom because the 
Iranian Republic assumes to be rising on the grounds of an ‘absolute truth’ and 
it attempts at regulating the political and social life in line with the dictates of 
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that ‘absolute truth’. It does not promote plurality and the expression of 
individual opinions, hence cannot establish freedom.
133
  
For Foucault, however, no political order can establish freedom, to put it 
more correctly: every political order enables freedom in the form of agency. As 
I have shown, in the western context each subject is located within a power 
matrix and is an active agent of it. Thus, he contributes to the functioning and 
reproduction of power. Like Arendt for Foucault, freedom is different from 
liberation and it is praxis as well. It is something experienced, enjoyed, tried, 
succeeded or failed. The practice of liberation relates to aesthetics rather than 
morality or science. The enterprise of working on freedom takes the private 
sphere at its center and starts from there. Any revolution that breaks out within 
this context, for Foucault is a peculiar thing to be understood, examined for the 
possibility of acquiring a different vision on politics. Different from Arendt, 
therefore, Foucault does not locate freedom in the moment of founding an 
order. He would probably argue that Arendt, in her final insistence on the 
necessity of an establishment of an order for a revolution to be successful, 
locates herself within the camp that fears from revolution. For him, in modern 
societies we are beyond revolutions. Revolutions are not possible anymore. In 
this context, modern individuals are left with the choice of pursuing critique, 
that itchy feeling they have when they encounter with the authorities that tell 
them how to live like that, diet, exercise, love and die like that. That disturbing 
                                               
133 For Norma Morruzzi, the Iranian Green Movement, which emerged after the controversial 
presidential elections in 2009 can be considered as a form of political action Arendtian theory 
would approve. The massive, peaceful, marches across the major cities were coherent in their 
presentation of a collective political agency and albeit being silent they expressed a very clear 
message with a multiple, single voice: “Where is my vote?” See, Norma Moruzzi. 2011. 
Reading Arendt in Iran/ Reading Iran through Arendt: Speech, Action and the Question of 
Street Politics. Paper presented at Bilkent University, September. 
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little voice that asks “how not to be governed like that?” is the mood of the 
critical attitude. The European modernity had exhausted its resources for a 
revolutionary spirit largely and it, therefore, has become archaic like the sewing 
machines he had come across in the bazaar in Iran.. 
It is against this background, he evaluates the Iranian Revolution as the 
emergence of “political spirituality” that has been forgotten in the western 
contexts. The desire for conducting a life with reference to Islam, on the other 
hand, is a desire to renew an entire existence. This is what makes Islam and the 
revolt revolutionary in his eyes. This is the irreducible will to revolt Foucault 
likes to embrace. He embraces it without knowing its direction or final 
destination. This is the ambivalent attitude he defends in his Kant seminars and 
envisions as the role of the intellectual.  
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CHAPTER IX 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 Ethnic, religious conflicts, violent outbursts, and civil and international 
wars have been taking place in many parts of world causing many deaths, 
casualties, damages and sorrows. The need for reflection on violence is due to 
the increased scale of the impairments it brings, grief it causes so that ways of 
reducing it can be searched and implemented.  
 The aim of this dissertation has been to understand the relationship 
between violence and politics in political theory. Such a project is necessary 
because despite a growing number of studies on the topic of violence, I think 
neither the existing empirical research nor debates that dwell on the denotative 
or connotative aspects of the term violence can solely settle questions of “What 
is the relationship between violence and the politics?” Is violence an intrinsic 
feature of politics or is it outside of it? What counts as violence what counts 
not? What counts as political violence? Is it possible to view violence as an 
instrument in politics? Is it possible to justify the use of violence in politics? Is 
it possible to make a distinction between different forms of violence? Is there a 
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difference between violence, force or terror? Is it possible to develop a critique 
of violence? Can we oppose violence and if so on what grounds? 
In order to find answer to these questions I have surveyed some of the 
contemporary political theories. I have labeled the task undertaken as a 
‘critique’ of the existing literature on the relation between violence and politics. 
With the concept of critique, I imply a way of thinking and elaborating on an 
issue by reviewing existing perspectives, analyzing and sorting them, 
comparing and finally passing a judgment.   
 Three chapters outlined three approaches on the relationship between 
violence and politics in the literature: “the liberal-democratic paradigm”, the 
critique of the liberal approach that views “violence as a constitutive force in 
politics” and the “position of ambivalence”.  
 The liberal-democratic approach is the major paradigm in the literature 
and the dominant political discourse in contemporary world in the 
understanding of violence and politics. Constructing politics on the basis of 
reason, mutual agreement and the exclusion of conflict, this paradigm considers 
violence as an irrational, exceptional, apolitical and abnormal phenomenon. I 
have reviewed Habermas and Rawls’s theories as examples of the liberal-
democratic paradigm. I have shown that in Rawlsian theory violence is seen as 
a problem of those who are blinded by comprehensive doctrines and those who 
lack virtues of civility. In Habermas, violence is seen as a product of the 
disruption of communication channels. Although Habermas may seem to 
acknowledge a structural link between political order and violence, his theory I 
have argued, does not pay attention to the analysis of structural (socio-
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economic, historical, political) factors that contribute to the distortion of 
communication channels in the beginning.  
 Within this framework, I have argued that the liberal-democratic 
approach treats violence as an issue of private, social or cultural sphere and in 
therapeutic terms. The problem of violence against women, for instance, can be 
considered as a problem of aggressive men or as a cultural malady victimizing 
women and threatening their individual human rights. The legal framework 
aims at reducing the damages of violence by punishing the perpetrators, by 
providing protection to the victims and finally by creating awareness on the 
unacceptability of violence against women. The issue is never considered 
politically, however. The patriarchal structure that defines gender roles, 
constructs unequal gender relations, and produces mechanisms that sustain and 
reproduce such relations and gendered practices is usually left intact. We have 
seen that this is the case in the issue of terrorism. Hence, the relationship 
between violence and politics is non-problematized.  This non-problematization 
extends to the topic of coercive function of the state. While state’s monopoly 
over violence is assumed legitimate and within the framework of law and 
justice, the problems occurred in reality such as police violence are usually 
neglected or again marginalized in political debates. The liberal-democratic 
approach denies other rationalities expressed in forms that are not recognized by 
the political order and overlook its trespasses such as tortures or state inflicted 
violence.  
The critiques raised by Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Frantz Fanon 
and Slavoj Žižek attack these points. Schmitt’s theory of decisionism underlines 
the ever-present possibility of violence in politics and argues that the threat of 
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violence engenders the vitality of the political. Benjamin’s analysis of the law, 
again, asserts violence to be inherent to any political order. Both the act of 
founding and the act of the preservation of law include violence. In an attempt 
to overcome violence in politics, Benjamin proposes an appeal to divine sources 
and asks for a pure and final violence. Frantz Fanon’s attack on western 
humanism points out the violent functioning of western reason in colonial 
context. His theory aims at exposing the destructive nature of colonial politics at 
the physical and psychological levels of the native people. Like Benjamin, 
Fanon aims at eliminating existing relationship between violence and politics 
and he proposes the solution to be a revolutionary and emancipatory anti-
colonial violence. Slavoj Žižek’s critique of the contemporary discourse on 
violence and terror too points out the necessity of thinking about the systemic 
violence inherent to the current political and economic system. Nothing is 
personal, cultural or private in Žižek’s account and everything is related to the 
reproduction of the capitalist political and economic system; hence 
overthrowing of it can be done either via massive violence or total withdrawal.  
As a result, the critique of the liberal-democratic paradigm emphasizes 
the link between politics and violence in structural or even ontological terms. 
Except Schmitt who treats ever present possibility of violence necessary for the 
dynamicity and vitality of politics, theorists of the second position would like to 
overcome the existing affinity of two. The process of overcoming, however, 
calls for violence and this violence is not problematized rather promoted and at 
times celebrated for its emancipatory impact.  
It is against this background, I have argued that the liberal-democratic 
approach and its critique have something in common: they both offer analytic 
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distinctions between what count as violence and what not and whether violence 
has a place in politics or not. Their conceptualization of the relationship 
between violence and politics are in the form of necessary propositions; hence 
is a postulate of reason (a priori). For Habermas and Rawls the definition of 
politics excludes violence (by naming certain types apolitical or anti-political in 
nature and by naming one type of violence as the legal use of force).  In Schmitt 
and Benjamin, violence is included within the definition of politics. For Fanon 
and Žižek, violence is structurally present within politics and necessarily 
defended for the destruction of politics. They do not offer a critique of their own 
conceptualizations. The liberal-democratic approach does not conceptualize 
something like state violence or can suggest a link between violence against 
women and political structure. The critique raised by the illiberal thinkers like 
Schmitt and Fanon rejects labeling destructive violence as violence. I have to 
note that I think both of the theories successfully address the questions I have 
raised in the beginning of the dissertation: “What is violence and what is not? 
Does violence have a place in politics or not?” Yet, their responses to the 
questions are necessary propositions meaning that we have to choose either one 
or the other as true and take an a priori stand—being for or against political 
violence.  
As I have stated in the introduction, exclusion of violence from the 
political sphere as it has been promoted by the liberal-democratic approach 
seems naïve and limited in the world we live in. With this, I do not denounce 
pacifism or reject the ethical preference of non-violence. Yet, I would like to 
take note the apolitical attitude hinted at the expression of “being against all 
forms of violence” that rejects facing the reality of violence and the message it 
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is transmitting to us.  A very legitimate cry for 9/11, when formulated as a 
question asking “why do they hate us so much?” closes the door for discussing 
the event politically (Butler, 2002c: 177). When the relationship between 
violence and politics is read with reference to abstract concepts or universal 
norms without having any reference to the social and historical reality its 
meaning can be interpreted differently that the intended one. We can condemn 
perpetrators of violence, label them as irrational people and feel comfortable 
about ourselves by thinking about ourselves as ‘civilized’, ‘peaceful’ and 
‘innocent’ people but the  social, economic or political mechanisms that lead to 
the emergence of violence would not change as long as we do not question 
them. As Judith Butler (2002c: 177) pointed out, “the cry that ‘there is no 
excuse for September 11’ has become a means by which to stifle any serious 
public discussion of how U.S. foreign policy has helped to create a world in 
which such acts of terror are possible.” Questions like “why do they hate us?” 
or “what is wrong with them?” defer the responsibility of facing the historicity 
of violence and its relation to politics.   
I have also asserted that the discourse commonly used by resistance 
movements that reject the evaluation of their acts as violence (defined or 
applied by the system) should not go without criticism. Any relationship 
between violence and politics must be questioned in its context and any type of 
determinism in action or in theory should be resisted. The ‘necessary 
propositions’ that end up with the formal exclusion of violence from the 
political or that makes violence the only way to change some things in politics 
fail to understand violence in politics or politics in violence in a context and in 
terms of its message. 
293 
 
After outlining main arguments of the two approaches, I have introduced 
the third approach, which I call as the “position of ambivalence.” This 
approach, I argue can be characterized by its recognition of the relationship 
between violence and politics. By accepting that violence can be an aspect of 
politics as it can be an aspect of every form of relationship, it aims investigating 
its emergence or sustenance. Violence is understood as a rational and 
communicative phenomenon and as a means for reaching political ends.  The 
critical engagement with violence and politics denotes analyzing dynamics and 
rationalities present in specific contexts. Available knowledge, beliefs and 
assumptions on violence and politics are studied to understand how they define 
and produce the relationship between the two. Practices and institutions, which 
contribute to the production, transformation or termination of political violence, 
are also considered.  
My argument is that works of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault can 
be considered as exemplary figures of the position of ambivalence. My will to 
juxtapose the two thinkers derive from a theoretical concern they share and I 
found valuable for this project. Theoretical reflection understood as a ‘critique’ 
of certain practices, beliefs and relations is significant for both and the way they 
treat it differs from the figures I have reviewed in the discussion on the 
relationship between violence and politics.   
For Arendt, the faculty of thinking is distinct from the faculty of 
cognition and the two are related with reason and intellect respectively (Arendt, 
1981: 57). The desire to know and the need for reason are two different 
impulses; one is looking for certain, essential, irrefutable answers, the other 
opens up the possibility of imagination, interpretation and judgment. In 
294 
 
Arendt’s opinion, thinking is political by implication since it destroys values, 
theories, and even convictions. It might not be possible to uphold the benefits of 
thinking but it is still possible to show the effects of non-thinking, which 
historically has been proved by the experiences of Nazism and Stalinism. To the 
question “how one could possibly commit evil?” Arendt responds that it is 
possible with the “absence of thought.” In the absence of thinking, people can 
be easily manipulated by more general structures. Conviction to values does not 
prevent assimilation; rather, it paves the way for it. Thinking, as Arendt 
conceives it receives its importance from its capability of questioning the 
values, beliefs and truth claims. Its significance lies in its potential to challenge, 
disrupt, and transform the existing order. Although the piece on Judgment was 
not complete by the time she passed away, we know that she wanted to 
construct a theory of judgment which is politically relevant—not derived from 
universal laws or imperatives rather is based on particular, subjective positions 
that can be shared with others.  
A similar concern can be found in Foucault’s works. He emphasizes the 
role of thinking since it enables questioning our relationship with ourselves, the 
world and with others. With a particular attention to the historical contexts, to 
the power mechanisms and power relations it is possible to understand the 
conditions that delineate our limits of knowledge. “Thought is freedom in 
relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, 
establishes it as an object, and reflects it as a problem” (Foucault, 1984: 388). In 
his late writings when he delivered several lectures on Kant’s text, ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’ Foucault locates himself within the Kantian critical tradition, 
which, for him, from the nineteenth century on presented and developed solely 
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as the ‘analytics of truth’. Another kind of critical interrogation that derives 
from the Kantian thinking is asking for the meaning of the present, trying to 
locate the self in a historical context to understand the conditions that produced 
that context and wonder about the possibilities of transformation, the ‘ontology 
of the present.’ What differentiates the question of “what is our present” from 
an analytics of truth is our awareness of being constituted by our history, and 
the attitude, which permanently questions our relationship with ourselves, with 
others and with authority. For Foucault this “mode of relating to contemporary 
reality”; this “way of thinking and feeling”; “acting and behaving”; “that at one 
and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself a task” is the 
attitude that he calls the ethos of Enlightenment.   
In order to dwell more on the possibilities of thoughts Arendt and 
Foucault invoke with regards to the relationship between violence and politics, I 
have examined their work and tried laying out the basic elements of the 
challenge they brought to the liberal-democratic approach and the illiberal-
radical view and their understanding of politics and violence. I have conducted 
the interrogation with a particular focus on power and revolution, two political 
phenomena linked to violence in the political theory literature.  Power, 
regardless of the way it is defined (either a form of domination or a collective 
force of a group) constitutes one of the major issues of politics. Furthermore, 
both Arendt and Foucault avoid reading politics from the lens of law, 
sovereignty and justice, thence power becomes the major notion to challenge 
the orthodox understanding of politics. Revolution, on the other hand, 
designates the constitution of a political order; it refers to the moment of the 
setting of the main parameters of a political order. The general tendency in the 
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literature is the association of revolution with violence and destruction. It is the 
experience and the knowledge of the French Revolution that led to the 
reflections on the problem of the handling of the possibility revolution, the 
construction and destruction of a given political order. That particular and 
historical event constituted a major case based on which universal lessons can 
be derived. Liberals interpreted it as chaos, try overcoming it by constructing 
politics around the notions of contract and consensus, and with an emphasis on 
order. Radicals, on the other hand, embraced contestation and change and aimed 
to sustain the revolutionary spirit. Revolution becomes an important issue for 
Arendt and Foucault for both wanted to deal with the question of being either 
for or against revolution. One of the ways of doing this was taking other 
historical examples and studying them either singly or in comparison with the 
primary example, the French Revolution. The intention was not to derive 
abstract assumptions or finding truths about human nature, politics or revolution 
but to understand the meaning of revolution.  
Foucault’s challenge comes from the historical analysis of the 
relationship between violence and politics. The direct and manifest relationship 
is replaced with non-violent, indirect yet subterranean networks of power 
relations. Foucauldian understanding of power points out the ever-present 
nature of power (ranging from relations with institutions to daily life 
interactions and to the self) and in that sense, represents a direct attack to the 
liberal premise of freedom and its exclusion of violence. Absence of violence 
does not mean freedom; the taming of violence within modern societies 
engendered establishment of normalizing institutions, disciplines and 
rationalities where subjectivities are continuously produced and regulated. The 
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argument that there is a historical relationship between violence and politics 
would side with thinkers like Schmitt and Benjamin.  Yet the point that the link 
is transformed and even weakened, violence is constituted at the margins of 
political order and that intermeshed power relations regulate the social, 
economic and political spheres, would defy the argument that violence is a force 
capable of a radical change. Foucauldian understanding of power suggests one 
should look for the possibilities of local resistances rather than massive 
revolutions.  
Arendt’s discussion of power and politics aims at assessing the faults she 
assesses in the political tradition as well. The link between violence and politics 
is not an ontological one for her; it was engendered by the rise of economic and 
social concerns and the introduction of instrumental rationality into politics and 
through hanging on the old beliefs about politics such as sovereignty.  Unlike 
Foucault Arendt provides a normative account of power by viewing it as a 
process of empowerment and as a product of empowerment. For her power is 
something that is produced, reproduced and transformed by the subjects as well. 
It is relational and collective. Power is a transient and fragile entity so formation 
of it and the implementation of a collective will is something that should be 
protected and promoted.  Yet still, one can argue that the link between violence 
and politics is kept not absented. If the liberal-democratic approach excludes 
violence from the political with the arguments of irrationality and marginality, 
Arendt locates it as constitutively outside of politics: the historical and political 
context of violence and politics is seen as mutually related and dependent. 
She recognizes possible causes for the emergence of violence in human 
relations or in history. Perception of injustice is one of the reasons of such 
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emergencies. Circumstances that offend people’s notions of justice or 
conditions that prevents argumentation or speech may lead to violent outbursts 
and these outbursts may have a therapeutic and restorative function. The 
strategic usage of violence within politics is again an understandable 
phenomenon for Arendt because in many instances violence can be an effective 
means in reaching the ends. It is swift, dramatic and effective. In terms of its 
impacts, violence has some resemblances with action as well: It operates as an 
unpredictable, at times expressive and disruptive force in human realm. The 
problem with is that it needs implements, functions within the framework 
instrumental rationality, destructive and is generally a silencing force. The 
circle of violence is a difficult to break and as long as the use of violence 
prolonged its justification becomes impossible. Arendt’s distinction between 
justification and legitimacy becomes an important criterion. Accordingly, 
justification implies understanding of the causal dynamics and the emergence of 
a certain event. Legitimacy, however, is a binding and bonding phenomenon 
and is related to power, people’s will of getting and acting together.  
Arendt’s comparison of the French Revolution with the American 
Revolution ends up with the judgment that the latter was successful in 
establishing a political order while the second failed and turned out to be a 
violent spectacle.  The mistakes in the initiation and interpretation of the French 
revolution were the emphasis on rupture and novelty, envisioning politics 
within the framework of technical knowledge and of biological sustenance. 
Violence was the result of the functioning of these dynamics not the revolution 
per se. For her, the meaning of a revolution does not lie in the intent of 
destruction but in the question of construction. Changes or beginnings should 
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aim being constructive and politically enabling. In her distinction between 
liberation and freedom, she passes her judgment on the link between violence 
and politics. Liberation, freeing oneself from domination may be violent and 
might be justified as well but it is pre-political. Acts including violent ones 
when they are bounded with necessities, instrumental reasoning, or reflexive 
judgments cannot be political actions. In that sense, she argues oppositions, 
liberation wars, acts of terror can be understood, morally justified yet cannot be 
legitimized.   
I have already argued that for Foucault revolution is a dim possibility if 
not a futile attempt considering his argument that underlines the intermeshed 
forms of power relations in modern societies. His ideas on the Iranian 
Revolution, therefore, are based on the implications of this argument but his 
motive was again to study the event in its singularity. The emphasis in the 
analysis was on the presence of a “political spirituality” that has been lacking in 
the western contexts and on the will to conduct a new form of life with 
reference to a rationality that radically differs from the one that had been ruling 
until then. Violence of the revolution was not problematized and may be even 
preferred by Foucault. This was, however, not in the form of an affirmation of 
violence either. Rather he expressed his fascination with the fearless 
confrontation with violence. In contrast to the disciplinary societies of the west, 
the massive and dramatic acts of the Iranians surprised him for its capability of 
a radical change. This was unexpected. The unexpectedness of the event is 
embraced by him with a curiosity and even enthusiasm and found expression in 
his actual writings. When the Iranian Revolution turned into a repressive regime 
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in the following years he voiced his concerns yet, I think, still hold on to the 
idea of being open to the possibility of revolution and of violence.   
 All in all, the position of ambivalence that suggests a contingent 
proposition with regards to the relationship between violence and politics 
proposes us to read violence to be an aspect of politics, as it is part of human 
life. It also proposes the link to be historical so that throughout the history it can 
be weakened or strengthened; at times violence becomes manifest, at times 
latent or even absent in politics. Accepting the historicity of the relationship 
requires us to study and analyze rationalities, power relations and other 
dynamics playing role not only in the production and in functioning of the 
relationship between violence and politics but also in the formation of our 
knowledges, conceptualizations and judgments. As Foucault has pointed out, 
definitions and interpretations, including the meaning of violence and politics 
are constituted in power/knowledge networks, and are, therefore, they are 
matters of contestation and struggle. Every violent event, therefore, can be seen 
as an invitation for the critique of its relation to politics. Violence in politics, as 
a moment of crisis can constitute a ground for critique of the epistemological 
and political order.  
 The position of ambivalence may also aim passing a judgment in the 
face of political violence. This judgment is a posteriori and can be either 
singular or generalizable. One can affirm the relationship between violence and 
politics at a particular time and reject it at another instance. Foucault’s 
nominalist and historicists account, exemplifies a unique judgment in the face 
of the Iranian Revolution. The criterion he used was the manifestation of 
critique in its radical form. Arendt’s historical analysis recognizes some forms 
301 
 
of violence as morally justified but she aims at going beyond critique. 
Therefore, she holds on to the phenomenological approach and judges violence 
in terms of its impact on politics.  
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